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 This dissertation is positioned at the intersection of philosophy, theology, and 
critical theory in order to explore the way early modern literature may be enlisted as a 
vehicle for a return to an ethically informed humanism, specifically with regard to how 
Western culture currently understands the contingent categories of “life” and “the 
human.” While a great deal of critical work is currently being marshaled in the field of 
biopolitics, scholarly focus continues to be placed on the materiality of the physical body, 
or what I term “biopolitical materialism.”  
What remains underexplored, however, is the reality that “life” and “the human” 
are deeply relational categories that should not be reduced to such material instances 
alone. Historically, and especially in the early modern period, “life” and “the human” are 
understood as interconnected and widely networked. Although such materialism indeed 
becomes solidified in the seventeenth-century, I seek to recuperate an ethical challenge to 
contemporary biopolitical materialism through an extended dialogue with early modern 
thinkers. By turning to works “in the Age of Shakespeare” I return attention to the 
originary epoch of what has been described as our “modern event horizon.” I argue that 
within the very historical period that gives rise to the practice of biopolitical materialism 
exists a rich textual archive of resistance to this troubling phenomenon in the form of 
neighborly concern and the acknowledgement of shared creaturely estate.  
Chapter One inaugurates my argument by turning to Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, 
reading as its central theme the tragic effect inherent to dissociating the individual from 
the community. The remaining three chapters attend to neighborly forms given 
expression in three of Shakespeare’s late plays: Chapter Two considers the potential 
ii 
 
political orientation of grace in Measure for Measure; Chapter Three positions 
neighborliness as a series of posthuman encounters in The Winter’s Tale; and Chapter 
Four explores an early modern understanding of hospitality as stewardship at work in 
Timon of Athens. I conclude by turning to philosophy and political theology in order to 
suggest a way to think “life” as an ethical relation with, in, and through “the Age of 
Shakespeare.”  
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If I am not for myself, then who will be for me? And if I 
am only for myself, then what am I? And if not now, when? 
—Rabbi Hillel, Babylonian Talmud 
 
 
It is proper to every gathering that the gatherers assemble to 
coordinate their efforts to the sheltering; only when they 
have gathered together with that end in view do they begin 
to gather. 





Biopolitics in the Age of Shakespeare 
 
 
If ethics without politics is empty, then politics without ethics is blind. 
—Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding 
 
[T]he theater is the political art par excellence; only there is the political sphere of 
human life transposed into art. By the same token, it is the only art whose sole 
subject is man in his relationship to others. 
—Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
 
 “Biopolitics in the Age of Shakespeare” offers a supplemental narrative to new 
historicist and cultural materialist understandings of early modern English literature and 
culture.
1
 Its readings eschew the now commonplace critical-theoretical binaries of 
subject/object and subversion/containment in favor of a wider discourse of networks, 
plurality, and ethics. In short, this dissertation reads within “the Age of Shakespeare” an 
argument for the human condition conceived of as a relational experience, the shared 
phenomenology of creaturely estate, rather than as an autonomous and objectifiable 
subjectivity. 
 As its title suggests, the target of my approach falls under the theoretical heading 
of biopolitics. Each chapter defines and situates its particular biopolitical terms in 
passing, yet to broadly summarize, biopolitics marks the incorporation of biological life 
into the apparatus of the state. Put simply, biopolitics is the political management of life 
in all of its lexical nuances: human, animal, environmental, pre- and post-mortem. The 
work of Michel Foucault and his theoretical descendants, particularly Italian political 
                                                 
1 For an extended argument against such “essentialist materialism” in Shakespearean criticism, see Graham 
Bradshaw, Misrepresentations: Shakespeare and the Materialists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
A representative overview of new historicist and cultural materialist readings of Shakespeare is collected in 
Materialist Shakespeare: A History, ed. Ivo Kamps (New York: Verso, 1995). 
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theorist Giorgio Agamben, locates the birth of modern biopolitics in the West in the 
seventeenth-century near the close of the Renaissance, especially as it is articulated in the 
Hobbesian political theology of the Leviathan (1651).
2
 In the chapters that follow I argue 
that the West’s biopolitical crises, in their varied early modern and modern iterations, 
arise from materialist thinking. This is not to disparage materialism wholesale, but rather 
to articulate a particular crisis in material thought: the instrumentalization of life.  
Just as Foucault and Agamben trace the origins of Western biopolitics to the 
seventeenth-century, Martin Heidegger and Claude Lévi-Strauss similarly map the 
emergence of modern Western instrumental thinking to the early modern period, 
especially in the scientific rationalism of seventeenth-century thinkers such as Francis 
Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Isaac Newton.
3
 The effect of instrumental thinking on the 
politics of life is to render what Foucault terms biopower. Following Foucault, biopower 
operates in two distinct yet interrelated strains. In its first iteration the body is treated as a 
machine, understood in terms of production and economic use and managed by various 
state apparatuses such as the military, public education, and private employment. For 
Foucault the second form of biopower centers on the reproductive capacity of life and 
how this might be leveraged best to statistical advantage (e.g. birth/death rates and 
population control as espoused under the ideology of the sanctity of life). Further, in its 
                                                 
2 The bibliography here is extensive. On the origins of such theorization, see Michel Foucault, The History 
of Sexuality, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978), especially the section entitled “The 
Right of Death and the Power over Life,” 133-60. Agamben builds upon Foucault’s framework by 
emphasizing the Aristotelian precedent in Western biopolitical thinking relative to the Greek terms for life, 
bios and zoe. See, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford: Meridian, 1998). These texts, along with Hobbes’ Leviathan, are taken up more fully in 
Chapter 2. 
3 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977), 22; Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
Myth and Meaning (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 6. 
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most egregious form biopolitics operates as thanatopolitics, the management of death 
itself, as demonstrated by the work of Timothy Campbell, Roberto Esposito, and Achille 
Mbembe.
4
 I would stress, however, the degree to which materialist thinking as 
instrumentalization comports as political practice, whether over life or death.   
 Christopher Breu has located a lacuna within the overlapping fields of biopolitical 
theory, materialist theory, and political economics. In a recent call to action he writes,  
Yet as powerful as biopolitics and thanatopolitics are as concepts…they need to 




Breu takes up his own call by turning to the experimental literature of the late twentieth-
century.
6
 I explore this critical gap and also theorize its potential by turning to literature 
“in the Age of Shakespeare,” roughly speaking that of the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. This archive is both precursor to and concomitant with the rise of biopolitical 
and instrumental thinking previously established in the seventeenth-century. As such “the 
Age of Shakespeare” offers a productive textual and temporal locus from which to think 
both materiality and political economy otherwise. The chapters that follow posit a 
networked materiality attended to and enjoined by the spiritual emphasis still widely 
resonant in the early modern thought of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
Plays by Marlowe and Shakespeare, as well as poetry, sermons, conduct manuals and 
                                                 
4 Timothy Campbell, Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Robert Esposito, Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy, 
trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Achille Mbembe, 
“Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15.1 (2003): 11-40.  
5 Christopher Breu, “The Insistence of the Material: Theorizing Materiality and Biopolitics in the Era of 
Globalization,” Working Paper 12/2 (Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, 2012), 
http://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/institute-on-globalization-and-the-human-condition/documents/IGHC-
WPS_12-2_Breu.pdf, Accessed 15 July, 2014, 9. Breu has extended his treatment of these ideas in 
Insistence of the Material: Literature in the Age of Biopolitics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2014).  
6 Breu, Insistence of the Material. 
xii 
 
other literature of the age are read for their religious relief. I use this term intentionally in 
its sense of prominence and contrast, as well as to suggest deliverance from oppression 
by the arrival of a substitute or replacement.
7
  
Throughout its chapters this dissertation renders materiality in terms of political 
theology, particularly in religion’s etymological carriage as religare, a site of communal 
binding (re-ligature) that bears ethical force. Julia Reinhard Lupton intuits that to 
conceive of religion in its aspect as religare is “to acknowledge moments of radical 
interdependence: of each human on other humans, of the human on the creaturely, and of 
secular writing on sacred writing.”8 Political theology in this sense is phenomenological 
encounter; it is the call of the other in proximal closeness to oneself, a politics of 
dwelling in lived nearness. My political-theological through-line in this dissertation is 
one well-worn in the spiritual writing of the Renaissance: Thou shalt love thy neighbour 
as thyself.
9
 Whether in the globalized world of first-century Palestine or the emergent 
market economy and empire of the early modern period with its similarly globalizing 
cast, the question that follows this divine injunction remains equally relevant and 
resonant, then and now: And who is my neighbour?
10
  
Each of this project’s four chapters takes up an aspect of neighborliness through 
early modern example, whether attending to the tragic dissociation of the individual from 
the community in Marlowe’s Faustus, the consideration of grace as a potential 
                                                 
7 OED, s.v. “relief.” 
8 Julia Reinhard Lupton, “The Wizards of Uz: Shakespeare and the Book of Job,” in Shakespeare and 
Religion: Early Modern and Postmodern Perspectives, eds. Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 180. 
9 Mk. 12:31 and Lev. 19:18; all biblical citations here follow the King James Version. On the Great 
Commandment in its Pauline theological cast, see Rom. 13:8-10. 
10 Lk. 10:29. 
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orientation for political restructuring in Measure for Measure, posthuman others as 
neighbors in The Winter’s Tale, or the early modern call to enact hospitality as 
stewardship in Timon of Athens.  
As an instance of political theology the divine command toward neighbor love is 
plural in its operation and intertextual in its calling, existing simultaneously in inscription 
and application as Hebrew and Greek, Jewish and Christian, ancient and modern. More 
importantly, this spiritual fiat is intended to be neither empty theology nor idealized 
theory; material action is required: Thou shalt. Working from this political-theological 
trajectory, political economy is similarly rethought in each of the dissertation’s four 
chapters along the vector of religare as a spiritual economy espousing the care of and for 
others, whether human, animal, environmental, or object in orientation.  
 
THE AGE OF SHAKESPEARE 
 
 In his preface to the First Folio (1623), Ben Jonson famously opined that 
Shakespeare is “not of an age, but for all time.” My readings take Shakespeare, and at 
times his contemporaries, to be equally atemporal. As Jonathan Gil Harris has shown, 
matter in the time of Shakespeare proves itself to be rather untimely.
11
 This is of course 
not to disavow a discernible likeness to or traceable origin of the modern West in the 
early modern period with its rise of the Market, proliferation of new technologies and 
access to information, as well as its rapid urban development at the expense of the rural.
12
 
                                                 
11 Jonathan Gil Harris, Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
12 On the rise of the Market in the early modern period and its after effects see Richard Halpern, The 
Poetics of Primitive Accumulation: English Renaissance Culture and the Genealogy of Capital (Ithaca: 
xiv 
 
Nevertheless, Shakespeare is equally coterminous with pressing issues today. As W.H. 
Auden once remarked, works of art read us; “if the plays do read us, they can help us to 
historicize our present.”13 The book culture of Renaissance Studies certainly corroborates 
such a position with its recent production of Shakespeares that espouse a bard invested in 
posthuman, eco-critical, and animal-minded discourse to name but a few theoretical 
trends in academe’s contemporary Zeitgeist.14  
In order to alleviate anxieties that may arise upon charges of anachronism or 
presentism I defer to Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes, who concede that  
we can never, finally, evade the present. And if it’s always and only the present 
that makes the past speak, it speaks always and only to—and about—ourselves. It 
follows that the first duty of credible presentist criticism must be to acknowledge 
that the questions we ask of any literary text will inevitably be shaped by our own 
concerns, even when these include what we call ‘the past.’ The irony which that 
situation generates constitutes a fruitful, necessary and inescapable aspect of any 
text’s being. Perhaps it’s the basis of the only effective purchase on Shakespeare 
that we’re able to make.15  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cornell University Press, 1991); and David Hawkes, The Culture of Usury in Renaissance England (New 
York: Palgrave, 2010). Regarding the use of Shakespeare relative to American political economy, see 
Michael Bristol, Shakespeare’s America, America’s Shakespeare (New York: Routledge, 1990). On the 
rise of technology in the early modern period, see Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making 
of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); Adam Max Cohen, Technology and the 
Early Modern Self (New York: Palgrave, 2009); and Jonathan Sawday, Engines of the Imagination: 
Renaissance Culture and the Rise of the Machine (New York: Routledge, 2007). For an overview of the 
shift from rural to urban development in the Renaissance see Halpern, Poetics of Primitive Accumulation, 
61-102; and Hawkes, Culture of Usury, 106-14.  
13 Bradshaw, Misrepresentations, 2. For a similar argument by Frederic Jameson see, “Radicalizing Radical 
Shakespeare: The Permanent Revolution in Shakespeare Studies,” in Materialist Shakespeare: A History, 
ed. Ivo Kamps, 320-28 (New York: Verso, 1995).   
14 Posthumanist Shakespeares, eds. Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus (New York: Palgrave, 2012); 
Ecocritical Shakespeare, eds. Lynn Bruckner and Dan Brayton (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011). 
Representative works on Shakespeare and animal studies include Bruce Boehrer, Shakespeare Among the 
Animals: Nature and Society in the Drama of Early Modern England (New York: Palgrave, 2002); and 
Laurie Shannon, The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2013). 
15 Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes, introduction to Presentist Shakespeares, eds. Grady and Hawkes 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 5. 
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Sharon O’Dair puts it this way: “one might fruitfully suggest—and I will do so now—
that, for all its hauteur, historicist Shakespeare rides on the back of presentist 
Shakespeare.”16 Although this project is historicist in nature, it is presentist in its desire to 
think with Shakespeare and early modern literature more broadly.
17
 That is, it thinks the 
past and present in tandem with an eye toward the ways the two may inform and enhance 
an understanding of both. Thus, for the purposes of this project I use Shakespeare to trace 
the confluence of biopolitical thought across what we tend to recognize (periodize) as 
“early modern” and “modern.”18  
 My methodology in large part follows the “Religious Turn” in early modern 
literary criticism.
19
 The approach I take to political theology is equally informed by what 
has come to be termed “New Perspectives on Paul” in religious studies and continental 
philosophy.
20
 Both are enhanced by critical theory and read religion broadly and Pauline 
theology specifically as sites of resistance to supersessionist narratives where Christianity 
replaces Judaism, Protestantism supersedes Catholicism, and the secular overrides the 
sacred. As recent scholarship demonstrates, the religious atmosphere of the early modern 
                                                 
16 Sharon O’Dair, “Is it Shakespearean Ecocriticism if it isn’t Presentist?” in Ecocritical Shakespeare, eds. 
Lynne Bruckner and Dan Brayton (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 73. 
17 In this aspect I follow Julia Reinhard Lupton’s example, see Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on 
Politics and Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
18 On modern/early modern as a false dichotomy, see Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. 
Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Regarding the problematic aspects of 
periodization in Renaissance Studies, see Jonathan Gil Harris, “Shakespeare After 5/11,” in Shakespeare 
After 9/11: How a Social Trauma Reshapes Interpretation, eds. Douglas A. Brooks et al. (New York: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 153-59.  
19 Texts in this sub-field are vast and wide ranging. For a general overview of the field in its emergent state, 
see the oft-cited review essay by Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti, “The Turn to Religion in Early Modern 
English Studies,” Criticism 46.1 (2004): 167-90. 
20 A survey of this movement relative to Shakespeare studies is provided by Julia Reinhard Lupton in her 
review essay, “The Pauline Renaissance: A Shakespearean Reassessment,” The European Legacy 15.2 
(2010): 215-20. My engagement with Faustus in Chapter 1 takes up the impress of Paul on early modern 
and contemporary political thought, see especially n.20. 
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period is simply too diverse to be reduced to such antiquated and linear narratives.
21
 
Instead these respective religious turns emphasize the interconnectivity and 
interdependence of the human experience within the wider networks of our personal, 
social, and political encounters.  
My archival choices reflect this emphasis. Marlowe’s Faustus opens my 
engagement with “the Age of Shakespeare,” in part due to its historical situatedness at the 
opening of the sixteenth-century stage but primarily because of what I read as its concern 
for communal association. Shakespeare’s late plays—Measure for Measure, The Winter’s 
Tale, and Timon of Athens—form the core archive of my Renaissance dramatic texts. My 
interest in these plays arises from their religious nature and ethical charge. As I read and 
re-read these late works I continue to encounter Shakespeare the man, the mortal man, 
looking back on life as one is wont to do near the end. Perhaps not unlike the writer of 
Ecclesiastes, the Shakespeare of these late plays pens dramatic encounters that challenge 
audiences, and perhaps even his younger self, to conceive of life otherwise than 
autonomous investment. The human condition is written here as an array of ethical and 
deeply relational engagements, religious in the sense of religare, a moral binding of 
oneself to others in our collective human drama.   
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that the tapestry of my early modern 
analysis is equally stitched through with Heideggerian thread. Heidegger took as his 
philosophical project nothing less than the destruktion of the binary thinking he viewed 
as underwriting Western philosophy (and subsequently politics). Heidegger’s 
methodology seeks to rescue Western thought from such dyadic opposition by advocating 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Harris, Untimely Matter; Julia Reinhard Lupton, Citizen Saints: Shakespeare and 
Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); and Political Theology and Early 
Modernity, eds. Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).   
xvii 
 
thinking as a practice of openness to plurality with an eye toward care and indebtedness. 
This is especially true of his later writings. Heidegger and his descendants, though 
writing from a distinctly twentieth- and twenty-first century vantage, provide both helpful 
terminology and critical perspective from which to approach Western biopolitical crises, 
then and now. The chapters that follow thus borrow from Martin Heidegger, Simon 
Critchley, Emmanuel Lévinas,
22
 Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze,
23
 
and Jacques Derrida in order to approach their respective thinking with “the Age of 
Shakespeare.” 
Chapter One turns to Faustus in order to argue that the crisis of Western 
biopolitics arises from instrumental materialist thinking. Biopolitics, in this sense, is 
understood as materialist polity. Reading Marlowe against an established critical grain, I 
argue that his use of early modern discourses on magic as well as the play’s religious 
investment advocates a conception of selfhood relative to communal attachment rather 
than the long-recognized model of the autonomous modern individual that emerges on 
the historical scene from the Renaissance world stage. The second chapter reads Measure 
for Measure as a specifically biopolitical play in order to suggest that Shakespeare’s 
Vienna is a theatrical proving ground for the practice of grace as a form of political 
mediation and remediation, a corrective to Angelo’s absolutist thanatopolitics. Chapter 
Three engages Shakespearean political life in its posthuman turns as animals, 
environments, and objects in The Winter’s Tale. The play’s resurrection theme, I argue, 
                                                 
22 Though Lévinas is resistant to Heidegger’s philosophy for its lack of overt ethics, I nonetheless consider 
Lévinas engaged in Heideggerian thinking. See, for example, Lévinas’ responses to Heidegger’s opus 
Being and Time in his rejoining philosophical treatises Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998); and Totality and Infinity: An Essay on 
Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).     
23 On Deleuze as Heidegger’s most direct philosophical heir, see Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of 
Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
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prompts religious and philosophical consideration of the potential politics afforded by 
feminine plurality. The fourth and final chapter reads in Timon of Athens an early modern 
call for the practice of hospitality as stewardship and an alternate political economics as 
oikos-pneumatics, an inspirited economy concerned with the care of and for others 
through an investment in relational dwelling. In my concluding remarks I turn to the 
philosophy of Heidegger and Pauline Messianism in order to propose a way of thinking 
life differently with “the Age of Shakespeare.”    
The readings that follow position early modern plays at the intersection of new 
materialisms and scriptural ethics, and offer, I hope, a fresh perspective of approaching 
“the Age of Shakespeare” that is sustained by the themes of citizenship as stewardship 





Doctor Faustus, Phenomenology, and the Illusion of Materialism 
 
 
The basic error of all materialism in politics…is to overlook the inevitably with 
which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even 
when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material 
object.  
—Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
Who would not be proficient in this art?  
—Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, 1.3.29 
  
 
Idou ho anthrōpos.1 Behold the man. This well-known scriptural phrase from St. 
John is perhaps more readily discerned by its translation in the Vulgate, or Jerome’s 
Bible as it is referred to by Faustus, a text dismissed in passing during his infamous 
opening soliloquy. Ecce homo. Behold the man. Translation performs a type of lexical 
alchemy in its ability to transubstantiate word or concept from one state of being to 
another. Such transignification has the power to both occlude and illuminate meaning. 
The Latin ecce (behold) of John 19:5, for example, proves more telling in its precursive 
Greek iteration. Idou (behold), a conjugated form of the verb horaó, means to see, 
perceive, attend to, discern, experience.
2
 To “behold the man” is thus a Johannine 
invitation to experience human subjectivity by attending to phenomenological encounter.  
I use the term phenomenology to signify an “inquiry into the conditions of human 
appearing,” one whose concern is the human subject as its point of reference, “but often 
within an arena constituted by the attentive presence of other people as well as the draw 
                                                 
1 All references to New Testament Greek cite Eberhard Nestle, Greek New Testament (London: British and 
Foreign Bible Society, 1904). Bible citations in English follow the King James Version unless otherwise 
noted. For the sake of textual consistency with other early modern English texts cited herein, Hebrew Bible 
references use the KJV Old Testament translations.  
2 James L. Strong, The New Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 
1990), s.v. horaó. 
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of things.”3 I argue that in Doctor Faustus Marlowe scripts not a Cartesian 
phenomenology premised on radical doubt and the indubitability of the individual self, 
but a communal phenomenology not unlike that of Job’s silent friends who sit shivah at 
his time of utter nakedness and abjection.
4
 In this biblical drama although Job is not dead 
he is attended as though he were. In Faustus Marlowe stages our encounter with his 
eponymous character in similar fashion, ensuring that we too, like Job’s attendants, sit 
shivah in silent witness to a man’s tragic fall from grace. The phenomenological 
encounter of Job 2:13 is literally rendered in the Hebrew as yashab, to dwell with. The 
medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides defines yashab in his Guide for the Perplexed 
(1204) as a state of remaining constant in one’s proximal relationships, whether in 
consistent relation to God or one’s fellow man.5 To invoke this chapter’s primary 
theoretical interlocutor Martin Heidegger, yashab is a state of dwelling-with, which is to 
say living in relational care for and proximity to others. It is such proximity to which I 
will turn attention in Marlowe’s Faustus. Its Prologue concludes and thus Marlowe’s play 
begins with an idou ho anthrōpos, an invitation to think phenomenologically as we attend 
to “this the man that in his study sits” (l. 28).6 
                                                 
3 Julia Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 15. I have borrowed Lupton’s definition of phenomenology in large part because of 
its Heideggerian associations, particularly as the draw of both people and things, from which I draw upon 
in this chapter. Heidegger proposes such phenomenological interconnectivity in his essay “Building 
Dwelling Thinking,” a text to which I turn in Chapter 4. This through-line in Heideggerian thought, 
however, is manifest in “The Question Concerning Technology” and “Letter on Humanism,” my central 
Heidegger texts for the present argument.  
4 In the Jewish tradition sitting shivah is a seven day ritual of mourning, a communal sitting with (yashab, 
literally “dwelling with”), observed to honor the dead and help the mourner deal with his or her loss.   
5 Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedländer (London: Routledge, 1919), 23. 
The 1204 parenthetical date give above references the date of publication for The Guide’s first translation 
into Hebrew from its original Arabic. 
6 Christopher Marlowe, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, in English Renaissance Drama: A Norton 
Anthology, ed. David Bevington et al. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 250-85. All quotations from 
Faustus follow this A-text edition. Variations between the A and B texts do not significantly affect my 
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What does it mean to behold the man? To behold Faustus, I contend, is to witness 
the human condition in tragic isolation. For Faustus ever shuns the community of human 
contact for the contractual promise of magic’s power, an illusion that is only delivered 
when one is divorced from true community. Such is the Faustian script. The individual 
self, I argue, is precisely what Marlowe casts under doubt in his Tragical History of 
Doctor Faustus. I propose that through Faustus’ tragical history Marlowe stages a critical 
moment in the history of Western thought as it began to conceive of the self, tragically, as 
autonomous, commodifiable, and objectifiable. And although these specific terms do not 
appear in Jacob Burckhardt’s The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860), this 
watershed text pens the narrative of Renaissance individualism as the birth of the modern 
individual. Burckhardt’s is a story of human autopoiesis. By his telling the autonomous 
self arrives onto the world stage during the early modern period; this is an objectified self 
to be sure (indeed the highest object of human study), what Stephen Greenblatt will later 
describe as a self-fashioning individual.
7
 
This chapter argues that such a thesis, like magic, is an illusion. This illusion 
operates variously in its performances as theatrical, critical-theoretical, and political 
sleight of hand. Its misdirection centers power in the individual and thus ever positions 
personhood as a site of potential use. In Faustus, I suggest, Marlowe leverages both early 
modern English discourse on witchcraft as well as scriptural references well-known in the 
period to emphasize personhood relative to the shared human experience of creaturely 
life rather than as an autonomous, materialist selfhood. Faustus read in this way is thus a 
                                                                                                                                                 
argument regarding the illusion of Renaissance individualism, thus my citations in this chapter follow the 
more widely canonized A-text. 
7 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984). 
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warning against such (mis)use of the human condition. This tension, I will show, 
manifests itself in a particular Faustian material locus, the contract, or more specifically, 
the differentiation between contracts and covenants, law (nomos) and spirit (pneuma). I 
thus begin my engagement with “the Age of Shakespeare” in an intentionally Marlovian 
turn, for there is perhaps no better early modern text to situate the problem of what I am 
calling materialist thinking (or the illusion of materialism) than Marlowe’s Faustus.  
My reading of the play diverges necessarily from the popular account of Faustus 
as the Marlovian overreacher and secular hero. Yet Marlowe’s argument in Doctor 
Faustus, as I read it, is no less a radical tragedy. I will return to this point in due time. 
Before I do so, it is helpful to first chart a particular genealogy of “radical” thinking. The 
term radical is derived from the Latin radix, root. Jonathan Dollimore’s Radical Tragedy, 
now in its third edition reissue, perhaps best locates the radix or root of what I engage in 
this dissertation as the problem of materialism. Dollimore’s insightful and influential 
reading of early modern subjectivity is uncompromisingly Marxist, which is to say 
materialist. For Marx, and the cultural materialists like Dollimore who follow in his 
wake, selfhood arises from the material conditions of social reality, not the other way 
around. To be clear, I do not intend to dismiss the importance of the material conditions 
of daily living. However, under materialism as I describe it here, when attention is 
repeatedly turned to things, to the material artifacts of living, over time life itself becomes 
understood as a material artifact. Put another way, when phenomenology becomes 
materialist people become things.  
Instrumentalization and materialism are often inevitable bedfellows. Heidegger 
makes this point in his own reading of Marx where he praises “the Marxist view of 
5 
 
history [as] superior to that of other historical accounts,” precisely for its existential, 
which is to say phenomenological, concern for selfhood constituted by the attentive 
presence of other people as well as the draw of the things which form the tangled 
experience of day-to-day living.
8
 For Heidegger the problem lies neither with Marx nor 
his particular brand of materialism, but with the temptation of materialist thinking itself 
to lapse into instrumentalization. As Heidegger puts it, “[t]he essence of materialism is 
concealed in the essence of technology,” by which he means our modern inclination to 
instrumentalize.
9
 In Heideggerian parlance technology always signifies a mode of 
thinking. Yet rather than reveal the truth of Being, Heidegger argues, modern technology 
(all Western thought following Plato) occludes Being by perceiving humans, animals, the 
environment, and objects (the entire cast of life’s daily existential drama) as what he 
terms standing reserve. Defined in simple terms, standing reserve is use-value to be 
harnessed. Heidegger terms this instrumentalizing process a challenging-forth, the 
forceful channeling of human and non-human alike into objectified use. To give an initial 
example of this phenomena by way of Faustus, Helen is not a whole person but merely a 
face, one that famously “launched a thousand ships / And burnt the topless towers of 
Ilium” (5.1.90-91). Whether by Agamemnon, Menelaus, or Faustus, Helen is reduced to 
the standing reserve perceived in her political use-value. Her personhood is denied at the 
expense of challenging-forth what Foucault would call in his later work her biopower: 
Helen is the face that launched a thousand ships. 
                                                 
8 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray, 
ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), 243. 
9 Ibid., 243-44. 
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The biopolitical encounters with which this dissertation engages arise from the 
problem of perceiving selfhood as wholly material. Or rather, a material selfhood 
consigned to the operation of exploitative use. This chapter turns to Heidegger and his 
philosophical descendants Emmanuel Lévinas and Simon Critchley in order to 
conceptualize and articulate the problem of materialist thinking, particularly in its 
narrative of the autonomous individual subject, a narrative bearing dire consequences 
according to Marlowe’s Faustian account. Reading Doctor Faustus as a locus for such 
thought, this chapter also brings to the fore its Judeo-Christian precedent archived by 
both allusion and indirect cultural association, the resonant call to repentance inspirited 
within the play, as an early modern corrective to such materialist thinking emergent in its 
own cultural moment. The call to repentance, as I will show, is to be understood as a call 
for return to community and relational dwelling. 
The narrative of cultural materialism, to recall Dollimore, is one of alienation, 
both in the Marxian sense of being alienated by, from, and as one’s labor, but also in the 
existential sense of experiencing an alienated selfhood torn at the site of religion and 
politics in their concomitant ideological pull. Indeed, following Marx, Dollimore 
understands religion as the opiate of the masses. His reading of Faustus as an example of 
subversion through transgression reads thusly as one might expect.
 10
 I propose that 
Marlowe’s radical tragedy stems from an alternate radix. Faustus, I argue, is a religious 
play in the sense of religion’s operation as ligature, an association of communal 
                                                 
10 While Dollimore’s reading of Faustus does emphasize alienated selfhood, it does not argue for an 
individual, autonomous self. Rather, Dollimore’s is an argument of a culturally produced (cultural 
materialist) self and should not be equated with my critique of those critics who posit an idealist individual 
conception of the self as emergent in the early modern period. See, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology 
and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (New York: Palgrave, 2010), 174. 
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(covenantal) bond; religion as religare.
11
 The narrative that I would trace in Faustus is 
thus not of alienation and individualism but of association and identity relative to 
communal affiliation, one that is deeply Pauline in its call. 
I thus begin necessarily by adducing Marlowe’s investment in the religious, 
particularly through the thinking of St. Paul. Next, I turn attention to self-fashioning and 
the illusion of the individual in order to argue that Marlowe’s identity politics as they are 
enacted in Doctor Faustus and drafted in Donne’s meditations and sermons recognize 
(re-cognize) selfhood relative to the socius, what Critchley refers to as a dividual, one 
attached to community by force of an ethical call to action. Though a secular philosopher, 
Critchley nonetheless builds his dividual subject from the foundation of predominantly 
theological thought, borrowing largely from Lévinas’ concept of the face-to-face, a 
notion deeply religious and avowedly Judaic in its gesture. The remaining three sections 
of the chapter continue to trace this communal through-line across Faustus’ tragical 
history. I first assess the circular motions of magical incantation as they are enacted by 
Faustus in isolation, reported by King James’ in his Daemonologie, and read through 
Heidegger relative to standing reserve. Secondly, I turn attention to what I have termed 
“Faustian Politics,” the differentiation between covenant and contract, as I continue to 
map this trajectory of thinking. The chapter closes by tracing the call to repentance 
(metanoia) recurrent throughout Marlowe’s treatment of the Faust myth which I read as a 
call to change the way one conceives of oneself, not as an autonomous individual but 
rather a dividual subject bound to the ethical call of the other.   
 
                                                 





Paul Marlowe is a central character in the dramatic action of Doctor Faustus 
though he has no lines of direct speech.
12
 He exists by allusion and inference, an 
interstitial figure (a spirit) first invited into the discursive space of this Faust myth rather 
ironically through Faustus’ disputation of the divine: 
Jerome’s Bible, Faustus, view it well. 
[He reads] “Stipendium peccati mors est.” Ha! 
“Stipendium,” etc. 
“The reward of sin is death.” That’s hard.  (1.1.38-41) 
 
Despite his instruction, Faustus does not view well the text laid before him. On the 
contrary, his reading of Romans 6:23 is famously incomplete. The “hard” truth of his 
reading cuts the Apostle off mid-thought. The full verse reads: 
For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus 
Christ our Lord. 
 
Ever the self-willed legalist, Faustus halts his study too abruptly, in this instance at the 
semicolon, taking its punctuation as an invitation for full stop rather than contemplative 
pause. The intent of Paul’s epistolary (communal) address is here held in suspension, 
nullifying its message of redemptive grace and return. I submit that Paul operates 
throughout Faustus as a silent partner, ever present, yet often silenced by Faustus’ 
legalistic dismissals. Even so, he is not rendered mute. The cultural presence of Paul’s 
                                                 
12 My conceptualization of Paul Marlowe is indebted to Lupton’s work arguing convincingly for the 
impress of St. Paul’s writings as they come to bear in Shakespeare’s thinking. Here I am drawing 
particularly on her formulation of the character she has called Paul Shakespeare; see Thinking with 
Shakespeare, 219-46.  
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voice resonates in the timbre of repentance as it rings throughout the play, tolling, like 
Donne’s communal bell, in remembrance of our human interconnectivity.13  
Paul Marlowe is equal parts hermeneutician and heretic, not unlike Christopher 
Marlowe himself. In his aspect as hermeneutician we might follow Leo Kirschbaum who 
avows, “[w]hatever Marlowe was himself, there is no more obvious Christian document 
in all Elizabethan drama than Doctor Faustus.”14 Indeed by John Ingram’s telling, “no 
finer sermon than Marlowe’s Faustus ever came from the pulpit.”15 Yet it is upon the 
charges of Marlowe’s atheism by both his early modern contemporaries and modern 
literary critics alike that I build my structure for an argument advocating the religious 
nature of Faustus and its subsequent religious reading.
16
 I do so partially by way of Paul 
Marlowe, which is to say by way of Paul’s impress on Marlowe’s thinking as evidenced 
through the Pauline associations in the play. The aspect of Marlowe’s atheism I would 
trace in this chapter is his heterodox use of Pauline thought relative to repentance as a 
return to community. Faustus’ dilemma, I would suggest, is not the private internal 
struggle to assess one’s status as either elect or reprobate, but the desire for communal 
affiliation which he rejects and to which he is unwilling to return, both due to a crisis of 
                                                 
13 Donne serves as a crucial interlocutor in this chapter’s argument, as does his Meditation XVII with its 
well-known and oft-quoted aphorisms, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the 
continent, a part of the main” and “never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.” For the 
present time, however, his voice must be necessarily deferred. 
14
 Leo Kirschbaum, “Marlowe’s Faustus: A Reconsideration,” The Review of English Studies 19.75 (1943): 
229. 
15 John Ingram, Marlowe and His Poetry (London: Harp, 1914). 
16
 Sixteenth century charges of Marlowe’s atheism are famously made in Richard Baines calumny against 
the playwright; see the “Baines Note” (BL Harley MS.6848 ff.185-6). For anti-Christian readings of 
Faustus see Dollimore, Radical Tragedy; Paul H. Kocher, Christopher Marlowe: A Study in His Thought, 
Learning, and Character (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), 104; and Harry Levin, 
The Overreacher: A Study of Christopher Marlowe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 132. 
Citations for Kocher and Levin have been borrowed from Kristen Poole, “Dr. Faustus and Reformation 
Theology,” in Early Modern English Drama: A Critical Companion, eds. Garrett A. Sullivan Jr. et  al. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107 n.9.  
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materialist thinking. Marlowe, I maintain, is a heterodox reader of Paul; he thinks Paul 
differently than dogmatic Calvinist readings can fully account. At its heart the 
Reformation was a paradigmatic re-thinking with the Epistles of St. Paul.
17
 He was the 
lens through which to re-view the early modern world. To quote Critchley, who positions 
Paul’s writings as an address to anyone politically and ethically minded no matter their 
era of birth or point of origin, “the spirit of Paul is the movement of reformation.”18 Such 
spirit, I argue, moves in Faustus.  
As Julia Reinhard Lupton has shown, Paul has recently undergone his own 
“Renaissance” in early modern literary criticism, religious studies, and continental 
philosophy.
19
 No longer viewed as the author par excellence of supersessionist typology, 
“in which Christianity supplants Judaism [and] Protestantism overcomes Catholicism,” 
Paul has been relocated to the moment of his own cultural hybridity where he lived 
simultaneously as a Roman citizen, Jewish Pharisee, and Christian Apostle.
 20
  Such 
relocation demonstrates how his thinking is both Jewish and Christian in its aspect, and 
while political, remains plural rather than polarizing in its thought. Turning specifically to 
                                                 
17 John S. Coolidge, The Pauline Renaissance: Puritanism and the Bible (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). 
18 Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (New York: Verso, 2013), 155. 
19 Lupton, “The Pauline Renaissance: A Shakespearean Reassessment,” The European Legacy 15.2 (2010): 
215-20. 
20 Ibid., 218. N.T. Wright provides a thorough overview of Paul as an Apostle of Christ while 
acknowledging both his Jewish roots and engagement with the Roman Empire, see Paul: In Fresh 
Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005). Wright’s two-volume Paul and the Faithfulness of God 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013) provides an exhaustive 1,700 page survey of Paul’s influence in the 
history of Christianity; see volume II on the Greek, Jewish, and Roman aspects of Paul’s thinking and 
theology. Paula Fredriksen writes of Paul’s Jewish-Christian thought in Augustine and the Jews: A 
Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism (New York: Doubleday, 2008). Influential scholars whose work 
calls attention to Paul’s Jewishness include W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic 
Elements in Pauline Theology (London: S.P.C.K., 1955); E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A 
Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977); Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: 
Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); and Jacob Taubes, The 
Political Theology of Paul (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). I have borrowed my citations of 
Davies, Sanders, Boyarin, and Taubes from Lupton, “The Pauline Renaissance,” 219 n.6.   
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the early modern literature where Paul operates as an intertextual touchstone, scholars 
such as Gregory Kneidel, Ken Jackson, Lowell Gallagher, Kathleen Biddick, Jonathan 
Gil Harris, Jenifer Rust, and Lupton herself have demonstrated with great acumen the 
degree to which “Renaissance writers are able to loop back into the Messianic caches of 
the Hebrew Bible while still maintaining their Christian orientations.”21 These Messianic 
caches, which follow Giorgio Agamben’s work in The Time that Remains, are archived in 
the Pauline call for lived action in the “time of the now” (ho nyn kairos) given in his 
address to the Romans.
22
 This lived action of the now, according to Agamben’s reading 
of Paul, is neither eschatological nor soteriological, but immanent, which is to say 
phenomenological: it is to be lived in one’s daily interactions with others today—now. 
This is a community-oriented Paul concerned with living ethically and politically in the 
present.   
Such a Paul, located simultaneously in the archive of Renaissance literature as 
well as at the intersections of religious studies, critical theory, and continental 
philosophy, recognizes the uneven development of the Reformation in England.
23
 This 
                                                 
21 Ibid. For bibliographic citations see 219-20, nn.10-11.  
22
 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia 
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Agamben’s Messianic reading of Paul may be 
summarized as follows:  
Agamben emphasizes the Pauline necessity to seize the moment, to participate in time’s contraction 
by responding to immediate occasions for speech, action, and new affiliation. For Agamben, 
Messianic time conjoins Judaism and Christianity, yet ultimately belongs to neither. Agamben 
accuses both the priests and the rabbis of neutralizing the Messianic impulses for which they found 
themselves responsible. Agamben recovers in Paul a Messianism for everyone, derived from a 
reading of the Epistles but supported by ventures in philosophy and linguistics, and ultimately 
disengaged from theology. (Lupton, “The Pauline Renaissance,” 217)  
23 By “uneven development of the Reformation in England” I mean to express a non-wholly Calvinist 
religious perspective. Poole argues convincingly for a complicated, non-uniform bearing to English 
religious thought during the Elizabethan era, see “Dr. Faustus and Reformation Theology.” Brian 
Cummings’ recent work similarly advocates a non-univocal comportment to Reformation thinking, 
demonstrating instead porous boundaries between the categories such as “religious,” “secular,” and “self,” 
see Mortal Thoughts: Religion, Secularity & Identity in Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture (Oxford: 
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Paul is neither Jew nor Gentile, Catholic nor Protestant. I argue that in Faustus Marlowe 
uses Paul in the sense of this Renaissance bearing, a Paul of scriptural avocation not 
doctrinal or creedal affiliation: Paul as one who calls sinners to repentance, those 
alienated, to community.  
If Paul Marlowe serves as the ground upon which I build my religious reading of 
Faustus as a text concerned with religare, the binding and rebinding of the wayward 
individual to the fold of communal investment, then the foundation laid atop such ground 
is what Critchley terms the dividual subject, selfhood conceived relative to the socius and 




The allure of individualism, its illusion and its flaw, forms the topic of discussion 
at the opening of Faustus’ final act: 
FIRST SCHOLAR: What ails Faustus? 
 
FAUSTUS: Ah, my sweet chamber-fellow! Had I lived with thee, 
then had I lived still, but now I die eternally. Look, comes  
he not? Comes he not? 
 
SECOND SCHOLAR: What means Faustus? 
 
THIRD SCHOLAR: Belike he is grown into some sickness by  
being oversolitary.  (5.2.2-8) 
 
Faustus’ ailment, as Marlowe tells it, is that he is “oversolitary.” His individualism 
precipitates his demise. I use the verb precipitate not only in its theological sense of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oxford University Press, 2013). For a postmodern theological approach to understanding the Reformation 
and Reformed thinking in tandem with and as precursors to philosophers such as Heidegger, Derrida, 
Lévinas, and Deleuze, see Carl Raschke, The Next Reformation: Why Evangelicals Must Embrace 
Postmodernity (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004).    
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being cast down headlong, but also to demonstrate Faustus’ action in bringing about this 
end, an action constituted in the material artifact of the soul-selling contract and 
completed through an idolatrous belief in its unbreakable materiality.
24
 This legal object, 
as I will show in due course, bears efficacious force. In the language of chemistry 
precipitate also describes an act of physical separation, the separation of a substance in 
solid form from a solution.
25
 My precipitate thus also intends to recall Mephistopheles’ 
on-stage alchemy as this early modern chemist produces his chafer of coals in order to 
render liquid once more Faustus’ would-be solid blood, thereby allowing the deed of gift 
to be conscripted.
26
 The significance of this scene is taken up more fully in my later 
distinction between contracts and covenants, as well as the role they play in Faustian 
Politics. For the present moment, however, my emphasis would remain on Faustus’ 
individualist ailment as expressed by the First Scholar. 
“My sweet chamber-fellow,” Faustus remarks to his friend, “Had I lived with 
thee, / then had I lived still” (5.2.3-4). One way of reading this exchange is to suggest that 
life arises in community. By Faustus’ telling life is only lived in relational proximity; it is 
his separation from the socius, born from and sustained by his desire for magic, that 
effects Faustus’ death. He tacitly acknowledges this (“then had I lived still”) as he 
capitulates his doom to his friends. Faustus speaks of his life here in past tense, had, 
implying that he is in effect already dead, a point reinforced by the regret of his 
consignment, “but now I die eternally” (5.2.4). In Faustus, I would suggest that life, as 
well as the self insofar as the self inheres to what we might call life, bears the sign of 
                                                 
24 OED, s.v. precipitate. 
25 Ibid. 
26 I take up the significance of this scene more fully in the Faustian Politics section of this chapter. 
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communal dwelling. That is, in Faustus Marlowe pens life as a relational experience and 
the self as a phenomenological encounter implicated in the draw of others; neither is a 
solitary vocation. By Marlowe’s telling, “being oversolitary” (5.2.8) runs contrary to the 
human condition. 
Why then all of the praise for the Renaissance individual? In answer, Julian Yates 
opines that it might be because 
Burckhardt’s story is a good one, a heady brew of Art, Science, Genius. A fully-
fledged ‘individual,’ armed with a host of new technologies, transforms the world 
into an object of use. For this reason his story has endured, providing Renaissance 
Studies with a set of terms and tropes that it has refigured as a new historicist epic 
of self-fashioning, a cultural-materialist tale of decentered selves, and, today, a 
call for ever greater attention to ‘materiality’ in the name of becoming ‘early 
modern.’27 
 
Yates, I think, has the right of it. To return to Heidegger, the problem lies not with 
materiality but with materialist thought as instrumentalization. Using technology (technē 
as a mode of thinking) to “transform the world into an object of use,” as Yates puts it, is 
effectively Heidegger’s argument for how instrumental thinking affects the world by 
reducing everything in its purview to standing reserve. Heidegger warns that the effect of 
such thinking is that eventually man will turn this objectifying gaze upon himself. This is 
precisely Faustus’ tragedy. Individualist thinking, the narcissism of human hubris, 
precipitates Faustus’ fall in the full sense this term bears as both a theological being cast 
down headlong, and a Heideggerian warning:  
[When] man…is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to 
the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself 
will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so 
threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the 
impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as 
                                                 
27 Julian Yates, Error, Misuse, Failure: Object Lessons from the English Renaissance (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 2. 
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it is his construct. The illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as 




Heidegger’s counsel may be read as a caution against self-fashioning and the valorization 
of the individual divorced from the socius. Heidegger maintains that belief in the human 
ability to fashion (or self-fashion) and subsequently control the world is an illusion. Like 
magic it is efficacious thinking. The effect, he tells us, “gives rise in turn to one final 
delusion,” the illusion of the individual self: It seems as though man everywhere and 
always encounters only himself. Read in this light, Yates’ accounting of Burckhardt’s 
Renaissance individual as “providing Renaissance Studies with a set of terms and tropes 
that it has refigured as a new historicist epic of self-fashioning [and] a cultural-materialist 
tale of decentered selves,” might be taken as a similar warning. Such cautioning certainly 
bears Marlovian comportment. Marlowe, read in this way, uses Faustus to demonstrate 
that the self is under threat of erasure by the idea of the individual. He does so by casting 
the concept of the individual in tandem with early modern discourses on magic. 
 It is precisely as one so threatened, to borrow Heidegger’s phrase, that Faustus 
exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth: “All things that move between the quiet 
poles / Shall be at my command” (1.1.58-59). Faustus’ first action as a magician is to 
command none less than Mephistopheles, an exchange that reveals the delusion of 
grandeur Marlowe locates in thinking oneself an autonomous individual:   
I charge thee to return and change thy shape. 
Thou art too ugly to attend on me. 
Go, and return an old Franciscan friar;  
That holy shape becomes a devil best. 
    Exit devil [Mephistopheles]. 
I see there’s virtue in my heavenly words. 
                                                 
28 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology 
and other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977), 26-7. 
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Who would not be proficient in this art? 
How pliant is this Mephistopheles, 
Full of obedience and humility! 
Such is the force of magic and my spells. (1.3.24-32) 
 
Who would not be proficient in this art? This chapter takes an epigraph from this 
exchange. Marlowe’s answer, I would suggest, is that proficiency in this art is an illusion. 
Faustus’ belief in the force of his magic (“my spells”) is similarly illusive, just as the 
individual self is artifice.  
Early modern discourse on magic forwards this argument. In his Daemonologie 
(1597), for example, King James reports that practitioners of magic “blindlie glorie of 
themselves, as if they had by their quicknes of ingine, made a conquest of Plutoes 
dominion, and were become Emperours over the Stygian habitacles.”29 On James’ telling, 
which is expressive of Renaissance thought on the subject, magic is always a 
master/slave arrangement. Under the operation of magic there is no individuality, only 
fidelity (fide: troth, pledge) to the Devil as stipulated in the terms of the contract. The 
individual is an illusion. Conjoined to this lack of individuality is the erasure of 
autonomy. As Mephistopheles makes clear to Faustus, he is not free to do anything 
without his master’s consent: “I am servant to great Lucifer / And may not follow thee 
without his leave. / No more than he commands must we perform” (1.3.41-43). This is 
the “individualism” Faustus willingly “self-fashions” in his vocation as magician; 
subjectivity thus proves dubious in magical enterprise.  
As if by James’ account, Marlowe pens the magician’s confusion regarding his 
power in a brief interchange between Faustus and Mephistopheles: 
                                                 
29 James VI and I, Daemonologie, in Minor Prose Works of King James VI and I, ed. James Craigie 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982), 7, emphasis is in original. 
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FAUSTUS: Did not my conjuring speeches raise thee? Speak. 
MEPHISTOPHELES: That was the cause, but yet per accidens.  (1.3.46-47)    
It is not by the quickness of his ingenuity that Faustus has made conquest and dominion 
over hell. His individual will—“my conjuring speec[h]”—has no effective power here. 
Faustus’ summons is insufficient to render Lucifer or Mephistopheles his thrall. The 
cause of the spirit’s appearance is rather, “yet per accidens,” and does not arise due to the 
magician’s independent will.    
 From a Pauline perspective, selfhood and empowerment (one’s unique abilities) 
derive from grace and spiritual gifts that operate through communal identity and fidelity 
to others. In Romans 12:3-5 Paul writes: 
For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to 
think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think soberly, 
according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith. For as we have 
many members in one body, and all members have not the same office: So we, 
being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another. 
 
Following Paul, identity is foremost communal, “many members in one body,” or as I 
have phrased it terms of the concept of the dividual, the self relative to the socius. To use 
Paul’s language: “every one members one of another.” Donne emphasizes this Pauline 
idea in Meditation XVII: 
The church is catholic, universal, so are all her actions; all that she does belongs 
to all. When she baptizes a child, that action concerns me; for that child is thereby 
connected to that head which is my head too, and ingrafted into that body whereof 




Unlike faith in magic with its Devil’s pledge promising power but delivering only 
illusion, Paul’s communal calling is one powered by grace and the divine fiat to serve 
                                                 
30 John Donne, Meditation XVII, in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et 
al., vol. 1 (New York: Norton, 2006), 1305. Donne’s reference to being “ingrafted” is expressed repeatedly 
in Paul’s epistle to the Romans; see Rom. 11:17, 19, 23-24. 
18 
 
others through one’s unique talents and abilities: “For as we have many members in one 
body, and all members have not the same office.” Where an affiliation with magic erases 
identity and nullifies autonomy, as in Mephistopheles’ example above, the autonomous 
aspect of Pauline community is its self-governing call to serve others (its office) based 
precisely on the uniqueness of one’s gifts (what might be otherwise called one’s 
individuality): 
Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us, whether 
prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith; Or ministry, let us 
wait on our ministering: or he that teacheth, on teaching; Or he that exhorteth, on 
exhortation: he that giveth, let him do it with simplicity; he that ruleth, with 




What I would stress from this Pauline perspective is that particular selfhood is not elided 
within the fold of communal association (e.g. the ingrafted body to which Donne 
attributes his membership). Although such community exists as a state of being “many 
members in one body,” and requires inasmuch a rethinking of the self in terms of the 
socius, the “individual” is not erased in this communal call in terms of one’s unique talent 
or ability. On the contrary, such particular selfhood is celebrated and enjoined to action 
for the good of others. Some are called to prophesy, others to teach, and yet still others to 
exhort or rule with diligence, mercy, and cheerfulness.  
 The problem of the individual self as it is encountered in Faustus and 
countermanded via Pauline thinking in the age is perhaps best conceptually understood as 
what Critchley terms the dividual subject. Early modern English identity, I would posit, 
                                                 
31 Rom. 12:6-8. 
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remains at the very least conceptually dividual insofar as national identity continued to be 
cast during the period in religious, and especially Pauline, terms.
32
 
 Critchley’s dividual is an “ethical subjectivity” built upon premises forwarded by 
three Pauline thinkers: French Philosopher Alain Badiou, Danish theologian Knud Ejler 
Løgstrup, and Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas.
33
 From Badiou Critchley borrows 
“the idea of fidelity to the event as [both] the central ethical experience” and locus of 
identity formation.
34
 The ethical call of the event for Critchley is then borne out through 
the unfulfillable demand of the other as it is given voice by the Judeo-Christian thinking 
of Lévinas and Løgstrup.
35
 The Pauline aspect of the dividual subject is not to be missed, 
and though it is parsed only in passing through Løgstrup’s influence in Infinitely 
Demanding (a connection to which I will shortly turn), Critchley’s expansion of this 
concept his more recent work The Faith of the Faithless directly engages this Pauline 
                                                 
32 Edward Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant: State Oaths, Protestantism and the 
Political Nation, 1553-1682 (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2005). 
33 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (New York: Verso, 
2008), 10. Regarding the Pauline thought of Badiou, Løgstrup, and Lévinas: Badiou’s philosophy of the 
self beginning in Theory of the Subject (Editions du Seuil, 1982) and expanded in Being and Event 
(Editions du Seuil, 1988), takes a marked Pauline turn in St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism 
(Presses Universitaries de France, 1997). Løgstrup’s emphasis on Christian ethics as a call for service to the 
other is equally Pauline. Lévinas’ correlation to Pauline thinking is situated in the recent scholarly turn to 
Paul emphasizing his Judaism. Thus when Lévinas writes of “the being-Jewish of all men,” one hears a 
Pauline echo in Rom. 2:28-29, “For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, 
which is outward in the flesh: But he is a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, 
in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God.” See, Emmanuel Lévinas, 
“Judaism and Christianity,” in In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 164. 
34 Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, 10, emphasis in original. 
35 Critchley frames his tripartite construction of the dividual self in as follows: 
From Alain Badiou, I am going to take the idea of the committing itself in fidelity to the 
universality of a demand that opens in a singular situation but which exceeds that situation. From 
Knud Ejler Løgstrup, I take that idea of what he calls ‘the ethical demand’ as his emphasis on the 
radical, unfulfillable and one-sided character of that demand and the asymmetry of the ethical 
relation that it establishes. From Emmanuel Lévinas, I will try to show how this moment of 
asymmetry that arises in the experience of the infinite demand of the other’s face defines the ethical 
subject in terms of a split between itself and a exorbitant demand that it can never meet, the demand 
to be infinitely responsible. (Infinitely Demanding, 40) 
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connection, particularly to the degree that a call or calling necessarily precedes the event 
of subject formation: one must be called to the event of being.
36
  
For Paul, and early modern English dividual subjectivity, such fidelity is located 
in the Christ-event, Jesus’ death and resurrection with its subsequent grace descendant 
upon all humankind.
37
 Even so, one must be called to Christ. Dividual subjectivity begins 
in answer to this call. Donne’s 1626 sermon on Matthew 9:13 is indicative of this concept 
as expressed in the religious lingua franca of Renaissance England: “No man is born a 
Christian, but call’d into that state by regeneration.”38 Regeneration, Donne’s term for the 
spiritual baptism of grace, is, to use Critchley’s and Badiou’s language, the new identity 
formed through fidelity to the event, what the Christian would refer to as being born 
again. The term regeneration, however, is not Donne’s alone; in the Renaissance it 
carries a Calvinist intonation.
 39
  
In an ostensibly similar turn, the relational identity I am seeking to trace through 
Faustus and in early modern English thought more broadly as dividual subjectivity has 
been cast in Calvinist terms as what Adrian Streete refers to as a “relational model of 
                                                 
36 Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless, 155-206. On the centrality of calling in the Pauline tradition see 
Paul’s opening addresses in Rom. 1:1-2, 1 Cor. 1:1, 2 Cor. 1:1, and Col. 1:1. Regarding the calling of all 
believers, see Eph. 1:4-14. 
37 On the open affiliation of grace, see Gal. 3:28. This verse forms the central focus of the latter half of 
Chapter 4. 
38 John Donne, “A SERMON Preached to the Household at WHITE-HALL, April 30. 1626. SERMON 
VIII,” in XXVI SERMONS (Never before Publish’d) PREACHED BY THAT Learned and Reverend 
DIVINE John Donne, Doctor of Divinity, Late DEAN of the Cathedral Church of St. Pauls, London, The 
Third Volume, (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1661), 115. 
39 See, for example John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: 
Calvin Translation Society, 1845), 5.12.1; and Calvin’s commentary on John 1:13 in The Gospel According 




early modern selfhood.”40 This “relational model” is, however, paradoxically isolationist. 
Streete’s term describes the individual’s private and internal struggle to assess his or her 
status as either elect or reprobate. Like Faustus, such specifically Calvinist relational 
subjectivity runs the risk of being oversolitary. I would once again stress that Marlowe 
thinks religiously beyond the cultural impress of Calvinism. And while Faustus’ solitary 
ailment might well read as Marlowe’s censure of Calvinist ideology,41 I propose that its 
particular doctrinal motions are not the express target of his aim. It is the illusion of 
individualism itself, by my reading, upon which Faustus sets its sights. To this point, 
Calvinist isolationism elides the ethical nature of the call to subjectivity through the 
Christ-event by emphasizing the self over the communal. Put another way, this one-to-
one relation between God and the solitary subject neglects the greater call of the socius 
via the unfulfillable demand of the other and otherwise locates the impetus of faith in the 
individual him- or herself relative to God. The Christ-event’s call to subjectivity 
nevertheless remains, to use philosophical language, an always already ethical call of the 
other: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
42
  
Jesus’ Great Commandment of Mark 12:31 is referred to by the Apostle James as 
a “royal law,” recalling the Judaic provenance of its original command in Leviticus.43 
Embedded within this association is the injunction of Hebrew hospitality requiring care 
for the widow, orphan, alien, and poor—the very others that dwell near the community 
                                                 
40 Adrian Streete, “‘Consummatum Est’: Calvinist Exegesis, Mimesis and Doctor Faustus,” Literature & 
Theology 15.2 (2001), 120. 
41 See Dollimore, “Dr. Faustus: Subversion through Transgression,” in Radical Tragedy, 109-19. 
42 Mk. 12:31. 
43 See Jas. 2:8 and Lev. 19:18.  
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yet are so often excluded from its fold.
44
 To invoke Paul Marlowe, the decree of the Great 
Commandment is espoused in both the Roman and Galatian epistles.
45
 This call to 
neighbor love is precisely the unfulfillable ethical demand of the other espoused by 
Lévinas and Løgstrup, especially when taken in light of Jesus’ caveat during his Sermon 
on the Mount where the love of one’s enemies is further added to the vocational 
responsibilities of the regenerate.
46
   
To return the call of dividual subjectivity to an early modern locus, Donne 
reminds those in attendance to his sermon, that, per the Christ-event, Jesus  
came not occurrere, to meet us; but yet he came not cogere, to compel us, to force 
us, but onely vocare, to call us, by his Word, and Sacraments, and Ordinances, 
and lead us so; and that’s his errand, and purpose in coming.47 
 
If Donne stresses the open aspect of the call in its capacity either to be answered or 
ignored though never forced, then Faustus dramatizes its condition to be rejected outright. 
Commissioning Mephistopheles on a soul-selling errand, Faustus initiates his own 
autopoietic call:  
Go bear these tidings to great Lucifer: 
Seeing Faustus hath incurred eternal death 
By desp’rate thoughts against Jove’s deity, 
Say he surrenders up to him his soul, 
So he will spare him four-and-twenty years, 
Letting him live in all voluptuousness, 
Having thee ever to attend on me, 
To give me whatsoever I shall ask, 
To tell me whatsoever I demand, 
To slay mine enemies and aid my friends, 
And always be obedient to my will.   (1.3.89-99, emphasis is mine)  
 
                                                 
44 This point is expanded in Chapter 4. 
45 See Rom. 13:9 and Gal. 5:14. 
46 See Mt. 5:43-48. Neighbor love as it is practiced through early modern understandings of hospitality and 
stewardship form the focus of Chapter 4. 
47 Donne, “A SERMON Preached to the Household at WHITE-HALL,” 104. 
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And always be obedient to my will. My added emphasis in the passage above is intended 
to highlight the individualist aspect of Faustus’ thinking. He is no dividual. His is a 
subjectivity centered on the I/me/mine, a selfhood unmoored from ethical constraint. And 
although he does not answer, Faustus nonetheless experiences the Christ-event’s dividual 
call. Just prior to the enactment of his soul-selling, Faustus hears the voice (call) of the 
Good Angel: “Oh, something soundeth in mine ears: / ‘Abjure this magic, turn to God 
again!’” (2.1.7-8). The call is silenced, however, by Faustus’ desire to be an individual: 
“The god thou servest is thine own appetite” (2.1.11), he reminds himself. Yet by his own 
admission, such self-will comes with a necessary caveat and subsequent affiliation 
nevertheless: “Wherein is fixed the love of Beelzebub” (2.1.12). Faustus thus pledges his 
fidelity otherwise.    
David Hawkes has shown with great acumen the practice of soul-selling to be an 
act of self-selling.
48
 Hawkes’ is a secular argument, reading this metaphorical practice as 
the descriptor of a fundamental misrecognition of sign for referent and representation for 
reality, a flaw deeply embedded in the history of Western thought. For Hawkes the Devil 
is a metaphor, a cultural symbol for such an illusion. Hawkes’ point, whether through a 
reading of early modern or modern Faust myths, is that Westerners have become 
fundamentally disconnected from their selves. Marlowe’s Faustus, as Hawkes reminds, is 
no less disconnected from true selfhood. Indeed he dismisses “men’s souls” as “vain 
trifles” (1.3.63) in a passing quip to Mephistopheles. To this end one might describe 
Faustus’ thinking as “secular.” In his formulation of the dividual subject, Critchley 
                                                 
48 David Hawkes, The Faust Myth: Religion and the Rise of Representation (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 
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leverages Løgstrup, a Danish theologian, to link subjectivity’s religious aspect as a 
communal binding of religare to a secular ethical, dividual, end.   
Løgstrup derives his ethics from the unfulfillable call of the other in the Great 
Commandment: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. For Løgstrup, to be a Christian is 
counter to Calvinist interiority. Following Løgstrup, Christian subjectivity is an external 
phenomenological encounter where “an individual’s relation to God is determined wholly 
at the point of his relation to the neighbour.”49 Critchley argues this point with secular 
bearing:  
to be a Christian on this view does not mean subscribing to whatever variety of 
more or less obscure metaphysical beliefs in the incarnation, resurrection or 
whatever. It means rather that one’s entire existence should be organized around 
the fact of the ethical demand insofar as that demand is enacted in the relation to 




Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre confirm that Critchley is not alone in reading 
Løgstrup via secular turn. By their assessment, for Løgstrup “the ethical demand is not 
laid upon Christians rather than non-Christians. There is not Christian morality and 
secular morality. There is only human morality.”51 Recent work by Renaissance scholar 
Brian Cummings provides compelling evidence for an understanding of “secular” and 
“religious” as a false and historically forced dyad.52 Donne would seem to agree. His 
famous maxim from Meditation XVII likewise espouses that there is only human 
morality: 
                                                 
49 Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, 54. 
50 Ibid. Lévinas demonstrates concurrent thinking when he writes of “ethics [as] the spiritual optics.” See, 
Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1979), 78. 
51 Quoted in Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, 54. emphasis in original. 
52 Cummings, Mortal Thoughts. 
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No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part 
of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a 
promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend’s or thine own were. Any 
man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore 




Donne’s thinking, like Løgstrup’s, brings to mind the phenomenological aspect of 
dividual subjectivity. That is, for these thinkers, the self is ever bound in ethical relation 
to the socius. Religion (religare) is ethics. There is only human morality. 
 Mephistopheles complicates this point. Not to the degree that religare is ethics, 
for Mephistopheles deeply desires communal return. As he conveys to Faustus, hell is the 
absence of community with God:  
Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscribed 
In one self place, for where we are is hell, 
And where hell is must we ever be. 
And, to conclude, when all the world dissolves, 
And every creature shall be purified, 




Embedded within Mephistopheles’ account, silent yet no less voiced, is the admission 
that the presence of God is heaven.
55
 Mephistopheles thus complicates the argument that 
there is only human morality. My point requires some space to unfold. If morality and 
ethics are yoked though dividual subjectivity, then it is by the phenomenological pull of 
the other. For Lévinas the draw of this encounter is located in the other’s face, a space 
“where God passes.”56 Thus to witness the face of the other is to witness the face of 
                                                 
53 Donne, Meditation XVII, 1305. 
54 Following Mephistopheles line of argument here, one might argue that hell is quite literally the 
individual subject, a self divorced from community represented by God.  
55 See Isa. 6:1-3, Rev. 7:9-12, and Rev. 11:16-17. 





 As he writes in Totality and Infinity, “[t]he dimension of the divine opens forth 
from the human face.”58 From this perspective Lévinas conceives of what Critchley calls 
dividual subjectivity in terms of the face-to-face encounter, one marked by proximity 
Not distance, the shortest through space, but initial directness, which extends as 
unimpeachable approach in the call of the face of the other, in which there 
appears, as an order, an inscription, a prescription, an awakening (as if it were a 
‘me’), responsibility—mine for the other human being. The face of the other…is 





For Lévinas, subjectivity can never be individual. It is always dividual, to use Critchley’s 
term; there is always the call of the other implicated in the formation of the me. To return 
to Faustus, the presence of God’s face, or rather the lack thereof deeply pains 
Mephistopheles. One might recall the Psalmist when he writes, “My heart says of you, 
‘Seek his face!’ Your face, Lord, I will seek.”60 It is thus that Mephistopheles speaks to 
Faustus of the phenomenological weight of being separated from God’s face: 
Think’st thou that I, who saw the face of God 
And tasted the eternal joys of heaven, 
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells 
In being deprived of everlasting bliss? (1.3.79-82) 
 
To reiterate, it is communal return that Mephistopheles seeks, relational subjectivity. By 
Marlowe’s estimation it would seem that angels too are dividual subjects, formed in the 
ethical call of the very face of God. Following this line of thought, to willingly rebel from 
God, to turn from his presence, is to become individual. Should we not then be surprised 
                                                 
57 I have found no better articulation of this Lévinasian idea than the twentieth-century parable written by 
Nikos Kazantzakis. See, The Last Temptation of Christ, trans. P.A. Bien (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1998), 330-31. 
58 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78. 
59 Emmanuel Levinas, “From Ethics to Exegesis,” in In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 110, emphasis in original.  
60 Ps. 27:8 (NIV). On God relative to the face-to-face, see also Ex. 33:11, Num. 12:6-8 and 14:4, 1 Chron. 
16:11, 2 Chron. 7:14, Ps. 24:5-6 and 27:4. 
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when this devil, Mephistopheles, cautions Faustus against a fate he knows all-too-
well?—“O Faustus, leave these frivolous demands, / Which strike terror to my fainting 
soul!” (1.3.83-84).61  Yet Faustus relentlessly continues in his “frivolous demands,” 





 The language of magic is the promise of control. “Lines, circles, signs, letters, and 
characters— / Ay, these are those that Faustus most desires” (1.1.53-54). This desire for 
magic, Faustus explains, is rooted in a lust for domination: 
                                           Emperors and kings 
Are but obeyed in their several provinces, 
Nor can they raise the wind or rend the clouds; 
But his dominion that exceeds in this  
Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man. 
A sound magician is a mighty god. 
Here, Faustus, try thy brains to gain a deity.   (1.1.59-65) 
 
Heidegger once more provides terminology helpful in adducing the threat of such 
thinking. Faustus’ language is (and thus his thoughts are) instrumentalizing. In his 
grandiose dream of power the very environment itself is rendered standing reserve to be 
challenged-forth. By his admission he would “raise the wind or rend the clouds,” the 
heavens themselves would be at the disposal of his will, a great mass of latent power 
lying dormant awaiting the release of his call. Indeed on Faustus’ telling “A sound 
magician is a mighty god.” Yet as Heidegger reminds, such thinking is an illusion, for it 
                                                 
61 My point is reminiscent of Stanley Fish’s conclusion in Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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is in the posture as such a lord of the earth that Faustus will consign his selfhood to the 
Devil. Faustus thus effects his soul-selling, I argue, because he conceives of himself as 
standing reserve. [When] man…is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then 
he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he 
himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.
62
 Though Marlowe did not have access 
to such Heideggerian language, he nonetheless stages this very condition, suggesting an 
overlap between Heidegger’s thought and the action penned by Marlowe. Borrowing 
Faustus’ investment in the grammar of magic, initially its “circles” (1.1.53) and later the 
materialist language of the Devil’s contract itself (2.1.30 ff.), the remainder of this 
chapter centers on Faustian discourse and the warnings Marlowe encodes in its 
expression.  
 Magic circles circumscribe exploitation. Immediately upon the conceit of magical 
enterprise, Faustus sends for his servant Wagner to fetch the sorcerers, his “dearest 
friends” (1.1.67), Valdes and Cornelius. “Their conference,” he admits after Wagner has 
made his exit, “will be a greater help to me / Than all my labors, plod I ne’er so fast” 
(1.1.70-71). From the start of his magical venture Marlowe scripts Faustus thinking in 
terms of standing reserve. Put simply, he views Valdes and Cornelius as what he can 
challenge-forth from them, in this case, the expediency of magical knowledge. This 
instrumentalizing gaze extends from the material to the immaterial as well. Spirits 
especially hold the promise of reserved power for Faustus: 
How I am glutted with conceit of this! 
Shall I make spirits fetch me what I please, 
Resolve me of all ambiguities, 
Perform what desperate enterprise I will? 
                                                 
62 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 26. 
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I’ll have them fly to India for gold, 
Ransack the ocean for orient pearl, 
And search all corners of the newfound world  




Marlowe here demonstrates how instrumental thinking often turns to commodification. 
Spiritual standing reserve proves no less to Faustus’ mind than the compass of all 
knowledge, heaven’s great commodity (“Resolve me of all ambiguities”), as well the 
more prosaic goods of the earth (gold, pearl, pleasant fruits and princely delicates).  
As the orderer of such standing reserve, the grammar of Faustus’ magic circle 
challenges-forth the names of God, holy men, and angels (“Figures of every adjunct to 
the heavens”) in order to summon Mephistopheles into his presence: 
Within this circle is Jehovah’s name, 
Forward and backward anagrammatized, 
The breviated names of holy saints, 
Figures of every adjunct to the heavens, 
And characters of signs and erring stars 
By which the spirits are enforced to rise. (1.3.8-13) 
 
As his Latin incantation indicates, Faustus intends a specific spirit to rise: “propitiamus 
vos, ut appareat et surgat Mephistopheles…et per vota nostra, ipse surgat nobis dicatus / 
Mephistopheles” (1.3.19, 22-23).64 We would do well, however, to remember 
Mephistopheles’ “per accidens” (1.3.47). As James confirms in his Daemonologie,  
it is no power inherent in the circles, or in the holines of the names of God 
blasphemouslie vsed; nor in whatsoeuer rites or ceremonies at that time vsed, that 
either can raise any infernall spirit, or yet limitat him perforce within or without 
these circles. For it is he onlie, the father of all lyes, who hauing first of all 
prescribed that forme of doing, feining himselfe to be commanded & restreined 
thereby, wil be loath to passe the boundes of these injunctiones; aswell thereby to 
make them glory in the impiring ouer him (as I saide before:)  As likewise to 
                                                 
63 Valdes and Cornelius view spirits similarly as standing reserve, see 1.1.121-50. 
64 The editor’s translation reads: “we propitiate you, that Mephistopheles may appear and rise…and by our 
prayers, may Mephistopheles himself, invoked by us, now rise!” 
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The commodity the Devil seeks is the magician’s selfhood, that is, the soul. James’ 
account is corroborated by Mephistopheles’ “per accidens”; there is no power in the 
magic circle, only the illusion of power. The spirits summoned feign themselves “to be 
commanded & restreined thereby,” when, in fact, it is the magician who is truly 
enthralled (in thrall). Once the Devil is “trusted in these little thinges,” it becomes easier 
to coerce the magician to sell himself by deed of gift on the promise of power, wealth, 
etc. The language of incantation is thus ultimately one of subjection and subjectivity; its 
grammatical logic encodes a tragic reversal. Though the magician believes himself to be 
the one in power and the spirit his subject, the reality of this exchange is quite the 
opposite. It is the magician who is to be used by the Devil, an object commodified for his 
exploitation. On this point James is quite explicit: by “better commoditie…I meane the 
euerlasting perdition of their soul & body.”66 Ultimately the magician becomes subject to 
the Devil, his personhood denied by force of writ, with the eventual (contractual) promise 
of the torments to which one will be subjected in hell.  
The grammar of incantation thus serves as the precursive logic of the soul-selling 
contract. I will turn attention to Faustus’ contract momentarily. Before doing so, 
however, it is pressing to reiterate the focus of my argument: according to early modern 
thinking on the subject, magic establishes false relationships, isolates personhood from 
community, and always turns to exploitive use. Though Valdes speaks of Faustus’ 
inclusion in a would-be coterie of magical jointure—“tell me, Faustus, what shall we 
                                                 




three want?” (1.1.150)—the community proves to be false. Standing reserve rules as its 
associative logic: “Faustus, these books, thy wit, and our experience / Shall make all 
nations to canonize us” (1.1.121-22, emphasis mine). Cornelius and Valdes supply the 
books and experience, but it is Faustus’ wit that is needed to make their power worthy of 
canonization. Even amongst “friends” Faustus is but another instrumental object. More to 
the point, Faustus may learn the art of magic from Valdes and Cornelius (a simulacrum of 
community), but its practice remains a solitary exercise. Marlowe writes Cornelius’ 
instruction in such terms: “Valdes, first let him know the words of art, / And then, all 
other ceremonies learned, / Faustus may try his cunning by himself” (1.2.160-62).  
Indeed on Valdes’ advice it is to a “solitary grove” (1.1.155) that Faustus first removes 
himself, in isolation, to conjure. It is as an individual, divorced from community, that 
Faustus raises Mephistopheles. In similar fashion, I argue, he conceives of himself as an 
individual. It is only as such that Faustus is capable of thinking his selfhood as an object 





 To understand what is at stake in Faustian politics, the selling of the self, we must 
first recognize the distinction between contracts and covenants. In The English Faust 
Book, Marlowe’s source text for his retelling of this myth, Faustus conflates contract with 
covenant: 
I covenant and grant with them by these presents, that at the end of 24 years next 
ensuing the date of this present letter, they being expired, and I in the mean time, 
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during the said years, be served of them at my will, they accomplishing my 
desires to the full in all points as we are agreed, that then I give them full power to 
do with me at their pleasure, to rule, to send, fetch or carry me or mine, be it 
either body, soul, flesh, blood or goods, into their habitation, be it wheresoever: 
and hereupon, I defy God and His Christ, all the host of heaven, and all living 
creatures that bear the shape of God, yea all that lives; and again I say it, and it 
shall be so. And to the more strengthening of this writing, I have written it with 
mine own hand and blood, being in perfect memory, and hereupon I subscribe to 
it with my name and title, calling all the infernal, middle and supreme powers to 
witness of this my letter and subscription 




Though Faustus “covenant[s]” himself by this writ, he nonetheless drafts a contract. The 
contractual nature of the document may be ascertained by the legal formalism of its 
language. It is also written by one of sound mind (“being in perfect memory”) and its 
signature attended by witnesses (of “the infernal, middle and supreme powers”) in order 
to ensure its legally-binding status. By their nature contracts are ever exchanges. Yet, 
perhaps somewhat ironically, what Faustus will receive is rather vague according to the 
stipulations written by his own hand and in his own blood. By the terms of the exchange, 
for a twenty-four year interim Faustus will “be served of them at my will, they 
accomplishing my desires to the full in all points as we are agreed.” In all points as we 
are agreed. Within the writ itself, however, these points remain mute, or rather, moot. 
Though this Faustus would be “[r]esolved of all ambiguities,” to borrow Marlowe’s line, 
what is desired remains decidedly ambiguous. Nothing is specifically stipulated, recalling 
perhaps Mephistopheles quip that magic is itself “Nothing” but illusion effected to 
“delight [the] mind” (2.1.83). The Devil’s terms are much clearer, although, like 
Marlowe’s Faustus, the author of this contract is unsure of what constitutes his selfhood 
and thus consigns anything that might denote the self in his terms of exchange: “be it 
                                                 
67 John Henry Jones, ed., The English Faust Book: A Critical Edition Based on the Text of 1592 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 98-99. 
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either body, soul, flesh, blood or goods.” Moreover, this contract indicates a hyper 
individualized action; in conscripting this writ Faustus rejects affiliation with the 
community of “all living creatures that bear the shape of God, yea all that lives.” 
 Covenant, unlike contract, is used to signify relationship. It is a term religious in 
its nature and origin. Thus Gary North writes that “[t]here can be no relationship between 
God and man apart from a covenant.”68 For scholars of religion covenant variously 
signifies relationship,
69
 promise or pledge,
70
 even obligation in the sense of ligature (ob-
ligare).
71
 In 1962 Alfred Jepsen raised the issue of this term’s problematic nature relative 
to translation. The Hebrew חידב (berith), as Jepsen noted, can be confused or conflated 
with legal connotation (contract), especially as the term shifts between human-to-human 
encounters and marking a human relationship with the divine. “Wouldn’t it be truer, 
Jepsen argued, to describe ‘covenant’ as a ‘promise’ between persons, and the divine 
‘covenant’ more specifically as a combination of ‘promise and command’ (Verheißung 
und Geheiß)?”72 Working from a semantic methodology, Ernst Kutch has argued for an 
understanding of berith in this sense as a “regulation” or “obligation” between the human 
and God, yet Petrus Gräbe has criticized this approach as misleading due to “the 
                                                 
68 Gary North, The Dominion Covenant: Genesis, An Economic Commentary on the Bible: Volume I (Tyler, 
TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1987), ix. 
69 Petrus J. Gräbe, New Covenant, New Community: The Significance of Biblical and Patristic Covenant 
Theology for Contemporary Understanding (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2006), 6. 
70 Ibid., 4. 
71 Adela Cortina, Covenant and Contract: Politics, Ethics and Religion (Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2003), 6-7. 
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Community, 8. 
72 Gräbe, New Covenant, New Community, 8. 
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historical changes in the meaning of the term under consideration.”73  Historicist 
approach to covenant is thus warranted. 
 In early modern England covenant was a descriptor of national identity.
74
 
England’s “covenanted relationship with God” expressed an understanding of the 
nation’s temporal and economic success in accordance with “the faithfulness of the 
people in keeping their covenant,” which Edward Vallance’s work has defined through 
actions as varied as “defending the gospel, praying, fasting, [and] supporting good 
ministers and their co-religionists abroad.”75 In a Pauline turn, English identity relative to 
national covenant is dividual in its expression. Put otherwise, covenanted identity, at least 
in its theological and theoretical formulation (if not its on-the-ground practice), is 
selfhood in action toward others (whether through prayer, fasting, providing financial 
support, etc). Historians, however, have also linked the theological discussion of 
covenants in the period to legal changes in forms of land ownership and the emergence of 
what we recognize today as the Market.
76
 Even so, Vallance counters that such 
“economic analogies” are equally defensible in terms of generic convention, indicative of 
“godly ministers’ preference for a ‘plain style’ of preaching, using comparisons that 
would be familiar to an unlearned audience.”77 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 9. 
74 Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant. 
75 Ibid., 1. 
76 Perry Miller, The New England Mind: Part One the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
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 For the purposes of this argument, I follow two complementary definitions of 
covenant, one offered by Alan Mittleman, the other by Gräbe. From Mittleman I borrow 
an understanding of covenant as a “theological-moral-political framework” in order to 
emphasize its civic aspect.
78
 I use Gräbe to recall covenant’s relational comportment, 
translating berith as a “comprehensive term for a fellowship enabling relationship.”79 
Marlowe writes the Devil’s contract in opposition to covenantal thinking; it disables 
relationships. It is also a maneuver of political theology, one that effectively scripts 
citizenship (and thus civic identity) through adherence to the letter of the law, an action 
which creates a false community premised on exchange at best and exploitation at worst. 
This is an extended way of saying that in Faustus Marlowe dramatizes the tragedy of 
conceptualizing identity relative to contracts rather than covenants.   
To reiterate my central claim, Faustus’ legalism may be read as his tragic flaw. 
That is, his belief in the power of the material contract supersedes his belief in the 
subjectivity offered by covenant through repentance (religare), a central theme in the 
play. The distinction between contracts and covenants might be thought of respectively in 
terms of nomos and pneuma. On this point Paul Marlowe once more proves a helpful 
interlocutor.    
In the sense of early modern theological thought, strict adherence to the law bears 
a Jewish cast. Such is the action of a Pharisee.
80
 A reading of this sort understands the 
Decalogue as God’s Old Testament law (legalism, nomos) superseded by Christ’s New 
Testament covenant of grace (pneuma), and it does so by way of a Hellenized reading of 
                                                 
78 Alan L. Mittleman, A Short History of Jewish Ethics: Conduct and Character in the Context of Covenant 
(Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 9. 
79 Gräbe, New Covenant, New Community, 12. 
80 Catholicism was similarly derided for its legalism. 
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Paul. Yet it is as a Pharisee that Paul reminds the readers of his Roman Epistle, both 
Christian and Jew alike, that the law is not abrogated but established by faith.
81
 Such faith 
is espoused in Romans 13:8-10, 
Owe no man any thing, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath 
fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, 
Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and 
if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, 
namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his 
neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law. 
 
This Pauline call for love as fulfillment of the law is a specific type of love, agape, the 
self-sacrificing and neighbor-servicing care of and for the other.
82
 Agape is dividual 
identity in practice. Renaissance scholars working in an Agambenian strain read such 
action as a messianic call that is Jewish in its inflection yet readily discernible by and 
applicable to the thoughts and actions of early modern English Christians.
83
 The 
Decalogue in this Jewish cast bears the aspect of pneuma rather than nomos. It is a site of 
religare, of communal binding and identity formation.
84
 Spinoza writes that “what is 
formed at Sinai is a congregation (edah) of the children of Israel: an assembly, a 
gathering, a company, a multitude.”85 Identity is thus given at Sinai through covenant, as 
a relational community (the people of Israel), not through legalistic adherence.      
Read in his Jewish-Christian historical context, Paul’s distinction between “the 
law of the Spirit of Life” (pneuma) and “the law of sin and death” (nomos) in Romans 
                                                 
81 Rom. 3:31. 
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8:2-3 nullifies a legalistic reading of the Decalogue. Following this reading of Paul, the 
Law did not inaugurate sin and death (as opposed to the life-giving grace of the Gospel’s 
new covenant), it became the marker thereof when man invested himself in the 
materiality of the law—put in Pauline terms, its letter over its spirit.86 If, as one scholar 
puts it, the covenant motif in scripture, especially in its Pauline operation, addresses the 
“ultimate crisis of human experience,” then Marlowe dramatizes this very crisis in his 
tragical history.
87
 It is Faustus’ unwavering belief in the letter of the law—its expression 
as contract over its relational carriage as covenant—that drafts a death sentence in 
Marlowe’s Wittenberg. This is why Faustus cannot repent; he understands his 
subjectivity relative to instrumental thinking. By his own discernment, Faustus is the 
subject underwritten by legal contract. 
Luke Wilson has argued that the early modern understanding of magic is useful as 
a productive metaphor to subvert the notion of what a contract represents.
88
 Put into 
biblical expression, contracts are a materialist form (idol) used to replace covenantal 
relation.
89
 Adela Corntina has mapped this aspect in Renaissance thought through the 
biblical idiom of Genesis and the political philosophy of Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651). 
Cortina’s intertextual reading illuminates my previous point that contracts disable 
                                                 
86 Agamben engages with this aspect of the Law in an epigraph to Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
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covenantal relationships by establishing false communities built upon either exchange or 
exploitation. Cortina writes, 
In view of the problem posed by the book of Genesis, in view of the problem of 
violence flooding the world through men’s malice, the parable of the Leviathan 
says that the most intelligent solution, the one that modern States governed by 
rule of law have adopted and should fortify, consists in sealing a contract, because 
men are irremediably selfish individuals, led by a rapacious instinct. Only their 
fear of losing life and wealth gets under way their reason, which is when all is 
said and done a calculating reason, and advises them through calculation to sign a 
self-interested contract with any others who are equally interested for their own 




By this reading, selfishness and self-interest—“fear of losing life and wealth”—give rise 
to political contract. It is the equal interest of each individual party that binds them 
together in contractual enterprise, an act of “calculating reason,” to use Cortina’s phrase. 
The subject defining event under contractual polity, at least by this understanding, is the 
preservation of the self in the face of the other (in spite of the other). Here the individual 
replaces the dividual through the written express of law; mutual self-interest (exchange) 
dictates political operation. Marlowe intensifies this aspect of self-interest in the form of 
the Devil’s contract, highlighting exploitation as the extreme end of contractual polity. 
 Where God communes through covenants the Devil deals in contracts. Marlowe’s 
dramatization emphasizes the materialist form of contractual exchange. At the close of 
1.3, for example, Faustus believes an oral contract sufficient to bind him to the Devil. 
However, in 2.1 Mephistopheles’ makes his master’s contractual requirements clear: 
“But, Faustus, thou must bequeath [your soul] solemnly / and write a deed of gift with 
thine own blood, / For that security craves great Lucifer” (2.1.34-36). For that security 
craves great Lucifer. In this exchange of services for goods (Faustus’ soul) the Devil 
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requires surety of written consent. He would have guarantee of payment. Yet once again 
Faustus’ misunderstands the material necessity of the Devil’s contract, mistaking oath for 
binding documentation: “I cut mine arm, and with my proper blood / Assure my soul to 
be great Lucifer’s” (2.1.53-54). And, once more, Mephistopheles stresses the need for 
legal consent: “But, Faustus, thou must / Write it in a manner of a deed of gift” (2.1.58-
59). The Devil, like Faustus, is a legalist. I will return to Faustus’ legalism in my closing 
remarks regarding the theme of repentance in the play. At present the soul-selling 
contract requires further attention. 
 That Faustus’ blood congeals in an act of natural rebellion should give us pause. 
On Lowell Gallagher’s impressive reading, “the staged appearance of Faustus’s blood 
supplies an intuition of the materiality of ethics.”91 The materialist ethics Gallagher traces 
through the flow of Faustus’ blood follows messianic thinking through the philosophy of 
St. Paul, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Agamben. Indeed it is upon Agamben’s 
translation of the Heracletian fragment “ethos anthropo daimon” that Gallagher premises 
his argument for such a materialist ethics. Agamben’s translation reads, “Ethos, the 
habitual dwelling place of man, is that which lacerates and divides.”92 The blood at the 
font of Faustus’ self-inflicted laceration forms an ethical imperative on Gallagher’s 
explanation. Yet from a Pauline precedent it is laceration and its flow that brings 
community rather than division: “But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far away 
                                                 
91 Lowell Gallagher, “Faustus’s Blood and the (Messianic) Question of Ethics,” ELH 73 (2006), 1. 
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have been brought near through the blood of Christ.”93 Might not Marlowe be similarly 
thinking with Paul in his Faustian tragedy?  
For Heidegger, tragedy renders ethics more discernible than political 
philosophy.
94
 Faustus, I would argue, bears this weight of ethical instruction. 
Heidegger’s translation of the same fragment from Heraclitus renders the aspect of 
relational dwelling (yashab, proximal nearness) inherent to Paul’s address: 
The saying of Heraclitus (Fragment 119) goes: ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn. This is 
usually translated, ‘A man’s character is his daimon.’ This translation thinks in a 
modern way, not a Greek one. Ēthos means abode, dwelling place. The word 
names the open region in which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows 
what pertains to man’s essence, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to 
him, to appear. The abode of man contains and preserves the advent of what 
belongs to man in his essence. According to Heraclitus’s phrase this is daimōn, 





Heidegger locates ethics in dwelling, specifically in nearness to the divine. If, following 
Gallagher, we are to read a materialist ethics in Faustus it is in this aspect of proximal 
nearness. In Marlowe’s play religare is ethics. That Faustus rejects the communal 
association of a covenant for contractual exploitation (by the Devil no less), is indeed his 
tragic gesture. In the process thereof he reduces his selfhood to a state of 
commodification; he is an object for sale, an individual commodity. Faustus’ is a 
misapprehension to be sure. Hawkes has shown that in early modern thought “objectified 
subjectivity” is synonymous with “idolatry.”96 And it is in this way that he poses a 
necessary question: “What happens, ethically speaking, in our minds or souls when we 
                                                 
93 Eph. 2:13. 
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are so ‘blinded’ as to mistake a sign for a referent, an image for reality?”97 One answer to 
this question is offered by Faustian example: we pledge fidelity to contracts rather than 
covenants. 
 Perhaps this is why Marlowe stages the Devil’s contract as hyperbolically 
material.
98
 He does so by way of dramatic triptych. First is the extended writing of the 
contract, drawn out through the coagulative pause of Faustus’ blood, and its completion 
with his subversive “Consummatum est” (2.1.73). This is followed by an intermediary 
“show” (2.1.81) effected by Mephistopheles “to delight his mind” (2.1.83)—for at this 
point he is on the verge of repentance prompted by the pneumatic appearance of “Homo, 
fuge” on his forearm (2.1.75-80). In the third and final scene of this dramatic frame 
Faustus is reaffirmed in his action and delivers over the contract, effectively sealing the 
deal: 
FAUSTUS: Here, Mephistopheles, receive this scroll, 
A deed of gift of body and of soul— 
But yet conditionally that thou perform 
All articles prescribed between us both. 
 
MEPHISTOPHELES: Faustus, I swear by hell and Lucifer 
To effect all promises between us made.  (2.1.88-93 
 
As with any contract, the document is premised on exchange (“But yet conditionally…”). 
What is more, by the end of his twenty-four year term Faustus will understand that the 
terms of the contract are exploitative by design. His soul is paid for in the currency of 
illusion—unanswered questions, mute images of celebrity (Alexander, his paramour, 
Helen), and parlor tricks conjured for pleasure of royalty. At this moment, however, 
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Faustus remains unaware and committed to the action of his newly-penned deed. As if to 
emphasize this aspect Marlowe has Faustus read the dictates of the writ on stage in full. 
Kristen Pool’s thoughts on the staging of this material merit repeating at length: 
The bond contains little, if anything, that the audience doesn’t already know; the 
purpose of reading the contract (probably with a large scroll as a stage prop) is to 
underscore its material presence. The document functions, of course, both as the 
inscription of an abstract contract and as the material record of a transaction 
between Faustus and the devil, but at this moment the bond’s evidentiary qualities 
take precedence. Here, form trumps content, as the play insistently draws our 
attention to the document’s materiality.99 
 
Its materiality, tragically, comes at the cost of a consummatum est. Pompa Banerjee reads 
this biblical allusion as an act of Faustian self-consumption.
100
 Faustus’ self is indeed 
consumed by contractual conscription, at least insofar as his misapprehension guides 
action. Such is the price of Faustus’ fervent belief in his autonomy. The play’s theology, 




 Faustus is ultimately a play about repentance. Marlowe’s tragic character poses 
the play’s central question in soliloquy at the opening of the soul-selling scene: “Faustus, 
must thou needs be damned, / And canst thou be saved” (2.1.1-2). Across its multiple acts 
(and actions) Faustus is repeatedly told that he can repent, and even concedes to do so on 
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three occasions during the play’s course.101 Yet he does not repent. Materialist thinking 
bars such action. 
 By definition repentance is a mode of thought. In the Greek koine of the New 
Testament repentance is signified by three terms, the verbs metamelomai and metanoeo, 
as well as the cognate noun metanoia.
102
 Whether as a verb or noun, repentance denotes a 
change of mind; it is a rethinking, a paradigmatic shift in thought which precipitates a 
subsequent shift in action—moral, ethical, political, and relational. Donne’s 1626 sermon 
on Matthew attests to its early modern understanding in similar terms:  
He that cannot define Repentance, he that cannot spell it, may have it; and he that 
hath written whole books, great Volumes of it, may be without it. In one word, 
(one word will not do it, but in two words) it is Aversio, and Conversio; it is a 




Donne dramatizes repentance in its turns as open to all, even the most seemingly 
unworthy (“he that cannot spell it”). In its early modern association repentance is a return 
to community, a rejection of narcissistic self-interest.
104
 Repentance also acknowledges 
the covenantal aspect of createdness as described by biblical scholar Michael Horton: 
We were not just created and then given a covenant; we were created as covenant 





Marlowe pens such an apprehension in the following exchange between Faustus and 
Mephistopheles:   
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FAUSTUS: When I behold the heavens, then I repent 
And curse thee, wicked Mephistopheles, 
Because thou hast deprived me of those joys. 
 
MEPHISTOPHELES: Why, Faustus, 
Think’st thou heaven is such a glorious thing? 
I tell thee, ’tis not half so fair as thou 
Or any man that breathes on earth. 
 
FAUSTUS: How provest thou that? 
 
MEPHISTOPHELES: It was made for man; therefore is man 
more excellent. 
 
FAUSTUS: If it were made for man, ’twas made for me. 
I will renounce this magic and repent. (2.3.1-11) 
 
Indeed, when Mephistopheles will not tell Faustus “who made the world” (2.3.36) in an 
act of homo fuge Faustus once again announces metanoiaic intent: 
 MEPHISTOPHELES: Think thou on hell, Faustus, for thou art damned. 
 FAUSTUS: Think, Faustus, upon God, that made the world. (2.3.72-73) 
Ultimately, however, Faustus consigns himself to instrumental thinking. His very body 
and soul come to be understood as a singular object for sale, under contract legally-
binding and irrevocable. In fact, upon pain of death (a devilish threat raised in response to 
his protest of repentance) Faustus’ drafts another deed of gift to Lucifer (5.1.69-74). 
 Like magic, the Devil’s contract is an illusion. Its legalism is designed to distract 
a subject from covenantal return. Donne preaches the open invitation of such return 
through the repetition of Matthew 9:13 as a sermon proof text: I came not to call the 
righteous, but sinners to repentance.
106
 Faustus, not unlike Paul, views himself as chief 
among sinners: “Faustus’ offense can ne’er be pardoned / The serpent that tempted Eve 
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may be saved, but not Faustus” (5.2.15-16).107 Although some thirty years distance 
separates Donne’s sermon from Faustus’ first performance,  Marlowe nevertheless 
reminds his audiences of the openness of the covenantal call, bearing witness to this early 
modern understanding of repentance as a return: “Yet, Faustus, call on God” (5.2.27). 
The weight of legalism and contractual exchange, however, prove too great for Faustus. 
His is ever an error in thinking. In a final admission to his only friends, Faustus resigns to 
the belief that he is an irrevocably commodified subject and thus consigns himself to hell 
as the object of contractual purchase: “I writ them a bill with mine own  / blood. The date 
expired, the time will come, and he will / fetch me” (5.2.40-42). In an alternate 
Renaissance turn, Donne levies similar economic language for the purpose of covenantal 
return (re-ligature): “The Market is open till the bell ring; till thy last bell ring the Church 
is open, grace is to be had there.”108 Repentance is religare, as Donne’s Meditation XVII 
has already shown; it is to become once more “ingrafted into that body whereof I am a 
member.” 
  
In an ever-deferred, uncompleted and yet would-be final action, Faustus affirms, 
“I’ll burn my books” (5.2.120). Yet his rejection of materialist thinking comes too late. It 
is never enacted. His metanoia remains in the future tense: I will burn my books. 
Similarly, the material artifact (idol) of the contract and its power could be cast aside, its 
false promise revoked by covenantal return. Yet, Faustus, call on God. Yet he does not. 
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Faustus’ confession recalls an instance of atemporal echo in a similar admission from 
Prospero: 
But this rough magic  
I here abjure; […] 
I’ll break my staff , 
Bury it certain fathoms in the earth, 
And deeper than did ever plummet sound 
I’ll drown my book. (5.1.50-51, 54-57)109 
 
Yet unlike Prospero, whose end signals the promise of communal return, Faustus’ fate is 
one of isolation and torment. The promise of Milan’s proximity is a stark contrast to the 
alienation of hell, the very absence of relationality.
110
 My aim in this chapter has been to 
suggest The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus as Marlowe’s dramatization of the dire 
effects and affects contractual and instrumental thinking have on the world and wider 
human relationships. From this early modern perspective, Faustus enacts the tragic 
consequences of failing to recognize the human condition as shared creaturely estate and 
covenantal relation. Read in this way, Marlowe’s is a metanoiaic text, a dramatic 
encounter that may be approached as an invitation for thinking life, politics, and the way 
the two inhere, otherwise. The chapters that follow take up three of Shakespeare’s later 
plays as similar opportunities for such rethinking. 
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Measure for Measure and the Biopolitics of Grace 
Only within a biopolitical horizon will it be possible to decide whether the 
categories whose opposition founded modern politics (right / left, private / public, 
absolutism / democracy, etc.)—and which have been steadily dissolving, to the 
point of entering today into a real zone of indistinction—will have to be 




also they have power over our bodies…and we are in great distress. 
—Nehemiah 9:37b1   
 
Grace is grace, despite of all controversy. 
—Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, 1.2.242 
 
 
Speaking of the scriptural reference made in Measure for Measure’s title, Grace 
Ioppolo has remarked that, “[a]t the very least, Shakespeare’s reconsideration of St. 
Matthew’s maxim to ‘judge not, that ye be judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye 
shall be judged, and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again,’ 
demands that Christianity prove its relevance to early modern England.”3 This chapter 
seeks to locate such relevance at the intersection of biopolitics and grace. Biopolitics may 
be loosely defined as the ways in and through which life in its varied meanings becomes 
entangled in polity. I use grace in its early modern Reformed theological context as 
God’s unmerited favor descended upon mankind. In its political-theological operation 
                                                 
1 I have chosen the American Standard Version here for its translation of the Hebrew mashal as “power,” in 
order to emphasize the connection with biopower examined in this chapter. Mashal may be similarly 
translated as “dominion” or “rule,” as in the KJV and NIV respectively. All biblical citations here follow 
the King James Version unless otherwise noted.  
2 All references to Measure for Measure cite the Norton Critical Edition edited by Grace Ioppolo (New 
York: Norton, 2010). 
3 Grace Ioppolo, introduction to Measure for Measure, by William Shakespeare (New York: Norton, 2010), 
xv. The titular reference is to Mt. 7:1-2; see also Lk. 6:38, “give, and it shall be given unto you; good 
measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with 
the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again.”  
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grace can further be said to initiate a bios-politics, a particular course of action (bios) 
through which one chooses to live one’s life among others. My discussion of biopolitics 
takes its cue largely from the work of Giorgio Agamben, particularly his influential 
monograph Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, as well as political theory from 
Aristotle and Saint Paul. In doing so, this chapter explores the political potentials opened 
by grace as they are traced across the Jewish and Christian scriptural registers in 
Shakespeare’s Vienna.4 In its Hebraic context, grace (hen, favor) often stages a face-to-
face encounter with God, which subsequently carries an ethico-moral imperative toward 
others. Luke and Paul ascribe grace (charis, favor) two further aspects in the Christian 
tradition following the Greek koine of the first-century Church. For Luke this favor is 
often associated with power, or in an Agambenian register, potentiality. For Paul, the 
favor of grace comes in the form of a calling, a vocation (bios), what Agamben terms 
form-of-life. 
Following the thread of political theology, this chapter weaves in the flows 
between biopolitical thought and political-theological thinking, with particular 
consideration given to the degree that the latter instructs the former in the fabric of 
Measure for Measure.
5
 My argument is that grace functions in Shakespeare’s Vienna as a 
paradigm for biopolitics. I will map this paradigm by suggesting that Shakespeare scripts 
Judeo-Christian eudaimonism as political-theological agapeism in Measure for Measure. 
Such a reading stages an ethics based on agapeic love. My terms here will be treated 
                                                 
4 For the definitional glosses that follow see, Baker’s Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. 
Elwell (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996), s.v. “grace.” 
5 For a concise overview of the intersection of political theology and biopolitical theory in Shakespeare 




more fully as my argument progresses, yet some initial explanation is helpful. 
Eudaimonia refers to the Greek philosophical desire to achieve a life well lived; I use the 
term both in its well-known Aristotelian sense and its pre-Socratic idiom as spiritual 
favor. In its theological aspect, a scriptural eduaimonism is inaugurated by St. Paul and 
emphasized as the practice of agapeism in the Reformed thinking of Martin Luther.     
Following this genealogy of eudaimonia, theological eudaimonism, a life well lived in 
the religious sense understood by many post-Reformation early moderns, is achieved 
through the practice of agape, love of the neighbor prompted by the divine fiat Thou shalt 
love thy neighbour as thyself.
6
 As I will show, within the Reformed tradition prevalent in 
the Renaissance, the practice of agape ought to be attendant in one’s life subsequent to 
the free receipt of grace.
7
 These connections will be parsed in due course; at present my 
aim is to establish the connection between eudaimonism as theological agapeism and 
grace. That is, agapeism as the active living of the good life by one who believes him- or 
herself to be saved by grace. To be clear, I am not advocating a materialist grace, but 
rather a material and indeed political-theological response to grace through the spiritually 
mandated practice of agape as a faith at work in physical action for the other.
8
 Paul 
Cefalu has argued that “a better way to explain the ethical work performed by early 
                                                 
6 See Mt. 22: 39 and Mk. 12:31. 
7 On the Pauline connection between the operation of grace and the Great Commandment of the Gospels, 
see Gal. 5:4 and 5:14. I take up Luther’s adducing of this point later in the chapter.  
8 Contemporary arguments for a materialist grace have been forwarded by Slavoj Žižek in The Fragile 
Absolute: or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (New York: Verso, 2000); On Belief (New 
York: Routledge, 2001); and The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 2003). For a critique of  Žižek’s particular conception of materialist grace, see Roland 
Boer, “Paul and Materialist Grace: Slavoj Žižek’s Reformation,” in Paul and the Philosophers, eds. Ward 
Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 186-223. Following the work of 
Bruno Latour, an object-oriented approach to grace has recently been theorized by Adam S. Miller in 




modern literature is to say that it offers ad hoc, context-sensitive guidelines for moral 
behavior rather than universalizable rules of conduct.”9 I would offer political-theological 
agapeism funded by grace as one such ad hoc, context-sensitive guideline for moral 
behavior forwarded by Measure for Measure.    
In terms of political theology, grace is often placed in opposition to law. For 
scholar of religion Vincent Lloyd this forced dichotomy reveals the problem of 
supersessionist logic.
10
  “Reducing the richness of theological tradition to two vague 
gestures,” he warns, “leads directly into the trap of discarding Law in favor of Grace.”11 
Such would certainly seem to be the case at the close of Measure for Measure with the 
restoration of the Duke’s gracious authority in Vienna over the strict legalism of 
Angelo’s religious zeal. Yet Lloyd’s critique goes further, defining grace as “modes of 
redemption,” contrary to law as “modes of living and acting” with the caveat whether one 
chooses to live “religiously or politically.”12 Shakespeare’s Vienna tests whether such 
divisive choice is necessary. Quite to the contrary, in this particular Vienna, to live 
politically in a positive ethical sense is to live religiously. The problem with grace, 
                                                 
9 Paul Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 189. 
10 Agamben’s epigraph in this chapter signals his critique of binary thinking as well. From an Agambenian 
perspective the “zone of indistinction” created in the wake of modern political binaries (right/left, 
private/public, absolutism/democracy, etc.) is a form of supersessionism; the binary ultimately collapses as 
one side eventually exerts its force over and in turn effectively replaces the other. See Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
4. On the problem of supersessionist logic as it relates to contemporary literary theory and criticism see, 
David Hawkes, “Against Materialism in Literary Theory,” in The Return of Theory in Early Modern 
English Studies: Tarrying with the Subjunctive, eds. Paul Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds (New York: Palgrave, 
2011), 237-57. “Against Materialism” was also published electronically as an invitation for an open 
conversation on the theme of “New Idealism?” for the ejournal Early Modern Culture (issue 9, 2012), 
where it generated rather heated critical debate. Respondents to Hawkes’ essay include Michael Booth, 
Adam Bryx and Bryan Reynolds, William Flesch, Christopher Kendrick, John Sutton and Evelyn B. 
Tribble, and Gabriel Egan. The ejournal can be accessed here http://emc.eserver.org/1-9/issue9.html. 
11 Vincent W. Lloyd, The Problem with Grace: Reconfiguring Political Theology (Stanford: Stanford 




following Lloyd’s argument, is the problem of lived action. For Lloyd, political theology 
in practice must promote law (modes of living and acting) not resign itself to grace (the 
passive acceptance of redemption), whose effective end, he argues, reveals itself to be 
nothing less than the sovereign exception.
13
 In place of grace, Lloyd advocates “a 
political theology…without Christian presuppositions.”14 Yet Lloyd’s intervention 
presupposes a Christianity that is necessarily supersessionist. 
Neither Scripture nor Shakespeare subscribe to this logic. Following Protestant 
theology, as the very incarnation of grace Jesus acknowledges his purpose in Matthew 
5:17 not as a destruction of the law but its fulfillment, despite the period’s dispersed 
antinomian opinion otherwise.
15
 In this Matthean sense, grace is a way of living law in 
ethical relation; grace as such does not replace law but rather becomes its enactment 
through praxis: the caring of and for others. Such action, though expressed in Matthew, 
gets its marching orders under Pauline theology in direct opposition to antinomian 
dissent. Luther affirms as much: “after [Paul] has rejected the works of the law, so that it 
sounds as though he would abolish the law by faith; ‘Nay,’ he says, ‘we establish the law 
by faith,’ that is we fulfill it by faith.”16 For Luther, to live by faith is to live under grace. 
As a mode of living and acting, grace thus performs Lloyd’s very definition of law. In an 
early modern turn, Shakespeare’s resistance to supersessionist logic has been recently 
                                                 
13 On this see Lloyd, introduction, 1-26. 
14 Ibid., 12. 
15 Mt. 5:17 reads, “Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, 
but to fulfill.” For a survey of early modern English antinomianism see, Gertrude Huehns, Antinomianism 
in English History, with Special Reference to the Period 1640-1660 (London: Cresset Press, 1951). On the 
antinomian critique of Puritan legalism, see David Como, Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the 
Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil War England (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004).   
16 Martin Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” in Works of Martin Luther, Volume VI 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1930), 450. 
52 
 
demonstrated by Julia Reinhard Lupton, whose work on the role of Whitsun and whitpot 
in The Winter’s Tale explores Pentecost in its rich Judeo-Christian heritage. As Lupton 
has shown through the confluences between Shavuot and Pentecost, both in the early 
Church and early modern England, Christian supersessionism need not exist and indeed 
exhibited pockets of active resistance in Shakespeare’s age.17 Similarly, Jonathan Gil 
Harris has argued brilliantly for the palimpsistic nature of life represented in both 
Shakespeare’s plays and by the environs of early modern England, suggesting continued 




Although I am not arguing that Measure for Measure is exclusively or even 
predominantly a biopolitical play, I do want to suggest that Shakespeare’s Vienna tests 
the potential of grace as a means of mediating between the human and its others, whether 
zoological (human, animal), environmental, or object-oriented in relation.
19
 The first 
section of the chapter begins by establishing Measure for Measure within the context of 
political theology and biopolitical thinking, while arguing for literature’s meditative 
capacity to bring an ethically concerned politics to the fore. Section two turns attention to 
the play proper by suggesting eudaimonia, the Greek concept of the good life, as 
Measure for Measure’s chief political concern, especially in its early modern register as 
                                                 
17 Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Whitsun and Whitpot in The Winter’s Tale” (Unpublished paper, University of 
California, Irvine, 2014). I wish to thank the author for sharing her pre-published work and for our 
extended discussions on this subject. 
18 See Jonathan Gil Harris, Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
19 In the spirit of grace, I must acknowledge my debt to Lupton, whose work has served as a rhetorical 
model for my phrasing here. With regard to grace’s political potentiality, this chapter focuses primarily on 
the function of grace in human to human relations. However, it serves as the foundation for the arguments 
in chapters Three and Four, which speak at length about gracious living in terms of posthuman encounters 
and stewardship, the care of and for people, animals, nature, and things.  
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agapeism operant under the banner of grace. Agamben’s thinking is introduced here as a 
methodology to think life along its Greek vectors and to assess the way Shakespeare’s 
Vienna stages the biopolitical concerns voiced in Homo Sacer, particularly the fate of the 
body under the law where personhood is reduced to material (and manageable) 
objectivity. The chapter concludes by arguing for a biopolitics of grace in terms of its 
relational enactments. Here grace is cast in Agambenian vernacular as both “form-of-life” 
and “potentiality,” and is offered as a hermeneutic lens to both re-read and ameliorate the 
marriages that form the play’s concluding action and which have long since garnered 
much of its critical censure.  
 




From the Duke’s opening lines, “Of government the properties to unfold” (1.1.3) 
in Act One, Scene One, Measure for Measure expresses its concern with measuring 
governmental action.
20
 In a generic turn, Ervene Gulley has argued for the play as legal 
theater, highlighting both the theatrical nature of law in human affairs and Measure for 
Measure as “a mediation on the nature of law itself,” going so far as to cast Angelo and 
                                                 
20 On the importance of the Duke’s opening lines see Richard Wilson, “Prince of Darkness: Foucault’s 
Shakespeare,” in Measure for Measure, ed. Nigel Wood (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1996), 150; 
Louis L. Martz, “‘Of government’: Theme and Action in Measure for Measure,” in Classical, Renaissance, 
and Postmodernist Acts of the Imagination, ed. Arthur F. Kinney (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 
1996), 212; and Deborah Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England: The Sacred and the State 
in Measure for Measure (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1.   
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Escalus as “legal dramatists.”21 Yet the play’s arguably most enduring generic affiliation 
is that proposed by nineteenth century critic F.S. Boas: the problem play. For Boas, the 
problem of locating Measure for Measure within a fixed category is its inherent 
resistance to capture by a single genre: how is it to be distinguished from its compounded 
associations with comedy, tragedy, and history? For twenty- and twenty-first century 
scholars the generic problem of and with Measure for Measure remains similarly vexed, 
although the contest is situated in decidedly polarized interpretations with regard to 
religion. Should the play be read as a wholly secular critique of politics on Shakespeare’s 
part, particularly to the degree that its marriages function as a political tool for patriarchal 
hegemony?
22
 Or, based on its overt religious rhetoric, does the play advocate an 
assessment of the period’s intrinsic political theology?23   
 As the only Shakespeare play with a direct Biblical allusion in its title, Measure 
for Measure suggests, or at the very least grants, a reading in light of scriptural intertexts. 
The titular “measure,” as already noted, is taken from the Gospel of Matthew.24 This 
overt Biblical reference, coupled with the plays internal New Testament glosses, lead G. 
Wilson Knight to his now infamous argument that Measure for Measure must be read in 
                                                 
21 Ervene Gulley, “‘Dressed in a little brief authority’: Law as Theater in Measure for Measure,” in Law 
and Literature Perspectives, ed. Bruce L. Rockwood (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 68 and 58 
respectively.  
22 On this see Martz, “‘Of government,’” regarding two 1990’s editions of Measure for Measure edited by 
Brian Gibbions and N.W. Bawcutt, which position the play generically as a tragicomedy in order to skirt 
the problems raised when reading the play as “religious allegory, parable, or morality play,” 211.   
23 For readings of Measure for Measure invested in its relation to political theology see Lupton, Thinking 
with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), who reads 
Measure and All’s Well as “Corinthian commentaries on marriage, liberty, and the law,” 219; for grace and 
pardoning as conjoined mechanisms of political theology see Paul Cefalu, “The Ethics of Pardoning in 
Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure,” in Early Modern Drama and the Bible, ed. Adrian Streete (New 
York: Palgrave, 2012), 105-17.   
24 See n.3. 
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light of the Gospels, with the play functioning as a parable of love as ethics.
25
 The critical 
backlash against Knight’s reading and others of its kind has been prolific. To read the 
play as a parable in the sense Knight intends is to force an allegorical interpretation on 
the text to the degree that, as R. M. Frye has criticized, such heavy-handed allegorization 
“translates Shakespeare out of dramatic and into theological terms.”26 Writing some thirty 
years later, Brian Vickers has censured those prone to allegorical (mis)reading like 
Knight on the grounds that allegory is forced hermeneutic, operating on a text from 
without and not being constructed from within.
27
 And while this is certainly a warranted 
critique, it should be noted that secular critical ideologies are no less forced. Vickers’ 
attack on religious readings of Shakespeare’s plays, as Julia Brett has shown, renders 
transparent his own ideological bias. Vickers’ criticism, while leveled at Christian 
readings of Othello, Lear, and Coriolanus, “makes no mention of Measure for Measure, 
a play so obviously dominated by Christian imagery that,” as Brett reminds us, “the 
omission is…worth pursuing.”28  
A similar trend can be seen in recent scholarly editions of Measure for Measure 
that editorially strip the play of its Biblical aspects. The effect of such editorialization is 
                                                 
25 G. Wilson Knight, “Measure for Measure and the Gospels,” in The Wheel of Fire (London: Methuen, 
1949), 79-109. For another Christian allegorical reading of Measure for Measure in the vein of Knight’s 
interpretation see Arthur C. Kirsch, “The Integrity of Measure for Measure,” in Shakespeare’s Christian 
Dimension, ed. Roy Battenhouse (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 181-87; see also Roy 
Battenhouse, “Measure for Measure and the Atonement Story,” in the same volume, 171-80.  
26 Roland Mushat Frye, Shakespeare and Christian Doctrine (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 
35.  
27 Brian Vickers, Appropriating Shakespeare: Contemporary Critical Quarrels (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 372-416. For an excellent assessment of Vickers’ argument, as well as its 
shortcomings, see Julia Brett, “‘Grace is grace, despite all the controversy’: Measure for Measure, 
Christian Allegory, and the Sacerdotal Duke,” Ben Jonson Journal 6 (1999): 189-207. 
28 Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 190. 
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to display both law and politics denuded of religious overtones.
29
 Yet doing so, as Brett 
has argued, is to enact a hermeneutic “error in the opposite kind.”30 If Carl Schmitt’s oft-
cited dictum is correct and “[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts,” and Deborah Shuger affirmed in her assessment of 
Measure for Measure as “a sustained meditation on its own political moment,” then to 
remove political theology from the play’s interpretive ambit is certainly such an error.31 
“To choose to read Measure for Measure outside the universe of Christian theological 
discourse,” Brett maintains and I am inclined to agree, “is to misread it indeed.”32 
However, before this play can be read in terms of its examination of political theology it 
is first necessary to understand Measure for Measure within the context of its more 






                                                 
29 See, Giorgio Agamben, Nudities, trans. David Kishik (Stanford: University of California Press, 2011), 
for a discussion of the flaw in such thinking. Extending my denuding metaphor, Agamben reminds that 
nakedness in Western thought is to always already encounter human nakedness before God, 57-87. For the 
editions cited, see Martz, “‘Of government,’”  n.27.     
30 Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 191. 
31 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 36; Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England, 
1. Shuger’s argument locates Measure for Measure’s “own political moment” as James’s accession 
specifically and the Reformation and its aftermath more broadly, establishing the play as being deeply 
invested political and religio-political commentary.   
32 Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 191. Robin H. Wells accentuates this point: “before we read the play against the 
grain, it’s as well to be aware of which way the grain is running in the first place,” 86, see “Recovering 
Shakespeare’s Humanism: Self-Knowledge and Social Justice in Measure for Measure,” in Renaissance 




Opening Doubts Upon the Law 
 
Research has shown that early modern English fascination with the law 
experienced rapid growth during the Tudor and early Jacobean periods.
33
 The recent 
collection Shakespeare and the Law writes that “[t]he passion of Elizabethans for law is 
impressive compared even to present-day American litigiousness, one estimate 
suggesting that toward the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign an English population of 
around 4 million persons was involved in 1 million actions per year.”34  This burgeoning 
legal interest, however, was often tempered with a healthy dose of skepticism worked out 
on the public theater stages. Much of this comports with Jean-Paul Pittion’s contention 
that during this period “[t]he stage became a public space, perhaps the only legitimate 
one at the time, where the values which the Law claimed to enshrine and with the Courts 
sought to enforce, were challenged and made the subject of a public negotiation, by 
means of dramatised fictions about justice.”35 By tracing one specific generic trajectory, 
the moot, the fictional dramatization of Shakespeare’s Vienna finds a generative politico-
critical locus in this dramatic form unique to the legal system.  
Boas’s categorization of Measure for Measure as a problem play demonstrates its 
resistance to generic capture. And while I do not wish to suggest the play as being 
restricted to any singular genre, Measure for Measure may nevertheless be read in light 
of certain generic conventions. To wit, Karen Cunningham has argued convincingly for 
                                                 
33 On this see Jean-Paul Pittion, “Writing the Law / Righting the Law in Shakespeare’s Time,” in 
Shakespeare and the Law, ed. Daniela Carpi (Ravenna: Longo, 2003), 59-69. 
34 Bradin Cormack, Martha C. Nussbaum, and Richard Strier, eds., Shakespeare and the Law (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013), 3. For recent critical interest on Shakespeare’s relation to law and legal 
studies, see n.6 in this volume. 
35 Pittion, “Writing the Law,” 59. 
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the play working within the legal genre of mooting.
36
 A moot is a theoretical dramatic 
enactment where law students assume the role of either prosecution or defense in an 
imagined case.
 37
 As a pedagogical exercise, the moot is designed to challenge law 
students to explore the nuances opened by the archive of court cases and extant laws 
while demonstrating each budding lawyer’s wit and argumentative acumen. To read 
Measure for Measure as a moot is not only to encounter the play within its political 
entanglements but also to engage it as a legal thinking-with, as a thought experiment 
designed not to resolve complex issues but to explore them. Thinking-with Measure for 
Measure as a moot calls for a consideration of its strident legalism in light of the play’s 
larger ethical concern. If politics is to be conceived as an ethical enterprise, how or when 
is it ethically viable to demand the law’s full measure, especially within a biopolitical 
arena heavily invested in the management of life even unto death?  
As a generic form, the moot further exhibits connections to political theology.
38
 
According to Cunningham, “[o]ne oft-repeated, classic case can offer a partial glimpse of 
the England imagined by moots”39; this case is none other than an early modern 
juridically constructed inheritance dispute between Jacob and Esau. Here the moot’s 
juridico-political entanglements take on an aspect of theology if only in their connection 
                                                 
36 Karen Cunningham, “Opening Doubts Upon the Law: Measure for Measure,” in A Companion to 
Shakespeare’s Works, Vol. IV: The Pomes, Problem Comedies, and Late Plays, eds. Richard Dutton and 
Jean E. Howard (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 316-32.  
37 It should also be noted that “moot” has another more generally known meaning as a kind of Anglo-Saxon 
court. However, for the purposes of this chapter, my interest centers on the dramatic nature of the moot as it 
was practiced in early modern law colleges, especially as such legal dramatization finds expression in the 
works of Shakespeare. In a more recent pedagogical turn, the tradition of connecting Shakespeare’s plays 
and thinking to the practice of mooting was the focus of the Shakespeare Moot Court at McGill University 
from 2002-2007. 
38 Perhaps a better term here would be legal theology, although I hesitate to use such a term due to its 
connotative suggestion of canon law. Even the example given, the Biblical case of Jacob and Easu, is 
considered within the moot is thought in terms of civil rather than ecclesiastical law. 
39 Cunningham, “Opening Doubts,” 319. 
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to Biblical narrative as a formative intertext in the Western philosophical-legal-political 
thinking affected by the moot itself. With its Biblically allusive title, Measure for 
Measure stages its moot in similar political-theological fashion. 
While moots enjoyed academic tenure from the medieval period through the 
sixteenth-century, by the early seventeenth-century they began to fall out of favor with 
political authority in England.
40
 In their open interrogation and theoretical exploration of 
the multiple possibilities posed by the law, moots came to be seen during this time to 
effectively “cloud rather than shed light on legal principles.”41 Famous among moots 
critics is none less than Francis Bacon, himself no stranger to the law as a resident of the 
Inns. Chief among Bacon’s concern for the practice of mooting was its capability to 
“open doubts upon the law.”42 With an eye toward ethical return in politico-legal action, I 
take up the moot’s  generic capacity to open and subsequently cast doubt upon the law in 
Measure for Measure as well as the wider sphere of Western politics within whose orbit 
it is necessarily drawn. Building upon the theoretical agency moots open onto such 







                                                 
40 Ibid., 328.  
41 Ibid. 







The problem with the law in Vienna is its laxity. As the Duke readily confesses to 
Friar Thomas in Act One, Scene Four, for fourteen years he has allowed “evil deeds [to] 
have their permissive pass / And not the punishment” (1.4.38-39).43 The effect of this 
legal leniency is nothing less than the decline of morality within the city:  “liberty plucks 
justice by the nose; / … / and quite athwart / Goes all decorum” (1.4.28-31). Anyone 
familiar with the play may easily decipher the Duke’s euphemistic language. These “evil 
deeds” and the “decorum” gone “athwart” are thinly veiled code for sexual immorality. 
Pompey, for example, Measure’s resident bawd, is effectively a synecdoche for 
prostitution and its social ills. Claudio and Juliet suffer “the morality of imprisonment” 
(1.3.18), as Lucio remarks, for an act of consensual intimacy within the bounds of 
betrothal. And Claudio further attests that although Juliet “is fast my wife” (1.3.31), his 
offence before the law is deemed “Lechery” (1.3.23). In fact, the only criminals we 
witness in the play not imprisoned or interrogated for reasons of a sexual nature are 
Barnardine and Ragozine, a drunk and a pirate.
44
  
As critics have repeatedly shown, the overarching politico-legal attention in 
Shakespeare’s Vienna is directed toward sexuality, yet I would suggest it is more 
pointedly a concern for eudaimonistic living. The Duke wants nothing more than for his 
                                                 
43 Claudio claims that the duration of the law’s laxity has been nineteen and not fourteen years as the Duke 
suggests, see 1.3.52. 
44 On Barnardine’s history and imprisonment, see 4.2.117-41; for Ragozine, 4.3.64. 
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citizens to live a good life, as witnessed by his multiple pardons in the final scene, an 
analysis I take up in the course of this chapter. Angelo’s politics are no less guided by the 
imperative of good living, even if he would have all of Vienna’s citizens live as saints.45 
What I would make clear, however, is that Shakespeare’s political-theological thinking 
on the subject of eudiamonia, while guided by early modern scriptural imperative as I 
will show, is equally invested in a critique of Puritan legalism.
46
 That is, the Duke’s and 
Angelo’s understanding of what constitutes the living of the good life, even as both are 
directed by scriptural course, prove radically divergent in their operation. My point here 
is that the idea of the good life directs the course of political action in Measure for 
Measure.  
According to Agamben, Western political tradition finds one of its fundamental 
topoi in Aristotle’s Politics. Thus Agamben explains in this oft-cited passage: 
when Aristotle defined the end of the perfect community in a passage that was to 
become canonical for the political tradition of the West (1252b, 30), he did so 
precisely by opposing the simple fact of living (to zēn) to politically qualified life 
(to eu zēn): ginomenē men oun tou zēn heneken, ousa de tou eu zēn, “born with 
regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life”47 
 
The problem with politically qualified life, per Agamben, is that it is poised in opposition 
to the simple fact of living. The larger project of his Homo Sacer series has been to bring 
                                                 
45 See Julia Reinhard Lupton, Citizen Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), on “the particular conceptual convergence—between the saint and the citizen, or 
more broadly, between a theology of exceptionalism and a politics of the norm—as it manifests in 
Shakespeare’s plays,” 21. 
46 M.W. Rowe has argued counter to my position that the Duke undertakes an ethical experiment in 
Measure for Measure to prove the superiority of Aristotelian ethics over Puritan morality; see, “The 
Dissolution of Goodness: Measure for Measure and Classical Ethics,” International Journal of the 
Classical Tradition 5 (1988-89): 20-46. 
47 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 2, emphasis in original. 
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to the fore the problematics that arise in such binary thinking.
48
 Inevitably, he concludes, 
one pole of the dyad is subsumed within the other; in this case, the simple fact of living 
becomes the focus of politics at the expense of concern for living with regard to the good 
life.
49
 As we shall see, this is the very predicament Claudio finds himself in before 
Angelo’s enactment of the law by its letter; the presence of Claudio’s physical body, the 
simple fact of his being alive, stands as an affront to Angelo’s legalism. For now, 
however, I wish to parse Aristotle’s concept of politically qualified life (to eu zēn) as 
existing with regard to the good life.  
 Put simply, the Greek eu zēn is synonymous with eudaimonia.50 In Aristotelian 
terms, eudaimonia may be translated as “doing well” or “living well,” as exemplified in 
the Nicomachean Ethics.
51
 This regard for doing or living well is marked by active verbs. 
Thus, as one critic has suggested, within the context of Aristotle’s ethics specifically and 
Greek philosophical thought more broadly, “[e]udaimonia primarily characterizes lives or 
                                                 
48 Agamben’s Homo Sacer series of monographs includes: Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); State of Exception, trans. Kevin 
Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological 
Genealogy of Economy and Government, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa with Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2011); The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath, trans. Adam Kotsko 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Opus Dei: An Archaeology of Duty, trans. Adam Kotsko 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002); and The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and 
Form-of-Life, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). The books are here listed in 
their sequential order within the larger argument of the series and not by their date of publication. 
49 On this in brief, see Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7. 
50 Regarding the Nicomachean Ethics, L.H.G. Greenwood writes: “Phronesis may be defined as the 
intellectual arete that leads to knowledge of the good things to do as means to the great end of man which 
is eu zen or eupraxia or eudaimonia,” Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six: With Essays, Notes, and 
Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 44. With reference to eudaimonia in the 
thinking of Socrates and Plato, C.D.C. Reeve notes that ““Eu zēn (living well) and eudaimonia are 
coextensive,” citing the Republic 353e10-354a4, Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato’s Apology of 
Socrates (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 126, n.23.  
51 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 
2000),  I.IV. 1095a18-21.  
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life-activities, rather than states of mind or feeling,”52 That is, eudaimonia, like Lloyd’s 
differentiation of law in opposition to grace, is a mode of living or acting. It is a way of 
life, indeed a way of living with regard to the good life. Thus from an Aristotelian 
precedent, it is not the fact that one merely lives, but rather how one chooses to live that 
should define the aim of politics. In order to better assess the progressive nature of 
Shakespeare’s political thinking on this front in Measure for Measure, it is helpful to first 
attend to the limits of Aristotelian eudaimonism developed in the play before turning to 
its scriptural supplement in the form of agapeic political-theology under Vincentio’s 
gracious actions. 
 We witness the Aristotelian eudaimonistic imperative as a central concern in 
Measure for Measure through Escalus’s exchange with Pompey: 
ESCALUS: Pompey, you are partly a bawd, Pompey, howsoever 
you color it in being a tapster. Are you not? Come, tell me 
true; it shall be the better for you. 
 
POMPEY: Truly, sir, I am a poor fellow that would live. 
 
ESCALUS: How would you live, Pompey? By being a bawd? 
What do you think of the trade, Pompey? Is it a lawful trade? 
 
POMPEY: If the law would allow it, sir. 
 
ESCALUS: But the law will not allow it, Pompey, nor it shall 
not be allowed in Vienna. 
 
POMPEY: Does your worship mean to geld and splay all the youth of the city? 
 
ESCALUS: No, Pompey. 
 
POMPEY: Truly, sir, in my poor opinion, they will to’t then. If  
your worship will take order for the drabs and the knaves, 
you need not to fear the bawds.  (2.1.201-215)
53
  
                                                 
52 Kimon Lycos, Plato on Justice and Power: Reading Book I of Plato’s Republic (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1987), 175, n.1, emphasis in original.  




As an officer of the state, Escalus’s primary concern for Pompey is the way he chooses to 
live his life. In his defense, Pompey argues that he is but a “poor fellow that would live,” 
and yet it is the quality of his life choices, here marked by his vocation as a bawd, that 
raise concern.
54
 Put simply, Pompey’s life is measured by Escalus (and thus political 
agency) by the degree to which he fails to live a life toward the good. In this legal 
dialogue, Escalus’s prosecution and Pompey’s defense both correlate a man’s livelihood 
with his life; in eudaimonistic terms the two appear synonymous, or at the very least akin. 
Within this register, it is perhaps not surprising that eudaimonia may be translated as 
“human flourishing” or “fulfilling life.” Pompey’s livelihood as a bawd, an unlawful 
trade, to paraphrase Escalus, works in quite the opposite direction. To the degree that 
prostitution exhibits productivity in Vienna, the outgrowths of such living conditions are 
illegitimate children and venereal disease. Lucio’s quick-witted dialogue with the two 
gentlemen in Mistress Overdone’s house testifies to the threat of disease ever present in 
the minds, and often on the bodies, of those who frequent such establishments.
55
 And as 
he admits to the disguised Duke, Lucio himself once got a prostitute with child.
56
 The 
class distinction between Lucio and Pompey, however, reveals the limitations of 
Aristotelian ethics relative to eudaimonia. As a noble, Lucio has the leisure time (and 
privilege) to attend to a life of the mind and thus the philosophical pursuit of the good 
                                                 
54 I take up the connection between vocation and eudaimonia in the final section of the chapter by way of 
the Apostle Paul, for whom grace is a vocational calling. The degree that Paul’s ministry advocates 
gracious living, grace as a vocation in the sense of the way one makes their livelihood (here used within the 
wider connotation of “human flourishing” through the living of  a “fulfilling life,” one that is truly worth 
living based on a higher ethico-moral standard) provides a space to consider grace as eudaimonia.   
55 On this see Act One, Scene Two. 
56 For Lucio’s confession to the Duke disguised as a Friar, 4.3.161-64. On Lucio’s punishment for his 
actions by the Duke, 5.1.505-18. 
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life. Pompey, as a proletarian, does not. His working class status (even if not his choice of 
profession) estranges him from such pursuits in the Aristotelian polis. Following the 
Nicomachean Ethics, there is no political remedy for Pompey’s ill-chosen form-of-life in 
terms of eudaimonistic pursuit. Yet under scriptural precedent, grace, which enacts its 
own eudaimonism in the form of agape, is available to even the chiefest of sinners,
 57
 and 
thus offers a viable workaround to this ethical elision in Aristotelian politics. As Lucio is 
wont to affirm, “Grace is grace, despite of all controversy” (1.2.24). Although some 
critics have found the play’s investment in sexuality troubling, when the primary political 
concern in Measure for Measure is approached as an early modern inclination toward a 
scripturally invested eudaimonia, its dilation upon sexuality becomes less a reflection of 
patriarchal hegemony enforced through state-sanctioned marriage and more a concern for 
each citizen’s quality of life.   
 Pompey is quite right, however, the city’s youth cannot all be gelded and splayed. 
Sexuality remains a political focus within the state of Vienna, one that is resolved 
through Act Five’s multiple marriages. While the political institution of marriage at the 
play’s conclusion has garnered much critical censure, 58 I would like to pose an alternate 
reading. At the close of the chapter I will turn attention to marriage in relation to grace; 
here, however, I return to Aristotle’s political topoi relative to marriage. In the Politics, 
                                                 
57 On this Pauline theological point, see 1 Tm. 1:15. 
58 See, for example, Pascale Aebischer, “Silence, Rape, and Politics in Measure for Measure: Close 
Readings in Theatre History,” Shakespeare Bulletin 26.4 (2008):1-23; Thedora A. Jankowski, “Hymeneal 
Blood, Interchangeable Women, and the Early Modern Marriage Economy in Measure for Measure and 
All’s Well That Ends Well,” in A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works: The Poems, Problem Comedies, Late 
Plays, Vol. 4, eds. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 89-105; Barbara Sebek, 
“‘By gift of my chaste body’: Female Chastity and Exchange Value in Measure for Measure and A Woman 
Killed with Kindness,” Journal X 5 (2000-2001): 51-85; Stephanie Chamberlin, “Capitalizing on the Body: 
Measure for Measure and the Economics of Patrilineal Worth,” Journal of the Wooden O Symposium 3 
(2003): 12-22.   
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Aristotle argues that for humans the polis is “the final and perfect association,” it is the 
sphere in which one may attain eudaimonistic living.
59
 This leads the political 
philosopher to the teleological conclusion that “man is by nature an animal intended to 
live in a polis.”60 If Aristotle is correct, then an instructional caveat may be found in his 
Ethics: “a man by his nature is even more meant for marriage than he is for political 
association, in proportion, as the family is earlier and more necessary than the polis.”61 If 
marriage—whether as political institution, sacrament, or covenant—inaugurates a space 
for eudaimonistic living and dwelling (within the polis and oikos respectively), then the 
unions between Angelo and Mariana, Claudio and Juliet, the Duke and Isabella, and even 
Lucio and his unnamed prostitute, need not be understood as a ducal act of 
heteronormative supremacy. They may instead be seen as a political gesture working 
toward the achievement of eudaimonia as it follows a scriptural course understood by 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries. 
 Scriptural eudaimonism may seem to be an oxymoron at first glance. Indeed the 
noted British analytical philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe has famously argued against a 
Judeo-Christian basis for ethical philosophy, advocating instead for a return to 
Aristotelian eudaimonism as a ground for moral enterprise.
62
 Yet within its wider Greek 
context, eudaimonia is ever a spiritual if not a scriptural encounter. Etymologically, 
eudaimonia is a combination of the prefix eu (well, good) and the noun daimon (spirit). 
Thus at the level of literal translation eudaimonia concerns itself with the goodness of the 
                                                 
59 Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. and ed. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958, 
1971), 1252b, 4. 
60 Ibid, 1253a, 5. 
61 Ethics I, c. vii. §6, quoted in Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 5, n.4. 
62 Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33.124 (1958): 1-19. 
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spirit, or as in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the wellness of the soul. For the pre-
Socratics,  
[i]n colloquial terms, to be eudaimon was to be lucky, for in a world fraught with 
constant upheaval, uncertainty, and privation, to have a good spirit working on 
one’s behalf was the ultimate mark of good fortune. Even more it was a mark of 
divine favour, for the gods, it was believed, worked through the daimones, 




Following the etymological genealogy of the pre-Socratic tradition, eudaimonia is akin to 
scriptural grace, having the favor of the gods, or in a monotheistic turn, the favor 
(Hebrew, hen; Greek, charis) of God. Regarding Christian eudaimonism specifically, 
various “positions have been held by different historical figures on this issue ranging 
from the view that Christianity and the Greek moral systems are mutually supportive 
(Origen, St. Augustine) via mutual compatibility without explicit support (possibly 
Luther) to outright conflict (Scotus, Ockham).”64  
In the pages that follow I will turn to Luther to explore the potentiality (“possibly 
Luther”) of a scriptural eudaimonism operative in Shakespeare’s Vienna. As Cefalu has 
argued, within the Reformed tradition, “[f]aith, of course, should express itself as an 
affective turn toward God, but Reformed theology suggests that it most efficaciously 
expresses itself vertically through horizontal love, that is, through the route of outward 
service. Luther’s well-known mantra to this effect is ‘faith active in love.’”65 Following 
this Lutheran paradigm the good life is expressed in faith through the active love of one’s 
                                                 
63 Darrin M. McMahon, “From the Happiness of Virtue to the Virtue of Happiness: 400 B.C. – A.D. 1780,” 
Dædalus 133.2 (2004): 7. 
64 Frits Gåvertsson, “Eudaimonism: A Brief Reception History,” Working Paper (Department of 
Philosophy, Lund University, 2013). 
65 Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature, 135. 
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neighbor, or in the political-theological terminology of my argument, agapeic 
eudaimonism.  
To reiterate my theoretical grounds for an understanding of scriptural 
eudaimonism available to Shakespeare and scripted in Measure for Measure, I refer to 
philosopher and theologian J.P. Moreland who has located a shared eudaimonistic 
enterprise among Plato, Aristotle, the Church Fathers and medieval theologians, as well 
as Moses, Solomon, and Jesus.
66
 Moreland’s point is reinforced by Brendan Cook who 
writes in his recent monograph Pursuing Eudaimonia of the shared “classical 
philosophical and theological pursuit of human development.”67 Moreover, Cook argues, 
this once-shared pursuit “has largely given way to reason’s modern autonomous and 
instrumental form.”68 In my pursuit of Shakespeare’s eudaimonic investment in his 
Viennese politics, I now turn to a specific problem of instrumental form within its polity: 
the body as form-of-life. 
     
Qualified Life 
 
Following Cunningham, I have positioned Measure for Measure as a moot in the 
generic sense of using dramatic roleplay as a theoretical space to question the law and its 
practices. In this light we have already witnessed the play’s concern for sexual 
licentiousness in terms of eudaimonia and its capture. That is, I have suggested that 
                                                 
66 J.P. Moreland, “Why Happiness Isn’t a Feeling,” Boundless.org, December 16, 2004, 
http://www.boundless.org/faith/2004/why-happiness-isnt-a-feeling, accessed October 10, 2014, ¶4. 
67 Brendan Cook, Pursuing Eudaimonia: Re-Appropriating the Greek Philosophical Foundations of the 




Measure’s dilation upon sexual mores might be read in terms of the political concern for 
citizens living with regard to the good life. Yet the political anxiety invested specifically 
in Claudio’s sexual transgression, which forms the through-line of its plot, further places 
Measure for Measure within the sphere of biopolitics. 
 Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volume 1 has traced the emergence of biopolitics 
to the seventeenth-century and its “anatomo-politics of the human body.”69 For Foucault, 
this shift in political focus directed its attention to 
the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the 
basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of 
health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these 
to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions 




From this Foucauldian perspective it should come as no surprise that Measure for 
Measure reflects a cultural concern for the regulation of sexuality, especially its capacity 
to generate new citizens through the process of birth.  
 Claudio’s predicament, however, goes beyond his culpability in fathering a child 
out of wedlock. It is the political management of his life, particularly his body and what it 
represents qua life, which drives the political questioning in the play posed by the Duke 
and Angelo, its two oppositional interlocutors. The reading I am suggesting takes up this 
interrogation of life by way of the lexical work established by Agamben. 
 Agamben is perhaps most famous for turning critical attention to “life” in its 
Greek vectors, following Aristotle, as bios and zoē. The former is the term used to refer 
to politically qualified life, “the form or way of living proper to an individual or group,” 
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the later denotes life in its most bare biological instantiation, life in “the simple fact of 
living.”71 As politically qualified life, eudaimonia may be viewed as a type of bios, and 
thus our political queries with Measure for Measure thus far have been ever biopolitical 
in nature.
72
 At this juncture, however, I would turn attention from bios to zoē. Agamben 
frequently uses zoē interchangeably with the term “bare life,” often in connection to the 
Roman legal figure homo sacer (sacred man), the person “who may be killed and yet not 
sacrificed.”73 Adam Kotsko, one of Agamben’s translators, has described this term and 
its implications well: 
homo sacer…far from indicating that human life has exceptional and 
unconditional value, actually refers to a form of human life that has been deprived 
of all legal protection. And instead of marveling at how much our concept of the 
sacredness of human life has changed, he [Agamben] argues that the old meaning 
still stands: the state that respects the sacredness of human life is actually a 
machine that threatens to turn every one of us into a defenseless homo sacer.
74
   
 
In his critique of homo sacer as a central concept of Western biopolitics, Agamben 
theorizes zoē otherwise as pure potentiality. I attend to potentiality as Agamben describes 
it in my gesture toward considering a biopolitics of grace operant in Measure for 
Measure in this chapter’s final movement. What I would stress here in relation to zoē is 
its further political-theological carriage. In the koine of New Testament Greek zoē is 
spiritual form-of-life;
75
 it is the good life of spiritual comportment.  
 
                                                 
71 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 1. 
72 Insofar as eudaimonia marks a particular way of living, and pace Aristotle a politically qualified way of 
living, eudaimonia is effectively a type of bios. It is one “form or way of living proper to an individual or 
group,” to use Agamben’s definition.  
73 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8, emphasis in original. 
74 Adam Kotsko, “How to Read Agamben,” Los Angeles Review of Books, June 4, 2013, 
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It is important to note that in Measure for Measure there is always a religious 
valence to political decision. Although the titular allusion frames this mode of 
engagement, Isabella’s plea on her brother’s behalf openly invokes Matthew 7:1-2 in the 
spirit it is intended:  
                                   How would you be 
If He, which is the top of judgment, should 
but judge you as you are? O, think on that, 
And mercy then will breathe within your lips, 
Like man new made.      (2.2.79-83) 
  
Tacit in Isabella’s appeal is the agapeic fiat to love one’s neighbor as oneself. Her 
argument in such terms is effectively: have mercy on him as God has shown you mercy 
through grace. In theological terms, Isabella’s intercession may be read as a messianic 
warning. I use “messianic” here not in the eschatological sense of waiting for a future 
savior, but as an utterance of censure by Jesus as messiah, one akin to the Johannine 
account of Jesus’ instruction regarding sin and casting stones.76 Yet like the generation 
rebuked by the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel whose words are echoed by Jesus in 
Matthew’s testament, Angelo has ears to hear but does not hear.77 Like Isabella, Angelo 
too can cite the same scripture, although he does so with a Puritanical eye: “When I, that 
censure him do offend, / Let mine own judgment pattern out my death, / And nothing 
come in partial” (2.1.29-31). Thus Shakespeare demonstrates in Angelo’s “And nothing 
come in partial” an apprehension of law stripped of its humanity. It is in this way he is 
                                                 
76 See John 8:7. 
77 On this see Jeremiah 5:21, Ezekiel 12:2, and Matthew 13:5. 
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able to answer Isabella’s request for Claudio’s release in a manner that removes human 
agency from the juridical act: “It is the law, not I, condemn your brother” (2.2.84). 
 Luther’s provides Renaissance political-theological counterpoint to Angelo’s 
Puritan adherence to the law. In his commentary on Romans Luther writes, “[t]he little 
word, ‘law,’ you must not take here in human fashion, as a teaching about what works are 
to be done or not done. That is the way it is with human laws—the law is fulfilled by 
works, even though there is no heart in them.”78 By Luther’s reasoning law is ever a heart 
condition, one enlivened by grace and demonstrated in faith through agape. In contrast, 
Angelo would have law after “human fashion,” to borrow Luther’s phrase, though he 
dresses his legalism in priestly vestment. Shakespeare scripts Isabella’s censure on this 
point in a similar metaphor of fashion: “But man, proud man / Dressed in a little brief 
authority, / [is] Most ignorant of what he’s most assured” (2.2.125-27). Angelo 
fundamentally and tragically misunderstands the scriptural intent of law. Despite his 
Puritanism, Angelo’s legal strictness is ironically an act of works righteousness believing 
the law to be fulfilled only through an absolute adherence to its letter. Yet in the legal 
zone of his Vienna, Shakespeare suggests the spirit of the law to be a condition of the 
heart through Isabella’s appeal (2.2.79-83) to Angelo’s authority in ducal proxy. Luther’s 
exegesis comports with this period understanding: “But god judges according to what is 
at the bottom of the heart, and for this reason, His law makes its demands on the inmost 
heart and cannot be satisfied with works, but rather punishes works that are done 
otherwise than from the bottom of the heart, as hypocrisy and lies.”79 Upon this 
                                                 
78 Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 447. 
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accounting legal absolutism is dressed in little brief, and indeed hollow, authority. That 
is, such action is not authorized by the spirit of the law.        
 Angelo’s legalism does not and indeed cannot consider Biblical clemency. To 
quote Luther, it is a law of hypocrisy and lies. Despite his outward concern for the 
qualified manner in which Viennese citizens ought to live their lives, Angelo’s political 
rigidity against Claudio prefigures habeas corpus insofar as the law must have its body. 
Thus Claudio is presented in the public streets as if in open court: 
CLAUDIO: Fellow, why dost thou show me thus to th’world? 
Bear me to prison, where I am committed. 
 
PROVOST: I do it not in evil disposition, 
But from Lord Angelo by special charge.   (1.3.1-4) 
 
This corollary becomes clear when Claudio’s public showing is read in tandem with the 
writ of habeas corpus: 
We command that you have before us to show, at Westminster, that body X, by 
whatsoever name he may be called therein, which is held in your custody, as it is 




Both instances express concern for the body’s showing and bear witness to the theatrical 
nature of the writ. Court could not convene without the physical presence of the 
defendant’s body, and as the work of Beverly Malmo has shown, the summons of habeas 
corpus effectively schedules a performance event. “The law and the body come 
together,” she reminds us, “on a given day, in a given court, pursuant to the king’s 
command to the sheriff.”81  By the Provost’s admission to Claudio, he does not “show” 
the defendant’s body out of “evil disposition / But from Lord Angelo by special charge” 
                                                 
80 I have used Agamben’s translation here; see Homo Sacer, 124. 
81 Beverly Malmo, “Beheading the Dead: Rites of Habeas Corpus in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure,” 
New Formations 35 (1998), 139. 
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(1.3.3-4). In exposing Claudio’s body thus, Angelo effectively summons the man under 
habeas corpus with all its performative charge. “More urgently,” Malmo emphasizes, 
“without the presence of the defendant’s body there could be no display of sovereign 
power.”82 What is staged is thus the very authority of the state itself. 
Angelo understands the proof of such authority to be a legalism evoking fear. He 
would “not make a scarecrow of the law, / Setting it up to fear the birds of prey, / And let 
it keep one shape till custom make it / Their perch, and not their terror” (2.1.1-4). The 
subject, or rather object, of discussion here is Claudio. And as with Isabella, Escalus’s 
attempt to dissuade Angelo’s decree by evoking Matthew 7:1-2 falls on deaf ears.83 The 
state will not make exception, but rather example of Claudio. As one condemned, 
Claudio fully understands his function as a political object in this course:  
                            this new governor 
Awakes me all the enrollèd penalties 
Which have, like unscoured armour, hung by th’wall 
So long that nineteen zodaics have gone round 
And none of them been worn, and, for a name, 
Now puts the drowsy and neglected act 
Freshly on me. ’Tis surely for a name.  (1.3.49-55) 
 
In his report to Isabella that Angelo’s first act of ducal authority is to leverage the “rigor 
of the statue” (1.5.67)  to make her brother “an example” (1.5.68), Lucio further 
demonstrates Claudio’s political objectification as common understanding. 
Angelo’s unwillingness to grant exception effectively misses the true 
performative potential of habeas corpus which resides in the monarch’s sovereign ability 
to enact clemency. As one scholar has put it, “[a]ble to pardon in the face of guilt, the 
king stood above the law. He thus wanted and needed the body of the accused to 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 See 2.1.8-16. 
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demonstrate his status above and beyond statute.”84 The monarch’s position above and 
beyond statute is what Agamben refers to as the sovereign ban. Following Schmitt, the 
sovereign ban marks the ruler’s ability to decide upon the exception, yet it is Agamben’s 
etymological work that mines the term for more subtle potential. Tracing “ban” across its 
usage in Romance languages he finds the term a paradox meaning both “at the mercy of” 
and “out of free will,” making it capable of signifying “both the insignia of 
sovereignty…and expulsion from the community.”85 Vincentio performs this sovereign 
ability as an act of grace via agapeism at the play’s close, effectively bringing those once-
expulsed back into the communal fold. To opposite ends, Angelo understands the 
sovereign ability as ever an act of expulsion. In their divergent roles of state authority, the 
Duke and Angelo thus enact the paradox of the ban as Agamben has described it.   
Shakespeare foreshadows this sovereign split in Act One, Scene One. As the 
Duke transfers his authority to Angelo he offers these parting thoughts: “In our remove 
be thou at full ourself. / Mortality and mercy in Vienna / Live in thy tongue and heart” 
(1.1.43-45). Implicit in the Duke’s speech is the enactment of clemency (grace), even 
though he suspects Angelo incapable of granting it.
86
 Taking up this division, we find the 
Duke delivering mercy in Vienna—even unto Angelo. He further pardons the unrepentant 
Barnardine in Act Five: “Thou’rt condemned, / But for those earthly faults, I quit them 
all, / And pray thee take this mercy to provide / For better times to come” (5.1.478-81). 
Barnardine is then handed over to Friar Peter for advisement, presumably on how to live 
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85 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 110-11. 
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a better life. This fatherly tutelage comports with an eye toward scriptural eudaimonia, 
one achievable through the dispensation of grace which makes available to the proletarian 
Barnardine, like Pompey, the possibility of eudaimonic living from which he is excluded 
under Aristotle’s political program.  
Where the Duke delivers mercy, Angelo delivers mortality. Escalus’s plea on 
Claudio’s behalf meets an unsympathetic rejoinder: “You may not extenuate his offense / 
… / Sir, he must die” (1.2.27, 31). The only clemency Claudio receives under Angelo’s 
reign is, to use Agamben’s phrase, to be “at the mercy of” his state. Just as the Duke’s 
sovereign ban effects mercy, under the peril of Angelo’s sovereign ban Claudio is 
effectively reduced to zoē. In this instance what is witnessed is “not bios, the qualified 
life of the citizen, but zoē—the bare, anonymous life that is as such taken into the 
sovereign ban.”87 
If Claudio is the example by which we are to measure the intersection of the body 
and the law in Shakespeare’s Vienna, then such measurement must be taken twice: under 
the authority of Angelo as well as attendant to Vincentio’s ducal return. Subordinate to 
Angelo, corpus has become the new subject of politics.
88
 Angelo’s state establishes its 
authority through bodily example brought forward by the full force of scriptural legalism. 
Yet Shakespeare scripts the immanent failure of the Puritan turn in Angelo’s would-be 
politics (Paulitics) by offering a voice of political-theological resistance through 
Isabella’s scripturally-inflected defense on her brother’s behalf: 
ISABELLA: Must he needs die? 
 
ANGELO: Maiden, no remedy. 
                                                 
87 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 124. 




ISABELLA: Yes: I do think that you might pardon him,  
And neither heaven nor man grieve at the mercy. 
 
ANGELO: I will not do’t. 
 
ISABELLA: But you can if you would? 
 
ANGELO: Look what I will not, that I cannot do. 
 
ISABELLA: But might you do’t, and do the world no wrong, 
If so your heart were touched with that remorse 
as mine is to him? 
 
ANGELO: He’s sentenced, ’tis too late. (2.2.51-61) 
 
Though Isabella’s plea voices the spirit of the law over its letter, Angelo remains deaf to 
such instruction. She, like Luther, reminds Angelo that the law under grace is a condition 
of the heart (“If so your heart were touched”), and that the letter of the law finds its 
fulfillment in its spirit, which 
also hath made us able ministers of the new testament; not of the letter, but of the 
spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
89
 Do we then make void the 




Luther explains this Pauline distinction between the law’s spirit and its letter in what 
might well be read as a similar indictment of Angelo’s legalism: “[Paul] himself explains 
that to mean that to be without the law is not the same thing as to have no laws and be 
able to do as one pleases; but we are under the law when, without grace, we occupy 
ourselves in the work of the law.”91 Unfortunately for Claudio, Angelo will not extend 
grace. Instead it is his body that has been chosen to bear, or rather bare, the law’s effect. 
The treatment of his body in this manner as pure zoē, to use Agamben’s terminology, 
                                                 
89 2 Cor. 3:6. 
90 Rom. 3:31. 
91 Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 457. 
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further exposes the negative core of such politics. Just as corpus bears an etymological 
relation to corpse, so too this particular strain of biopolitics, Angelo’s preoccupation with 
“the work of the law” with its praxis centered ever on the physical body (the site of the 
law’s literal inscription under political action), reveals itself to be essentially 
thanatopolitics, the management of death rather than life. 
It is no accident that Agamben locates Romans 7:10 at the fore of his description 
of the West’s biopolitical (and tacitly thanatopolitical) project. The Apostle Paul’s words 
serve as one of three epigraphs to Homo Sacer following Savingy and Hobbes:  
Euretē moi hē entolē hē eis zōēn, autē eis thanaton. 




Exegetes agree that the commandment to which this address opens is in reference to the 
Decalogue.
93
 The Apostle’s point, however, is not to lay blame upon nor dispel the law. 
Luther provides early modern illumination of this point: 
Therefore St. Paul here concludes that law, rightly understood and thoroughly 
comprehended, does nothing more than remind us of our sin, and slay us by it, 
and make us liable to eternal wrath; and all this is taught and experienced by our 
conscience, when it is really smitten by the law. Therefore a man must have 
something else than the law, and more than the law, to make him righteous and 
save him. But they that do not rightly understand the law are blind; they go ahead, 





                                                 
92 This translation is Agamben’s. Recently continental philosophy has turned attention to Paul’s writings as 
a generative locus for contemporary political thinking, especially as counterpoint to Neo-Liberal ideology. 
On this see Alain Badiou, St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003) and Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia 
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).    
93 On this see Ernst Käsemann, Commentary on Romans, trans. and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 193-94; Craig S. Keener, Romans: A New Covenant Commentary (Cambridge: 
Lutterworth Press, 2011), 89-91; Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1996), 438-39. 
94 Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 458. 
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Angelo is one that does not “rightly understand the law,” as Luther puts it. What’s more, 
by Luther’s description Angelo’s legalism might well be called an act of works 
righteousness. In this political-theological turn the accurate measure of the law, what 
Luther describes as the law “rightly understood and thoroughly comprehended,” is grace 
in action; that is, agape, evident in the law’s demand for “a willing and happy heart.”  
Just as scholarship from the last quarter century forward has brought attention to 
Paul’s Jewishness, 95 the Hebraic aspect to his thinking should be equally acknowledged. 
Where Christian readings such as Luther’s emphasize grace in agapeic action, Jewish 
scholarship reads the law in terms of its emphasis on community. That is, the work of the 
law in its Hebraic spirit is an act of inclusion rather than exclusion, to reiterate 
Agamben’s well-known phrasing. According to Spinoza, the Decalogue marks the 
formation of Israel as a congregation (edah) at Sinai. By this account the life given 
through the law is one of communal attachment and relation, especially insofar as edah is 
“linked to another Hebrew word meaning ‘witness’ and ‘testimony,’ imply[ing] a social 
and linguistic moment of responsiveness to and responsibility for others, juridical without 
necessarily requiring the mediation of a judge.”96 In a different vein, Emmanuel Lévinas 
                                                 
95 For a relative sample of recent essays on this topic see section two “Paul Between Jews and Christians” 
in St. Paul Among the Philosophers, eds. John D. Caputo and Linda Martin Alcoff (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2009), 61-184; also Kent L. Yinger, The New Perspective on Paul: An Introduction 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011) and James J.D. Dunn, The New Perspective on Paul: Revised Edition 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007). For thorough yet earlier treatments of this subject, see Krister Stendahl, 
Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976) and Daniel Boyarin, 
A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
96 Lupton, Citizen Saints, 7. 
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has argued for a life-giving aspect inherent to Mosaic Law in the fiat “Thou Shalt Not 
Kill,”97 whereby the face of God is forever witnessed in the face of the other.  
 Paul’s comment, if we are to read it as a critique in the manner Agamben’s 
epigraph suggests, especially when attended by its full scriptural measure in both Jewish 
and Christian tradition, must be considered in light of his position as a man embodying 
both religious traditions. It is from this vantage that the Apostle is able to speak of the 
law within a Judeo-Christian confluence where the death brought by law is the product of 
Israel’s own desire to establish its righteousness through law rather than community with 
God.
98
 Put in secular terms, it is when man looks to himself to define righteousness 
through law that the law becomes an implement of death rather than life. Such is certainly 
the case if we are to take Angelo as an example of polity in this form. 
 In order to recover from such political maneuvering, the Duke Vincentio, not 
unlike Agamben, would turn attention away from zoē as bare life and toward its potential 
otherwise. For it is on his Viennese political stage through the character Vincentio that 
Shakespeare drafts a polity built upon communal regard for scriptural eudaimonia. As 
Lupton reminds us, from an Agambenian perspective there exists an “enduring attraction 
to zoē…to life as what subsists as pure potentiality.” 99 For Agamben this pure 
potentiality can only be realized by what he terms “form-of-life,” the manner in which 
one chooses or refuses to live.  
 
                                                 
97 This point recurs throughout Lévinas’ work but is explained succinctly in his essay “From Ethics to 
Exegesis,” in In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), 109-13. 
98 On this point see Keener, Romans, 91. For the Christian referent in Paul’s comment as I have glossed it 
here, see Romans 9:30-32 and 10:3. 
99 Lupton, Thinking With Shakespeare, 6. 
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As we have seen, from the Duke’s opening lines, “Of government the properties 
to unfold” (1.1.3), Measure for Measure invests itself in the discussion of political 
action.
100
 And as I have suggested, this political action is ever measured against the 
practice of eudaimonia. The Duke says as much in his public dialogue with Angelo 
regarding his choice for investiture as head of state: “Angelo: / There is a kind of 
character in thy life / That to th’observer doth thy history / Fully unfold” (1.1.26-29).101 
This “character” to which the Duke alludes is the manner Angelo lives his life (“thy 
history”), and despite the Puritan form-of-life witnessed by “th’observer” in this account 
it is nonetheless guided by a scripturally inflected (mis)understanding of what constitutes 




Heaven doth with us as we with torches do, 
Not light them for ourselves, for if our virtues 
Did not go forth from us, ’twere all alike 
As if we had them not. Spirits are not finely touched 
But to fine issues, nor nature never lends  
The smallest scruple of her excellence  
But, like a thrifty goddess, she determines 
Herself the glory of a creditor, 
                                                 
100 See n.24. 
101 On the aspect of daimon as a character and this character relation to eudaimonia, see Julia Reinhard 
Lupton, “Arendt in Italy: Or, the Taming of the Shrew,” Law, Culture and the Humanities 8.1 (2012): 68-
83. 
102 For an ecumenical reading of the Duke’s political theology as neither Catholic nor Protestant, but rather 




Both thanks and use.    (1.1.32-40) 
 
Unlike Angelo, the Duke is no Puritan. Rather than deferring to a particular sectarian 
cast, his speech instead elicits a textual (re)turn; in this case, to the Gospels and the 
Parable of Light:  
Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid. Neither do 
men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick; and it giveth 
light unto all that are in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they 




What are we to make of such a reference? If we are to take Knight at his word, then the 
play must also be read as a parable. Yet Knight’s rigid allegorization is no less a form of 
hermeneutic legalism than Angelo’s Puritanical reading of the law, a mistake clearly 
eschewed by Measure itself. Knight, however, is correct in that this play must be read 
alongside its scriptural intertexts. I would suggest that the Duke recalls this specific 
Biblical allusion because of its concern for bios, particularly to the degree that bios may 
guide civic life within the polis: “Ye are the light of the world / Let your light so shine 
before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in 
heaven” (bios), “A city that is set on an hill” (polis). In this light, the Duke uses this 
parable, this scriptural instance, as a mechanism to correlate the relationship of form-of-
life to politics and citizenship, or put another way, to position form-of-life in relation to 
political reform. I would thus amend Knight’s thesis and those of its ilk by suggesting 
that from its opening scene forward Measure for Measure indeed operates within a 
political sphere that is concomitantly scriptural, one that highlights a necessarily 
relational aspect of good government, yet one that does not require allegorical reading. 
                                                 
103 Matthew 5:14-16; see also Luke 8:16 and Mark 4:21. 
83 
 
Rather, Measure demonstrates the potential boons and ills of divergent strains of politics 
in praxis. 
 The Duke speaks to this relational aspect of good government at the close of his 
initial exchange with Angelo. Just prior to his exit from the Ducal Palace and ostensible 
remove from the polis, he charges Angelo “to enforce or qualify the laws / As to your 
soul seems good” (1.1.65-66). This precept makes two points. First, the enforcement of 
the law may be qualified. Second, this qualification of the law is to be gauged by the soul 
in accordance with what it deems good. By invoking the soul and/in its accordance with 
the good, the confluences of Greek philosophical and political thought and Judeo-
Christian thinking are carried together by a shared political current in its flow toward a 
eudaimonistic end. Angelo, however, does not follow the Duke’s injunction. Thus as a 
political thought experiment (moot), Measure for Measure considers and ultimately 
passes judgment on absolutist law. If Angelo’s reign is to serve as the example of law 
followed to its strict enforcement without consideration of the extenuating circumstances 
unique to each transgression, the result is both tyranny and hypocrisy. By denying any 
human-to-human relational aspect to the law (“It is the law, not I, condemn your 
brother”), Angelo effectively instantiates a law incapable of justice. Instead, it metes only 
death. Just so, the irony of Angelo’s response to this ducal direction should not be 
missed: “The heavens give safety to your purposes” (1.1.73). I now turn to the potential 








The Duke’s vocation turns specifically to the critique of governmental operation 
once he is clothed the habit of a friar. “My business in this state,” he makes publicly 
explicit, “Made me a looker-on here in Vienna, / Where I have seen corruption boil and 
bubble / Till it o’errun the stew; laws for all faults, / But faults so countenanced that the 
strong statutes / Stand like the forfeits in a barber’s shop, / As much in mock as mark” 
(5.1.313-19). Here of course the Duke is censuring Angelo for his hypocrisy in 
condemning Claudio to death for the very crime he is guilty of himself, a point this friar 
knows all too well.
104
 Yet this public admonition goes further. Like his fellow Viennese 
citizens, Angelo’s life choices have taken a turn for the worse. No longer living toward 
the good, but rather masking the secret sins he would conceal through Claudio’s murder, 
Angelo’s civic duty—his bios—is marred by poor life choices.105 And like Pompey his 
trade effectively shifts from bawd to hangman.
106
 This public remonstration as a friar, I 
would suggest, may thus be read as an extension of his belief that form-of-life is the only 
agent capable of true political reform. By the Duke’s example, the political implication of 
Measure for Measure is that a biopolitics concerned only with the management of bare 
life will always be ineffective. Rather, it is a bios-politics that is necessary, one that 
recognizes the potential for human good within the way a life is lived that must be the 
guiding biopolitical principle.   
                                                 
104 It is Vincentio, guised as a friar, who orchestrates the tryst turned bed trick between Angelo and 
Isabella/Mariana which forms the plotline of Act Four, Scene One. 
105 Angelo admits his culpability both privately and publicly in his soliloquy at the close of Act Four, Scene 
Four, see particularly 4.4.26-30. 
106 On Angelo as bawd see Act Two, Scene Four where he is willing to exchange Claudio’s life for the 
currency of Isabella’s maidenhead. On Pompey’s vocational shift from bawd to hangman see 4.2.13-14. 
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Like the Duke, Agamben’s work acknowledges the scriptural aspects of form-of-
life as a potential recovery from Western biopolitical practices. This can perhaps be seen 
best in his most recent monograph The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-
Life, which turns its attention toward Franciscan monasticism and the form-of-life 
exhibited there. Yet as one critic has noted, “Agamben is able to carry out a 
transvaluation of biopolitics only in the guise of a bio-theo-politics.”107 In what remains 
of this chapter I would follow a similar transvaluation under the guise of grace, 
particularly within the register of its potentiality. 
However, before I can speak of grace with this designation it is necessary to 
understand what is at stake in the term potentiality. It has been described variously as 
possibility, power, ethics, and action. In Western political thought the concept of 
potentiality is derived from Aristotle’s distinction between dynamis and energia, 
potentiality and act.
108
 Taking up this distinction, for Agamben the central import of 
potentiality is its ability to both do and not do. Such an understanding recalls the Duke’s 
imperative that the law may (and by implication must) be qualified: it has the potential to 
either do or not do as the soul deems fit. Following Agamben, potentiality is nothing less 
than form-of-life itself; it is how one chooses to live their life.
109
 Moreover, form-of-life 
in this cast marks life’s open “possibilities” which constitute its “power”—indeed the 
                                                 
107 Lorenzo Chiesa, “Giorgio Agamben’s Franciscan Ontology,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of 
Natural and Social Philosophy 5.1 (2009), 105. Chiesa traces a Franciscan through-line across Agamben’s 
thinking, particularly in Homo Sacer (1998), Means without End (2000), State of Exception (2005), and The 
Time that Remains (2005), signaling a Franciscan turn in his thought well in advance of the 2013 
publication of The Highest Poverty.  
108 This is a key point for Agamben; see Homo Sacer, 44-48. 
109 On potentiality as form-of-life see, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and 
Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 3. 
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very power and possibility of political resistance.
110
 For Agamben this power is located at 
the nexus of action and inaction, yet is affected best in its not-doing. Thus his exemplar is 
Melville’s Bartleby, the scribe who prefers not to write. We find a similar act of overt 
political resistance in Barnardine who, like Bartleby, will not let his person be used by 
political authority, and who thus “will not consent to die this day” (4.3.48). As Agamben 
reminds, “[t]hese figures push the aporia of sovereignty to the limit but still do not 
completely free themselves from its ban.”111 However, as we have witnessed in the 
distinction between the Duke’s and Angelo’s respective sovereign bans, this aporia can 
be a locus for enacting a non-destructive biopolitics (the Duke)  or casting doubt upon the 
law (Angelo). 
Potentiality also carries with it a politico-ethical imperative. In The Coming 
Community, Agamben yokes ethics to potentiality while also suggesting potentiality as 
“the most proper mode of human existence.”112 And in Means Without End this mode of 
existence or form-of-life is parsed following Aristotle’s Politics (1278b) as being 
immediately constituted “as political life.”113 Thus potentiality as political life is political 
                                                 
110 Ibid. 
111 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 48. 
112 Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993, 2007), 43. 
113 Agamben, Means Without End, 3. Compare Agamben: 
“That is why human beings—as beings of power who can do or not do, succeed or fail, lose 
themselves or find themselves—are the only beings for whom happiness is always at stake in their 
living, the only beings whose life is irremediably and painfully assigned to happiness. But this 
immediately constitutes the form-of-life as political life. 
 
with Aristotle, Politics, 1278b, in Barker, 111: 
 
‘man is an animal impelled by his nature to live in a polis.’ A natural impulse is this one reason 
men desire to live a social life even when they stand in no need of mutual succour; but they are 
also drawn together by a common interest, in proportion as each attains a share in good life. The 
good life is the chief end, both for the community as a whole and for each of us individually. But 
men also come together, and form and maintain political associations, merely for the sake of life; 
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life as ethics. Yet this ethics may become occluded if we are to take as our example either 
Melville’s Bartleby or Measure’s Barnardine. In their preferring not to, whether to write 
or to be hanged, their potentiality is effectively an act of self-satisfying individualism. 
Rather than demonstrate the eudaimonistic potential of form-of-life, such inaction 
suggests an ethics of narcissism, one befitting a biopolitics which, like Narcissus, cannot 
see past the reflection (the reification) of the body itself. 
Yet as Lupton has shown, Agamben’s thinking may be enabled by Hannah 
Arendt’s. Where Agamben witnesses the greatest potentiality through inaction, Arendt 
locates our greatest human potential through shared action and in relation to and with 
others.
114
 For Arendt, the power enabled through potentiality traced by following its 
etymological root in Aristotle’s dynamis is one of communal action toward the good. 
Thus, According to Arendt: 
Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where 
words are not empty and deeds are not brutal, where words are not used to veil 
intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy 




Such potentiality enacts civic world building with eudaimonistic intent. Under this 
paradigm, relations are established and new realities created with a mindful and active 
civic duty toward a shared good life.  
Moreover, where Agamben explores this term’s etymological potential in its 
Italian potenza (ability), Arendt tests similar potential across her native German Macht, 
                                                                                                                                                 
for perhaps there is some element of the good even in the simple act of living, so long as the evils 
of existence do not preponderate too heavily. It is an evident fact that most men cling hard enough 
to life to be willing to endure a good deal of suffering, which implies that life has in it a sort of 
healthy happiness and natural quality of pleasure. 
 
114 See Thinking With Shakespeare, 5.  
115 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 1998), 200. 
88 
 
which she is quick to point out is derived “from mögen and möglich, not from 
machen.”116 It is within this vernacular operation that we find counterpoint to Bartleby 
and Barnardine’s inaction: mögen, to want to, would like to, to wish to, may (as invitation 
to do something).
117
 With regard to individual inaction, Arendt’s thinking also gives 
pause to consider a further differentiation between strength and power. “While strength is 
the natural quality of an individual seen in isolation,” she tells us, “power springs up 
between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.” 118 Thus to 
conceive of potentiality in its Arendtian strain is to witness the difference between 
individual strength (which is fleeting) and power (which can only be achieved through 
shared community). 
It is this communal, relational aspect of potentiality that I wish to (mögen) 
traverse for the remainder of this chapter, particularly where form-of-life as eudaimonia 




Matthew 7:1-2 has been a recurrent intertext throughout this discussion of 
Measure for Measure. Ioppolo’s earlier remarks cast the play’s titular allusion as a 
“reconsideration of St. Matthew’s maxim” on Shakespeare’s part.119 I would like to offer 
one such reconsideration here, that the injunction in this Matthean account is not only a 
                                                 
116 Ibid. For Agamben see Homo Sacer, 45. 
117 Collins German Unabridged Dictionary, 8th Edition (London: Harper Collins, 2013), s.v. “mögen.” In 
its transitive and intransitive forms as gemacht, mögen expresses the same inclination: trans. to want, to 
desire, to wish for; intrans. to be willing to.  
118 Arendt, The Human Condition, 200. 
119 See n.3. 
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warning against inhumane politics but also a paradigm for the political practice of grace. 
The play’s trial (moot) of Angelo’s political actions throughout its course, as well as the 
Duke’s remediation of the state along overtly scriptural lines at its close, make possible 
such a reading. By this accounting grace is the bios, the political form-of-life one must 
take in order to achieve eudaimonia in Shakespeare’s Vienna. Ethical biopolitics in this 
Viennese sphere is similarly rendered a biopolitics of grace. Such a reading necessarily 
requires space to unfold.  
 To speak of eudaimonia in this way is to move beyond its denotation within the 
strict purview of Greek philosophy as I have already suggested. That is, I wish to chart a 
specific type of good life whose course is given compass and direction through the daily 
living of the Judeo-Christian concept of grace as expressed in Shakespeare’s unique 





That the concept of grace is central to Measure for Measure there can be no 
doubt. The word occurs no fewer than twenty-three times in the play, often in terms of 
respect (e.g. “your grace”), yet nearly half of its uses “carr[y] a theological meaning or 
overtone.”120 The play’s relation to grace, however, is at times occluded by its other 
legal-political-theological themes of law, justice, and mercy.
121
 Following a comparable 
                                                 
120 Martz, “‘Of Government,’” 213. 
121 Ibid., 212-13. The term “law” is repeated twenty-five times in the play, “justice” no fewer than twenty-
six times, and “mercy” sixteen times, which although less than the invocations of law or justice cited here, 
occurs in Measure for Measure “more frequently than in any other work by Shakespeare,”213.   
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hermeneutic line, David Bevington has recently suggested equity as a similarly viable 
theme, yet as the earlier work of Joel Levin contests and I am inclined to agree, “[a]s a 
matter of law” the political actions in the play “fail technically, and as a matter of equity 
they fail for immorality.”122 What then are we to make of grace and its association with 
polity in Measure for Measure?  
 The nature and distribution of grace is presented as a subject of inquiry from the 
play’s opening, hence this chapter’s epigraph: “Grace is grace, despite of all controversy” 
(1.2.24).
123
 Even in the mouth of Lucio this comment retains its resonance of truth. 
Controversial though it may be and especially in a political register, grace ever is grace—
and despite its tautologous ring, Lucio’s point holds. This is perhaps best understood 
through definitional comparison to mercy, a term often rendered synonymous (though 
incorrectly) with grace. From a theological perspective, grace is understood to be 
undeserving where mercy is an act of “compassion to the miserable.”124 What remains 
elided in this theological definition of grace, however, are its wider character and scope. 
When attention is given to the undeserving characteristic of grace its form is missed. 
Political (or sovereign) power is not the proper focus of grace. Instead, as demonstrated 
by its valences across both the Tanakh and New Testament, grace marks a relational way 
of living where focus is shifted to community rather than sovereign authority, whether 
                                                 
122 Joel Levin, “The Measure of Law and Equity: Tolerance in Shakespeare’s Vienna,” In Law and 
Literature Perspectives, ed. Bruce L. Rockwood (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 196. For Bevington’s 
argument see, “Equity in Measure for Measure,” in Shakespeare and the Law: A Conversation Among 
Disciplines, eds. Bradin Cormack, Martha C. Nussbaum, and Richard Strier (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2013), 164-73.  
123 Regarding the importance of Lucio’s remark within the context of interpreting Measure for Measure see 
Brett, “‘Grace is grace.’” On the nature and distribution of grace in relation to our understanding of the play 
see Cefalu, “The Ethics of Pardoning,” 112. 
124 Cefalu, “The Ethics of Pardoning,” 110, citing Hughes, 46. 
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divine or human in its cast.
 125
 I will parse this point more fully after mercy is first given 
its due. 
When compared to grace in this register, mercy signals a divergent operation. 
While it is true that divine mercy is reflective of God’s beneficence, in its human-to-
human enactment mercy tends to shift attention to sovereign authority in a specific 
actualization of state power: the act of granting mercy. As a singular action, mercy works 
in the opposite direction of grace by effectively operating as a synecdoche for the 
sovereign ban. To borrow Arendt’s phrasing, mercy thus becomes the operative sign of 
political strength where grace opens a space to consider the power afforded by ethical and 
relational living-with others for greater communal good. 
The relationship between law and grace, particularly in its communal register first 
occurs in the Judeo-Christian tradition when Moses receives the Decalogue on Mount 
Sinai.
126
 It is only because Moses finds favor (hen, grace) with God that he is called to 
the summit to receive the law. Yet more importantly, as Emmanuel Lévinas would have 
us remember, this fiat marks a direct face-to-face relation with the divine, one that signals 
not only sovereign authority but, perhaps more importantly, the communal and relational 
aspect of such grace. It is in this context that Exodus 33:11 is able to report God speaking 
with Moses not as sovereign to subject but “as a man speaketh unto his friend.” This 
divine-human interaction is further carried out in the human-to-human operation of the 
law through a correlative face-to-face intimacy. For example, it is at God’s behest in 
Exodus 19:7 that Moses gathers the people of Israel and “la[ys] before their faces all 
                                                 
125 I here use Tanakh to retain the specifically Jewish locus of what is commonly cast as the Christian Old 
Testament. 
126 I here use communal in its denotative sense as both a marker of community and of conversation, 
particularly intimate face-to-face conversation.  
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these words which the Lord commanded him.” As this Tanakhic example suggests, law 
and grace are intimately bound to one another, indeed to the point of being one and the 
same. Lévinas helps to elucidate this point.  
For Lévinas the face of the other is where the human witnesses the face of God. 
He finds this an especial case in the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” which he reads 
as an injunction for “the care of one being for another being, into non-in-difference of 
one toward the other.”127 This relational care of and for others is nothing less than grace 
as bios operating under the direction of the law. Moreover, from this vantage grace/law is 
only enacted—it is only lived—through the ethical treatment of others. Thus, to use 
Lévinas’s bold phrasing, “[e]thics is the spiritual optics.”128 To see with such ethical 
vision is to live one’s life with an eye ever toward the good of others. Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself. 
Similar optical recognition can be found in grace as it operates through its New 
Testament vectors. In the Lukean accounts, for example, there is “a strong association 
between grace and power,” particularly the power to make another’s life better. 129 Thus 
in 4:33 it is the power of grace that enables the casting out of demons or in 6:8 the 
healing of a man’s withered hand. However, the concept of grace in the New Testament 
remains largely Pauline.
130
 This is perhaps best witnessed in Romans 15:15-16 where the 
Apostle positions grace as a vocational calling to witness to those beyond the pale, the 
Gentiles. In this instance grace operates as bios (vocation) yet with an explicit politico-
                                                 
127 Lévinas, “From Ethics to Exegesis,” 110, emphasis in original. 
128 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969), 78. 
129 Baker’s Evangelical Dictionary of Biblical Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 




ethical imperative to bring the Gospel to the Gentiles, or to put it terms correlative to 
Measure for Measure, to offer grace to the citizens of Vienna—even unto the likes of 
Pompey, Lucio, and Angelo, who may certainly be deemed unworthy of its receipt.   
Within this New Testament paradigm, recent scholarship from Mika Ojakangas 
has repeatedly shown the origins of what has come to be termed “biopolitics” in Pauline 
theology.
131
 According to Ojakangas, “early Christian ideas and practices of the pastorate 
were not a prelude to what Foucault calls bio-power and governmentality, but marked a 
rupture in the history of governmental ideas and practices which originate in the Graeco-
Roman world and continue into early modern Europe thanks to the revitalization of the 
classical heritage.”132 I would argue that such a rupture in early modern English politics 
is staged in Shakespeare’s Vienna through Vincentio’s actions in Measure for Measure, 
first as a friar and later as the Duke, both of whom embody a decidedly Pauline cast 
through their actions.
133
 This political disruption and its doubtful cast upon the law is 
perhaps not surprising given that Pauline ethics, and thus Pauline biopolitics, is built 
upon the pastoral principle of grace as form-of-life.
134
 That is, the vocation of pastor is a 
bios of grace, one lived out through the love (agape) and care (cura) of and for others.
135
  
                                                 
131 On this see Mika Ojakangas, “Michel Foucault and the Enigmatic Origins of Bio-politics and 
Governmentality,” History of the Human Sciences 25.1 (2012): 1-14; “On the Pauline Roots of Biopolitics: 
Apostle Paul in Company with Foucault and Agamben,” JCRT 11.1 (2010): 92-110; and “Impossible 
Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies 2 (2005): 5-28. 
132 Ojakangas, “Enigmatic Origins,” 2. 
133 On the influence of Paul’s thinking in Shakespeare’s works, see Lupton, “Citizen Paul,” in Citizen 
Saints, 19-48, and “Paul Shakespeare,” in Thinking with Shakespeare, 219-46.  
134 Arne De Boever has offered counterpoint to this position, arguing that rather than offer a site of 
resistance to what Foucault called biopolitics, Paul’s writings serve as the origins of modern biopolitical 
power through the institution of Christian pastoral power as Foucault surmised; see, “Bio-Paulitics,” 
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11.1 (2010): 35-51. 
135 See Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue.”  
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To be a pastor is to be etymologically connected to the vocation of a shepherd, 
especially in its verb tense shepherding (to pastor), itself a bios, the care of and for one’s 
flock.
136
 In terms of political theology, Measure for Measure witnesses shepherds who 
are often remiss in the duties entrusted to them. Angelo, for example, has no love (agape) 
for his subjects and certainly demonstrates no care (cura) for Claudio’s predicament. At 
the play’s opening Vincentio’s political pastoring (his political posturing) is equally 
lax.
137
 Yet a surprising turn occurs once he sheds the robe of state for that of the clergy. 
As a friar the Duke embodies this pastoral aspect, giving deep investment to the courses 
of life his citizens lead. We have witnessed this already in his concern for Barnardine. 
Act Three, Scene One finds this friar similarly voicing his concern for Isabella and her 
future course of action. Moreover, Claudio’s bios is not only the plot’s recurrent 
narrative, but as the Duke cum pastor it affects Vincentio with an urgency that spans the 
entirety of the fourth act. Each of these examples serve as reminders that along this 
vocational course the Duke demonstrates a polity marked by a living-with rather than the 
management-of those under his charge.    
Biopolitical polity concerned with management-of has already been shown in its 
operation to be the management of death rather than life. Similarly, the Biblical reference 
in the play’s title may be read as an injunction against levying death over life in politico-
legal action. Ghosting behind the aspect of death in Matthew 7:1-2, however, is also the 
promise of life. Implicit in Jesus’ remarks is a call to live life differently, to follow a new 
course of life based on his teachings. This call to new life is to be the vocation, the form-
of-life, for all believers in Christ under Paul’s theology and it should be noted that grace 
                                                 
136 OED, s.v. “pastor.” 
137 The Duke admits his culpability in this at 1.4.26-31. 
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under this design is dependent upon spiritual baptism, the effective sign of such new 
life.
138
 The Apostle makes this point explicit in Romans 6:3-8, but I would draw 
particular attention to v.8 and its emphasis that to be baptized in this way is to engage in a 
continual living-with relationship (Greek syzēsomen). Incumbent upon the recipient who 
is saved by grace is the charge to live a gracious life toward others. As Luther writes, the 
outward expression of received grace is agapeic living: 
Hence a man is ready and glad, without compulsion, to do good to everyone, to 
serve everyone, to suffer everything, in love and praise to God, who has shown 
him this grace; and thus it is impossible to separate works from faith, quite as 




It is important to recognize that for Luther, and indeed the political-theological paradigm 
I am seeking to trace in Measure for Measure, works do not effect faith. That is, there is 
no this for that exchange understood between God and man. Rather, the vertical receipt 
of grace moves outward, horizontally, in agapeic human-to-human exchanges. Faith in 
this sense is phenomenological encounter, experienced, to use Luther’s analogy, like heat 
and light from fire.     
Whether in secular or scriptural terms, there is perhaps no better example of 
relational living-with than marriage. For critics, the multiple marriages that close 
Measure for Measure’s politico-legal investment tends to ring hollow and resonate as an 
empty and unsatisfying gesture. To invoke Boas’s generic description, these marriages 
are often what critical readers find most problematic in the play. In this light, marriage as 
a political solution/resolution can certainly be read as Shakespeare’s capitulation to 
patriarchal authority or heteronormative hegemony, etc. Critics of this vein find it deeply 
                                                 
138 On the connection between grace and baptism see Peter C. Meilaender, “Marriage and the Law: Politics 
and Theology in Measure for Measure,” Perspectives on Political Science 41.4 (2012), 199. 
139 Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 452, emphasis is mine. 
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unsatisfying, for example, that Isabella’s vehement demand for justice—“giv[e] me 
justice, justice, justice, justice!” (5.1.26)—is met graciously through marriage.140 I would 
like to offer a different reading, one that understands this conclusion upon marriage as 
necessary given the eudaimonistic political program running in the play from its start. 
Such a reading, however, requires a return to the argument with which this chapter 
opened: to read this particular play outside of the context of its Biblical intertexts and to 
ignore their precedent in Measure’s political concerns is to do the play an interpretative 
injustice. 
To take but one example, what might we make of Isabella’s imminent marriage to 
the Duke? For Barbara Tovey, their union is a marriage of opposites with the one 
complementing the other in its yoking of wisdom (Duke) with the law (Isabella).
141
 While 
such a reading gestures toward the relational nature of grace I have been advocating, it 
also retains an overt allegorical cast. In an altogether different reading, Lupton has called 
Measure for Measure a “Corinthian commentar[y] on marriage, liberty, and the law,” 142 
and in her turn to Corinth returns critical attention to gracious living, for in Pauline 
theology marriage, liberty, and the law each operate under the banner of grace. 
Paul devotes the majority of his discussion of marriage to chapter seven of his 
first epistle to the Church in Corinth. 1 Corinthians 7 may be divided, not unlike a play, 
into a three-act plot structure: the first act on marriage (vv. 1-16), the second on 
vocational calling (vv. 17-24), and the third once again returning attention to marriage 
                                                 
140 Regarding critical discontent on this issue see Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 205-06. 
141 Barbara Tovey, “Wisdom and the Law: Thoughts on the Political Philosophy of Measure for Measure,” 
in Shakespeare’s Political Pageant: Essays in Literature and Politics, eds. Joseph Alulis and Vickie 
Sullivan (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 73-74. 





 “Paul’s thoughts on marriage, which he presents as both a symbol of 
cosmic hierarchy and a promise of social equality,” Lupton argues, “are key to the civil 
and civic dynamics of Measure for Measure.”144 If we take into account the three-act plot 
structure I have outlined in 1 Corinthians 7, then embedded within (and indeed at the 
center of) this larger narrative of marriage is form-of-life itself, specifically the injunction 
to abide in God (v. 24) by serving one another in His name (vv. 21-22).
145
 This Pauline 
promise of social equality, I would argue, achieves its civil and civic dynamics in the 
play under the operative sign of grace and the relational living-with effected through 
Measure’s concluding marriages. Thus the Duke’s remarks to Isabella at the close of Act 
Five might as well be addressed to the whole of Shakespeare’s Vienna and most certainly 
those assembled on the stage to be wed:  
Your friar is now your prince. As I was then 
Advertising and holy to your business,  
Not changing heart with habit, I am still 
Attorneyed at your service.    (5.1.378-81) 
 
In a similar political-theological gesture, the Hebrew prophet Micah tells a legal 
narrative between God and Israel that correlates justice with eudaimonia.
146
 As both 
Israel’s prosecuting and defense attorney, not unlike Vienna’s Duke, Micah tells the 
people that God has already shown them what is “good” (towb). The Hebrew towb can 
                                                 
143 On the similarities between Paul’s letters to the Corinthian Church and the problems faced by the Duke 
Vincentio, see Daniel Gates, “The Law Made Flesh: St. Paul’s Corinth and Shakespeare’s Vienna,” 
Christianity and Literature 62 (2013): 511-30.  
144 Lupton, Citizen Saints, 13. 
145 The central placement of vocational calling within 1 Cor. 7 can be more clearly seen if the verses are 
divided into three stanzas comprised of 16 lines on marriage, 8 lines on vocation, and 16 concluding lines 
on marriage, thus 16 | 8 | 16.   
146 See Micah 6:1-8. 
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operate as an adjective, verb, and noun.
147
 In its adjectival form, towb denotes that which 
is pleasant, agreeable, or good, yet also what is good in the sense of being ethical and 
right. Psalm 133:1 uses the adjectival form to mark a dwelling together in and for the 
doing of good. Towb’s verb form enacts the doing of what is pleasing in the eyes of God, 
actions enfolded in its noun form as that which is morally good. It is thus the Hebrew 
towb shares association with the Greek eudaimonia. And as the prophet reminds the 
people, this good life is a dwelling-with, a relational polity achieved only through just 
actions, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God.
148
  
Under Biblical precedent, whether that of the Tanakh or New Testament, each of 
these actions is achieved by living graciously in society with others as you have been 
shown grace (favor: Hebrew hen, Greek charis) by God. It is in this way that Jesus, when 
asked by a lawyer what the greatest commandment of the law is, responds in turn: firstly, 
to love (agape) God with the entirety of your being, and secondly to “love (agape) thy 
neighbour as thyself.”149 Jesus’ binary response does not divide life along the lines of 
bios and zoē, excluding the one from the other as in Graeco-Roman polity, but rather 
conjoins its two halves with the caveat that “the second is like unto” (homoios) the first; 
each form-of-life is thus of the same substance because both operate under the same fiat 
of grace.  
In an overt political turn, Lévinas has rendered this relationship thusly: “The 
passing of God, of whom I can speak only by reference to this aid or this grace, is 
                                                 
147 The definitions that follow are from The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon, eds. 
Francis Brown, S.R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996), s.v. “towb.”  
148 Micah 6:8. 
149 Matthew 22:39. This account is given in three of the Gospels: Matthew 22:36-40, Mark 12:28-31, and 
Luke 10:25-27. In the Matthean and Lukean narratives the man who poses the question to Jesus is 
identified as a lawyer; The testimony of Mark identifies him as a scribe. 
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precisely the reverting of the incomparable subject into a member of society.”150 This 
civic reverting of the subject—or as I have been suggesting, this remediation of the 
biopolitical subject—into a member of society, whether Barnardine, Angelo, or Claudio, 
is achieved in this play in varying degrees as one is willing to consign him- or herself to 
live graciously with others. Writing of Measure for Measure as a political intertext for its 
own time, Deborah Shuger once remarked that “[e]arly modern political writings are 
profoundly and pervasively concerned with what should be.”151 I have traced one such 
“what should be” in this chapter: the potential of a bios-politics over biopolitics, a  
statecraft that rejects the (mis)management of people as pure Aristotelian zoē in favor of 
a political-theological eudaimonia achieved through the practice of grace. To approach 




                                                 
150 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1998), 158. 





Post/Human Biopolitics: The Winter’s Tale 
 
Where a fully secularised, anti-religious humanism might claim that human 
beings can only realise themselves independently of a religious framework, 
Shakespeare, by intensifying the existential significance of religion, give us cause 
to wonder whether the secular self is a freedom or restriction. He gives us cause to 
question which way of living might be a more or less authentic expression of what 
it is to be human. 
—Andy Mousley 
 
The post/human is that which both confounds but also holds up to scrutiny the 
terms on which the quintessentially human will be conceived. 
—Elaine Graham  
 
You speak a language that I understand not. 
My life stands in the level of your dreams 
—Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, 3.2.77-78 
 
 
 This chapter begins in medias res, in the middle of things. I will argue that in The 
Winter’s Tale Shakespeare drafts a political world deeply invested in the life of things—
animals, environments, objects, and especially women (things par excellence for 
Leontes)—as well as the political spaces they occupy. This association with the political 
aspect of things comports with what sociologist of science Bruno Latour has envisioned 
as a Parliament of Things, an open forum where  
The imbroglios and networks that had no place now have the whole place to 
themselves. They are the ones that have to be represented; it is around them that 
the Parliament of Things gathers henceforth. ‘It was the stone rejected by the 
builders that became the keystone.’1  
 
Latour’s “imbroglios and networks” could well be recast in Sicilia’s troubled (and 
troubling) political sphere as women, children, animals (cows, sheep, horses), 
environments (gardens, ponds), and objects (statues). As Latour maintains, “[t]hey are 
                                                 
1 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993), 144. Latour’s Biblical reference is to Mk. 12:10. 
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the ones that have to be represented”; my italicization here draws attention, I hope, to the 
sense of urgency and critical necessity in Latour’s call. Shakespeare grants such 
representation, I contend, in the political environs of Sicilia and Bohemia.  
Latour finalizes the construction of his Parliament by way of a building allusion 
in scripture, one that recalls Jesus as the Messiah in his own thingly comportment: It was 
the stone rejected by the builders that became the keystone.
2
 As Andy Mousley’s 
epigraph and my use of Latour’s politico-scriptural invocation suggest, this chapter charts 
a religious Shakespeare, or to be more specific, a political Shakespeare who thinks 
religiously. I use religion in its etymological sense as the Latin religare, a site of 
communal binding and union, a bearing taken up recently by political theorist Simon 
Critchley who sees in religion’s “strongest articulation…possible forms of collectivity 
[and] commonality.”3 It is thus in a religious register that I will build my argument. The 
resurrected Christ as the keystone of Latour’s parliamentary construction, for example, 
finds a specific localization in The Winter’s Tale through another lithic imaginary of 
resurrection, Hermione-as-statue and the political restructuring, the religare, Shakespeare 
poses for our consideration through the feminine. We would do well to remember that 
                                                 
2 Mark 12:10 alludes to Psalm 118:22, “The stone the builders rejected has become the cornerstone” (NIV).  
3 Simon Critchley, interview with Beatrice Marovich, “Simon Critchley, Atheist Religious Thinker on 
Utopia & the Fiction of Faith,” Religion Dispatches, August 20, 2012, http://religiondispatches.org/simon-
critchley-atheist-religious-thinker-on-utopia-the-fiction-of-faith/. Critchley develops this point more fully 
in The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (New York: Verso, 2012). Giorgio 
Agamben traces the etymology of religion as well, yet arrives at a divergent conclusion: “The term religio 
does not derive, as an insipid and incorrect etymology would have it, from religare (that which binds and 
unites the human and the divine). It comes from relegere, which indicates the stance of scrupulousness and 
attention that must be adopted in relations with the gods, the uneasy hesitation (the ‘rereading [rileggere]’) 
before forms—and formulae—that must be observed in order to respect the separation between the sacred 
and the profane,” Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 74-75. In Renaissance 
literature broadly and Shakespeare studies specifically, Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton have 
also traced the connection between religion as religare and its theoretical implications; see, “Sovereigns, 
Citizens, and Saints: Political Theology and Renaissance Literature,” Religion and Literature 38.3 (2006): 
3.      
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only the feminine is granted new life at the play’s close. Where Hermione and Perdita 
may be read as sites of new political possibilities (more on this in due course), Mamillius 
and Antigonus remain resolutely dead.    
This chapter unfolds from the premise that in The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare 
attempts to think the politics of life differently by tracing life’s confluences in its wider 
cast as creaturely (human and animal), environmental, and object-oriented, which is to 
say life in its posthuman turns. The posthuman is both a contested term and a site of 
contestation. As Cary Wolfe expresses in his recent monograph What is Posthumanism?, 
this term “generates different and even irreconcilable definitions,” though often signaling 
a movement beyond the limits of human biological finitude.
4
 As a site of contestation, 
theorists of the posthuman turn attention to the study of animals, the environment, and 
new materialisms (e.g. Object Oriented Ontologies, Speculative Realism, and Actor 
Network Theory) in an attempt to de-center the false ontological security imposed by the 
familiar dyads subject/object, self/other, man/animal, human/non-human, etc.
5
 The 
posthuman’s de-anthropocentrizing gesture is an attempt to displace the Western 
conception of the human that has far too long been fabricated as white, male, and 
heteronormative. To quote Levi Bryant, a posthumanist ontology is one in which 
“humans are no longer monarchs of being, but are instead among beings, entangled in 
beings, and implicated in other beings.”6    
                                                 
4 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xi. 
5 A historical overview of the term can be found in Wolfe’s introduction ‘What is Posthumanism?’, xi-
xxxiv. For excellent examples of these varied modes of posthuman theories in practice, see the themed 
inaugural themed double issue of Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval and Cultural Studies 1.1/2 (2010), 
‘When Did We Become Post/Human?’, eds. Eileen Joy and Craig Dionne. The posthuman in relation to 
Shakespeare studies has recently been explored in the collection Posthumanist Shakespeares, eds. Stefan 
Herbrechter and Ivan Callus (New York: Palgrave, 2012). 
6 Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities, 2011), 44, emphasis in original. 
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Elaine Graham, working at the intersection of theory and theology, maps a similar 
posthuman genealogy by positing the post/human. Graham’s post/human utilizes the 
slash as a visual marker, a semiotic reminder of the human’s situatedness with its posts, 
ever beside and living alongside them, never as a dyadic either/or.
7
 Judeo-Christian 
theology broadly and its Pauline iteration specifically is similarly post/human in its 
express desire to move beyond human self-centeredness and narcissism. Put another way, 
at the purely textual level both Judaism and Christianity are religious formulations whose 
theologies firmly position the other over the self (and thus post- the human), even if they 
may have historically failed to do so in practice. In Renaissance studies such a Pauline 
post/humanism can be found in Barbara Lewalski’s Protestant Poetics and the 
Seventeenth-Century English Lyric; more to the express point of this chapter, Maurice 
Hunt reminds that in Lewalski’s Poetics we find “that the Judeo-Christian archetype 
capable of being traced in The Winter’s Tale was likely construed in Shakespeare’s time 
as a Pauline…paradigm.”8 This paradigm is grace, freely given from above, but totemic 
and totalizing in its call for a selfless comportment toward and care for the other. As St. 
Paul writes in his letter to the Ephesians, “For by grace are ye saved through faith; and 
that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God.”9 In his Galatian epistle Paul makes clear that 
a faith demonstrative of this grace will yield to the calling of the other. In this way Paul’s 
theology may be read as one of service and self-sacrifice, indeed it is a calling to “love 
[and] serve one another. For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt 
                                                 
7 Elaine L. Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Culture 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002). On the theological connections to the post/human, see 
221-34. 
8 Maurice Hunt, “Syncretistic Religion in Shakespeare’s Late Romances,” South Central Review 28.2 
(2011):70. 
9 Eph. 2:8 (KJV). 
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love thy neighbor as thyself.”10 Within the Pauline tradition this faith exercised in grace 
through love is love of a specific kind, agape, the self-sacrificing love Jesus showed to 
the world through his ministry, death, and resurrection. It is the agape of the Christ-event.    
Ken Jackson has argued convincingly for a Pauline Shakespeare as the writer of 
The Winter’s Tale.11 Similarly, I propose that it is a Pauline Shakespeare whose political 
thinking in the spheres of Sicily (court) and Bohemia (pastoral) suggests a desire to 
bypass the mis- and micro-management of life mobilized by biopolitics. There is no 
shortage of contemporary political thought critiquing such biopolitical maneuverings. For 
example, one might look to the works of Foucault, Agamben, Eric Santner, or Roberto 
Esposito to name but a few.
12
 I would suggest that in The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare does 
so by way of Judeo-Christian thinking, particularly in its Pauline cast via the character of 
Paulina, as a religio-political paradigm (religare) centered on the Christ-event, that is, the 
resurrection, with its subsequent outpouring of  the Holy Spirit and grace to all 
humankind. Grace Tiffany reads such Pauline grace as a recurrent theme in 
                                                 
10 Gal. 5:13b-14 (KJV). The Christian imperative to “love thy neighbor as thyself,” Jesus’ so-called Great 
Commandment, is found in three of the four synoptic gospels: Mt. 22:36-40, Mk. 12:30-31, and Lk. 10:27. 
There Jesus himself recalls the Hebrew Scriptures, Deut. 6:5 (love the lord your God) and Lev. 19:18 (love 
thy neighbor as thyself), demonstrating what I have termed the Judeo-Christian post/human turn to 
conceive of the self as always in a service relation with the Other and thus post-ing the all-too-human 
inclination toward self-serving narcissism.   
11
 Ken Jackson, “‘Grace to boot’: St. Paul, Messianic Time, and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale,” in The 
Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies, eds. Paul Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds (New York: 
Palgrave, 2011), 192-210. 
12 For Foucault’s first continuous thoughts on biopolitics, see his lecture series Society Must Be Defended: 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997); see also The Birth of 
Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (New York: Picador, 2010, reprint). Agamben’s 
sustained engagement with biopolitical thinking can be found in his Homo Sacer series of monographs, see 
Ch.2 n.17. Santner’s biopolitical engagement concerns creaturely comportment, see On Creaturely Life: 
Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Esposito’s work centers on the 
politics of death at biopolitics core (biopolitics as thanatopolitics), see Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). For a general overview of contemporary biopolitical 
thinking, see Thomas Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction, trans. Eric Frederick Trump (New 
York: New York University Press, 2011). 
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Shakespeare’s late plays, including The Winter’s Tale, likely arising “from a personal 
late-life interest [by Shakespeare] in the possibilities of ultimate forgiveness.”13 For 
Tiffany, the force of Pauline grace as it is dramatized by Shakespeare has the power to 
“forgiv[e] human mistakes [and] nullify their fatal potential.”14  
The Winter’s Tale, perhaps even more so than Hamlet, discloses a Shakespeare 
concerned with the complexities of being and becoming, of humanity’s fatal potential and 
its possible suspensions. Indeed The Winter’s Tale bears witness to a Shakespeare who 
gives deference to becoming and its political potentiality. In the previous chapter I traced 
the genealogy of such potentiality through the thinking of Aristotle, Agamben, and 
Arendt. I do so here via the post/human as a biopolitical swerve that follows the vectors 
marked out by St. Paul, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In Galatians 3:28 Paul makes a 
proclamation that has become the locus for his radical politicization by contemporary 
continental philosophers: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, 
there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.”15 The erasure or at the 
very least suspension of ethnic (Jew/Greek), legal and biopolitical (bond/free), as well as 
biological (male/female) distinctions in St. Paul’s address forms the nexus of my 
engagement with Paul, Paulina, and the Pauline Shakespeare of The Winter’s Tale.16 
                                                 
13 Grace Tiffany, “Calvinist Grace in Shakespeare’s Romances: Upending Tragedy.” Christianity and 
Literature 49.4 (2000): 422. 
14 Ibid., 421. 
15 In order to establish an early modern intertextuality between Shakespeare’s Pauline thinking and The 
Winter’s Tale, a Jacobean play, I have here cited the KJV. However, its translation of the Greek is flawed 
and will be addressed more fully later in this chapter. On Paul and Gal. 3:28 as they are taken up by 
contemporary continental philosophy, particularly by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, see St. Paul among 
the Philosophers, ed. John D. Caputo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009). Badiou provides a 
book-length treatment of Paul and Gal. 3:28 in relation to the Christ-event and its political potential in St. 
Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).    
16 On Paul’s abolition of ethnic and gender identities see Alan F. Segal, Paul the Convert: The Apostolate 
and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
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From Deleuze and Guattari I borrow the concept of becoming, a theoretical premise that 
privileges immanence over transcendence and action over ideation. Becoming is a lived, 
moving, active force, as opposed to the ontological stasis of being (e.g. being as object).  
Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming occurs in what they term the plane of 
immanence, a space of horizontal expansion rather than the limit-enforcing structure of 
vertical hierarchy. For Deleuze and Guattari becoming is also necessarily feminine; as 
one scholar has phrased it, becoming posits “a line of flight that passes through and 
beyond binary distinctions that define and confine our lives.”17 These binary distinctions 
arise, according to Deleuze and Guattari, from a Western mindset that is always already 
male in its orientation. Thus for Deleuze and Guattari there can be no becoming-male 
because “man, the rational, white, adult male” is the fixed point of ontological certitude 
their project seeks to disrupt.
18
  Becoming-woman and becoming-girl, in contrast, are 
what Deleuze and Guattari term nodes of becoming (origin points, starting locations) that 
unfold in trajectories imbued with the potential to disrupt and displace the project of 
Western hegemony and its patriarchal phallogocentrism. 
Patty Sotirin writes, “[b]ecoming explodes the ideas about what we are and what 
we can be beyond the categories that seem to contain us.”19 In this sense becomings are a 
type of post/humanism, and following their trajectories, this chapter’s post/human 
encounters in The Winter’s Tale are encoded in the Deleuzian sense of opening 
possibilities by and as the feminine (becoming-woman and becoming-girl) in opposition 
                                                 
17 Patty Sotirin, “Becoming-woman,” in Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, ed. Charles J. Stivale (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 102-3. 
18 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 292. 
19 Sotirin, “Becoming-woman,” 99. 
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In what follows, I begin by charting patriarchy’s biopolitical misogyny through 
the varied ontologies Shakespeare develops through animal, environmental, and object-
oriented tropes in The Winter’s Tale, each of which, I argue, maintains a feminine cast. 
Following this political trajectory, the chapter dilates from the intersection between Paul, 
Deleuze and Guattari, by locating Galatians 3:28 as a Deleuzian plane of immanence and 
hermeneutical key for both St. Paul and the restorative politics Shakespeare leaves open 
through Paulina, Hermione, and Perdita. I close by considering the resurrection theme at 
The Winter’s Tale’s own closing, both Perdita’s return from supposed death and 
Hermione’s from statuary quiescence, to suggest a Pauline Shakespeare whose religious 
thinking (religare) centers on a political paradigm shift to the potentiality of the feminine 
and its plurality over the masculine (patriarchal) tendency to reduce everything in its 





In Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing, Ian Bogost outlines 
what he proposes as a practical mode of object-oriented theory in praxis. Bogost writes, 
“[a]s philosophers, our job is to amplify the black noise of objects to make the resonant 
frequencies of the stuffs inside them hum in credibly satisfying ways. Our job is to write 
                                                 
20 I say “Deleuzian becomings” as the theorization of becoming is attributed to Deleuze and occurs 
throughout his individually authored work, even though it is first given expression in his co-authored 
writings with Guattari.  
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the speculative fictions of their processes…I call this practice alien phenomenology.”21 
Shakespeare, I would suggest, is such a philosopher. The critical field of Shakespeare 
Studies alone is, to use Bogost’s turn of phrase, a testament to his ability to make the 
resonant frequencies of the stuffs inside his objects hum in credibly satisfying ways. And 
indeed Shakespeare does so by writing masterful speculative fictions. 
I would like to consider here two speculative fictions in particular, one 
Shakespearean, the other biopolitical. Shakespeare populates The Winter’s Tale with a 
proliferation of female objects through the character of Hermione, whether cast in stone, 
as animal, or environmental loci. These speculative fictions, while suggestive of a radical 
political re-writing as I will argue, arise from the very cultural narrative they seek to 
resist, patriarchy and its inevitable metastasization, misogyny. In The History of 
Sexuality, Vol.1 Michel Foucault traced the genealogy of biopolitics in the West to an 
origin in the seventeenth-century and the development of two distinct yet convergent 
systems of power over life, or what he calls biopower. Foucault describes the first as an 
“anatomo-politics of the human body” which took as its conceptual symbol the body-as-
machine and subsequently “its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the 
extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, [and] its 
integration into systems of efficient and economic controls.”22 The political exigency to 
increase both the body’s usefulness and docility while at the same time managing its 
                                                 
21 Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012), 34, emphasis in original. Julian Yates has made a similar theoretical connection in 
Renaissance literary criticism’s turn to things and its desire to hear objects speak; “What are ‘Things’ 
Saying in Renaissance Studies?”, Literature Compass 3.5 (2006): 992-1010. Yates has also written the 
speculative fiction of early modern oranges in an essay that anticipates Bogost’s object-oriented praxis; see, 
“Towards a Theory of Agentive Drift; Or, A Particular Fondness for Oranges circa 1597,” Parallax 8.1 
(2002): 47-58.      
22 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 
139, emphasis in original. 
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integration into a larger system of economic controls is readily discernible in the female 
body’s status as a commodified object of exchange by and between men in the 
Renaissance marriage market.
23
 Leontes, for example, has the newly-born Perdita cast out 
because “No father own[s] it,” a crime he admits “is indeed / More criminal in thee 
[Hermione] than it” (3.2.86-87).  
What Foucault discloses as “a biopolitics of the population,” however, more 
directly renders the patriarchal desire, indeed its requisite, to control the female body and 
in particular a woman’s sexuality.24 As Foucault defines it, a biopolitics of the population 
“focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as 
the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, 
life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.”25 
Following Foucault, the “species body” is thus precariously tethered to female biology 
and desire. Put another way, this centralized focus on the “species body” is localized in 
female sexuality (propagation) as well as a woman’s unique and singular ability to 
sustain life through both gestation and nutritive provision after a child’s birth in the form 
of milk, without which an infant would die (births and mortality). In terms of polity, level 
of health, life expectancy, and longevity mean little for patriarchy if one cannot secure 
future lineage in the form of legitimate offspring. Such is patriarchy’s narrative, its 
speculative fiction. 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Francis Dolan, Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy (Philadelphia: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008). Dolan historicizes marriage in the period as not only an exchange 
between two families of men, but through the Biblical union of “one flesh” what was united in marriage 
was an expectation that wife’s subjectivity would be subsumed within her husband’s identity. Regarding 
women as commodity objects, see Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ 
of Sex,” in Toward an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1975), 157-210. 




This is Leontes’ predicament at the impassioned opening of The Winter’s Tale. 
Believing his wife unchaste, the charge of adultery is simultaneously one of treason: 
“There is a plot against my life, my crown” (2.1.49). Thus female sexuality reveals its 
potential to dissolve the very continuation of the state; treason (in deed) indeed.
26
 To be 
clear, there has been no threat upon Leontes’ physical body, real or imagined. Though he 
plotted regicide with an unwilling Camillo to poison Polixenes, Leontes’ charge admits 
no trespass against his own physical person. Instead Camillo and Polixenes’ crime is, 
according to Leontes’ narrative, one of complicity in his emasculation through the social 
stigma of a horny wife and his bearing a cuckold’s horns, leaving “Camillo and Polixenes 
[to] / Laugh at me, [and] make their pastime at my sorrow” (2.3.23-24). In Much Ado 
About Nothing, Benedick remarks that Beatrice “speaks poniards, and every word stabs” 
(2.1.216).  The social stigma of laughter stabs equally so for Leontes. The plot against his 
life, then, is one against the futurity of his name and the legacy of his crown. His 
invective readily attests as much equating life with crown in metonymic exchange: 
“There is a plot against my life, my crown” (2.1.49). 
Taking up the quill cum sword, Shakespeare drives this point home through his 
psychologization of the young Mamillius. On Leontes’ report, Mamillius 
Conceiving the dishonour of his mother 
He straight declined, drooped, took it deeply, 
Fastened and fixed the shame on himself; 
Threw off his spirit, his appetite, his sleep, 
And downright languished. (2.3.13-17) 
 
Here, it is Leontes’ poniard words that will strike unto death. In an ostensible turn 
Leontes implicates his unchaste wife in their son’s languishment. Yet in a Freudian turn 
                                                 
26 All references to The Winter’s Tale follow The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition, 
Romances and Poems, eds. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, and Katherine Eisaman 
Maus (New York: Norton, 2008). 
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the king’s report might also be read as an act of projection, one that retains its misogynist 
cast even as it unseats his patrilineal security. That is, by Leontes’ testimony (projection) 
it is only upon realizing (“Conceiving”) his mother’s “dishonour” that Mamillius begins 
to languish, suggesting in this Freudian register the son takes upon himself his mother’s 
(false) guilt, even to the point of death.
27
 In a very real way Leontes is correct in that 
there is a plot against his life in the form of his patriarchal lineage in Mamillius, a plot he 
himself drafts and signs into execution. 
 Believing his wife unfaithful in her current pregnancy, the king begins to doubt 
the paternity of his only son and heir. “[H]e does bear some signs of me,” Leontes 
declaims to Hermione, “yet you / Have too much blood in him” (2.1.58-59). As my 
emphasis shows, Leontes is willing to consider his son’s legitimacy (“he does bear some 
signs of me”) only to allow this truth to be occluded by adulterous fantasy (“yet you / 
Have too much blood in him”). As Jean Howard reminds, it is the unknowability of the 
biological origins of his children—plural—that drives both Leontes’ fantasies and the 
misogynistic vitriol of his attacks against a chaste Hermione.
28
 Much Ado stages a similar 
exchange of topic though not intent. Nonetheless, this dialogue makes clear the concern 
for paternal legitimacy in the period:  
DON PEDRO:                 I think this is your daughter. 
 
LEONATO: Her mother hath many times told me so. 
 
BENEDICK: Were you in doubt, sir, that you asked her? 
 
                                                 
27 In her introduction to The Winter’s Tale, Jean Howard reminds of the etymological association in 
Mamillius’ name to lactation and breastfeeding, further placing the young prince and the future of Sicily’s 
patriarchy itself in the sphere of feminine power. See, Jean E. Howard, introduction to The Winter’s Tale, 
in The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition, Romances and Poems, eds. Stephen Greenblatt, 
Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, and Katherine Eisaman Maus (New York: Norton, 2008), 195.   
28 Ibid., 194. 
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LEONATO: Signor Benedick, no, for then were you a child. 
 
DON PEDRO: You have it full, Benedick. (1.1.84-88) 
 
What is said in jest and witty sport in Much Ado, Benedick’s off-color quip answered 
“full” by Leonato’s pithy return, resonates in The Winter’s Tale in the key of anxiety and 
open hostility. Indeed, with Polixenes fled, it is with full misogynistic furor that Leontes 
turns on his wife: “Let him be / Until a time may serve. For present vengeance, / Take it 
on her” (2.3.21-23).  
 Near the end of Act I, Leontes’ speculations about Hermione’s supposed 
indiscretions take a marked phenomenological turn: 
Ha’ not you seen, Camillo— 
But that’s past doubt; you have, or your eye-glass 
Is thicker than a cuckold’s horn—or heard— 
For, to a vision so apparent, rumor 
Cannot be mute—or thought—for cogitation 
Resides not in that man that does not think— 
My wife is slippery? If thou wilt confess— 
Or else be impudently negative 
To have nor eyes, nor ears, nor thought  (1.2.267-77, emphasis mine)  
 
Although his wife’s transgression is wholly imagined, Leontes’ false vision (both in sight 
and cogitation) bears full phenomenological weight. His narrative to Camillo is one of 
lived experientiality through sight, sound, and thought—and although he does not come 
close to touching the truth, he would have Polixenes taste poison all the same. Under 
Leontes’ traducement Hermione’s personhood is further altered to the status of a thing: 
                                       O, thou thing, 
Which I’ll not call a creature of thy place 
Lest barbarism, making me the precedent, 
Should like language use to all degrees,  
And mannerly distinguishment leave out 




In his rage Leontes revokes both Hermione’s creaturely estate and social standing. She is 
neither queen nor lady (“a creature of thy place”), nor may even be attributed a baseline 
human comportment of “mannerly distinguishment…Lest barbarism” becomes 
“precedent”; his dignity and social status would be yoked to her own if Hermione were 
granted her once-occupied place as such a creature, a lady and the queen both deserving 
respect. Instead, Leontes’ humanity is separated from Hermione’s non-humanness. 
Alienated and alone under her king’s pronouncement, she is translated into object-
orientation: O, thou thing. Such is patriarchal prerogative. 
 While this chapter focuses primarily on the human qua object, turning especially 
to Hermione-as-statue in the conclusion, I would be remiss if I did not discuss Leontes’ 
other alien phenomenologies. Perceiving Hermione’s believed transgression as a threat to 
himself and the state, the king writes a series of anthropocentric fictions in an attempt to 
preserve his own “ontological hygiene,” a term I borrow from Graham.29 These stories, 
tragically, distance Leontes from his wife and son who are cast therein as things (cows, 
horses, gardens, ponds) both alien and alienating to him. 
 
Of Animals and Environments 
 
 In The Accommodated Animal Laurie Shannon has shown early modern culture to 
be “less provincially human than ours.”30 Under Leontes’ rule however, Sicily appears to 
be a cultural outlier on this point. Animals only become his concern in fictions of marital 
                                                 
29 Graham, Representations of the Post/Human, 11. For an extended discussion of “ontological hygiene,” 
see 33-39. 
30 Laurie Shannon, The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013), 8. 
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infidelity and social collapse, and in these events he is not the least accommodating. 
Turning attention to The Winter’s Tale, Paul Yachnin reads “sheep all the way down,” 
especially in “the second half of the play (with all of those sheep just off-stage).”31 For 
Yachnin, “the entire dramatic action, the psychology of the characters, and the themes of 
the play are well explained in terms of the animality of human beings.”32 I tend to agree. 
Yet where sheep populate the environs of Bohemia, in Sicily its cows all the way down. 
That is, as Leontes conceives of his political, social, and masculine decline he does so 
through a cuckoldry imagined in bovine, not ovine terms. Consider the following 
passage: 
LEONTES:           Mamillius,  
Art thou my boy? 
 
MAMILLIUS: Ay, my good lord. 
 
LEONTES:                                        I’fecks, 
Why, that’s my bawcock. What? Hast smutched thy nose? 
They say it is a copy out of mine. Come, captain, 
We must be neat—not neat, but cleanly, captain. 
And yet the steer, the heifer, and the calf 
Are all called neat.  (1.2.120-27) 
 
The exchange begins directly enough, with Mamillius likely unaware of his father’s 
paternal doubts. What any onlooker might observe as a moment of filial doting, turns 
with one turn of phrase to anxious speculation: “We must be neat—not neat, but cleanly, 
captain.” At the touch of his son’s nose—a nose he admits is regarded in the realm as a 
copy of his own—Leontes’ begins to construct the metaphor of their mutual demise. 
“Neat” is a pun meaning both “clean” and “cattle with horns,” an association Leontes 
                                                 
31 Paul Yachnin, “Sheepishness in The Winter’s Tale,” in How to Do Things with Shakespeare: New 




makes apparent in the lines that follow: “And yet the steer, the heifer, and the calf / Are 
all called neat.”33 At this point the king’s wandering eye usurps his wandering mind’s 
narrative: 
LEONTES:              —Still virginalling 
Upon his palm?—How now, you wanton calf— 
Art thou my calf?  (1.2.126-28) 
  
Now, turning from Mamillius to Hermione and Polixenes just in view, he sees (or thinks 
he sees) the two playing (“virginalling”) at each other’s palms. Leontes’ pun here is on 
the virginal, a musical instrument played on the lap, as well as “virginalling’s” obvious 
association with chastity. Though Leontes openly accuses his wife of adultery at this 
point (“How now, you wanton calf”), Mamillius seems to be unaware of the situation 
unfolding before him and answers his father’s question—“Art thou my calf?”—thusly: 
MAMILLIUS:              Yes, if you will, my lord. 
 
LEONTES: Thou want’st a rough pash and the shoots I have, 
To be full like me. Yet they say we are 
Almost alike as eggs. Women say so, 
That will say anything. (1.2.129-33)    
 
The son’s response is met by his father’s rejoinder, and yet the exchange (compounded 
by Leontes’ distracted asides) leaves one wondering exactly to whom his question is 
addressed. Mamillius’ response, “Yes, if you will, my lord,” demonstrates a son’s 
complicity in his father’s animal imaginary. And indeed this has all transpired through 
Leontes’ will. At this point Hermione has (un)willingly become a “wanton calf”; so too, 
Mamillius has been scripted both as a boy unbreeched and a calf that as-yet “want’st a 
rough pash and the shoots” Leontes believes himself now to wear. Here Leontes’ attempt 
at ongological hygiene has failed. Rather than preserve the human/animal dyad he has 
                                                 
33 Winter’s Tale, 206 n.4. 
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worked so hard to construct, his humanness as victim to his wife’s animal lust, Leontes 
ultimately  becomes conscripted within his own narrative. He too believes himself made 
animal by Hermione’s actions. And even though neither Mamillius nor Leontes yet bear a 
cuckold’s horns, this father, mother, and son, this king, queen, and prince are all 
variously undone by Leontes’ animal fiction. 
 The repertoire of misogynist fancy in the Sicilian state is not limited to animals. 
Environmental imaginings prove equally threatening. Leontes channels the feminine 
association with bodies of water, for example, into an ecology of infidelity. Alone with 
his thoughts, the king imagines his whole kingdom has gone as awry as his household: 
                                 There have been, 
Or I am much deceived, cuckolds ere now, 
And many a man there is, even at this present, 
Now, while I speak this, holds his wife by th’arm, 
That little thinks she has been sluiced in’s absence, 
And his pond fished by his next neighbour, by 
Sir Smile, his neighbour. (1.2.191-97) 
 
In this imaginary the adulterous vagina is both sluice, a trough or channel for giving 
direction to water, and pond.
34
 Fantasizing his wife giving direction to another man’s 
flows does nothing to help Leontes’ volatile mental state. Indeed the anxiety and sarcastic 
anger embedded in his feigned “pond fished by his next neighbour” recalls a modern 
water preserve whose fragile ecosystem has been violated by unlawful sport. Sir Smile 
has been fishing without license and for Leontes there is no catch and release. Neither is 
Bohemia alien to such allegorizing. Polixenes uses a fishing metaphor when he worries 
Florizel is courting a poor shepherd’s daughter: “I fear, / the angle that plucks our son 
thither” (4.2.39-40).    
                                                 
34 Ibid., 208 n.7.  
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The terrestrial proves equally adulterous as the aquatic for Leontes. At her 
husband’s request, Hermione agrees to entertain Polixenes in the garden: “If you would 
seek us, / We are yours i’th’ garden. Shall’s attend you there?” (1.2.178-79). He does 
attend them, but only by cognitive dissonance. Giving line to another fishing metaphor, 
the king admits that he would trap his wife and best friend: “I am angling now, / Though 
you perceive me not how I give line” (1.2.181-82). His line (of sight) in turn soon finds 
horticultural allusion. Following his libel against the imagined neighbor Sir Smile, 
Leontes muses, 
                                   Nay, there’s comfort in’t, 
Whiles other men have gates, and those gates opened,  
As mine against their will. Should all despair 
That have revolted wives, the tenth of mankind 
Would hang themselves.  (1.2.197-201). 
 
It is the garden gate that is here transgressed, and as Leontes admits, though gardens have 
gates they prove “No barricado for a belly” (1.2.205).  
Renaissance gardens were widely thought of as erotic spaces in the period.
35
 The 
Italian humanist Pietro Bembo illustrates this point in Gil Asolani, “Let sleep lie behind 
the curtains of our beds [while we] go into the Garden” (1.4).36 Amy Tigner remarks that 
“[f]or Bembo…beds are reserved for sleep, but the garden provides a larger world of 
sensualty.”37 In Leontes’ fancy this larger world of sensuality is nothing short of a “tenth 
of mankind” (1.2.200). In her work with early modern gardens, Tigner writes that “[n]ot 
                                                 
35 Amy L. Tigner, “The Winter’s Tale: Gardens and the Marvels of Transformation,” English Literary 
Renaissance 36 (2006): 114-34. The garden was also a general symbol for the harmonious marriage of 
nature and culture during the Renaissance. Under Leontes’ tending, however, the garden ceases to figure as 
a trope for proper female sexuality and serves rather as a metaphorical locus for wanton and lascivious 
play.   
36 Pietro Bembo. Prose Dell Volgar Lingua; Gil Astolani, Rime (Torino, 1989), cited in Tigner, 116. 
37 Tigner, “The Winter’s Tale,” 116. 
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only was the garden a common site for an adulterous rendezvous in literature, but the 
garden itself was also often coded as the female body,” citing as examples Boccacio’s 
Decameron and Chaucer’s The Merchant’s Tale.38 This is certainly the case for Leontes, 
who readily conceives of a garden whose gate remains open at the wife’s will and not her 
husband’s. It is the threat of conception, in fact, that fertilizes the ground of Leontes’ 
anxiety. As Tigner puts it, “[i]n The Winter’s Tale the garden represents bodies of the 
Queen and her daughter, the bodies that produce future rulers and therefore affect the 
health and well-being of the state itself.”39 Thus we arrive once again at Foucault’s 
biopolitics of the population, although by way of animal and ecological object-others.  
 
The Feminine Thing 
 
 Mark Breitenberg has argued that patriarchy unavoidably though often 
unwittingly produces a masculinity that is anxious.
40
 Leontes’ anxiety has shown itself to 
be as such with his masculine angst manifested as imagined animal and environmental 
others. Yet those alien things both foreign and frightening to Leontes’ world and its 
system of power are ever and always feminine in their associations. The cuckold, for 
instance, while not a female object per se derives his identity instead as an object of the 
feminine. Put simply, when a man possesses horns, or rather, is possessed by horns (as if 
they are some demonic other), he is marked (in)visibly as the object of his wife’s 
adultery. Thus to be a cuckold is to be caught up within a matrix of female transgression 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 117. 
39 Ibid., 115. 




and male dispossession: to possess horns is to be dispossessed of one’s masculinity. In 
order to defend himself from such a hostile takeover, the man must deploy active 
countermeasures. Language works well. In The Winter’s Tale the language of patriarchy, 
which is always already one of Leontes’ misogyny, displays its power through a rhetoric 
of reification. I use reify here in the sense of its Latin root res (thing), to make into a 
thing.      
In a very real sense Leontes’ words do things, to borrow a phrase from J.L. 
Austin.
41
 Or rather, they make things: the female qua thing, to be exact. For example, 
while talking privately with Camillo, his trusted advisor, Leontes concludes his calumny 
against Hermione thusly, 
My wife’s a hobby-horse, deserves a name 
As rank as any flax-wench that puts to 
Before her troth-plight. Say’t, and justify’t.        (1.2.278-80) 
 
By both saying and justifying “it,” Leontes renders his chaste wife an it as well: she is a 
“hobby-horse.” This it is special in its behavior as both animal (horse) and object (toy). 
That is, although ostensibly a child’s plaything, this particular hobby-horse bears a foal. 
And like the inheritance of original sin, in the political sphere of Sicilia reification is an 
inheritable trait, one that passes as if through the genome from one female to the next: it 
begets it. 
 Perdita’s first entry onto the political stage is as an “it.” Presenting the child to her 
resistant father, not even Paulina seems to be able to escape Leontes’ linguistic 
expectations: “Here ’tis—[your wife] commends it to your blessing” (2.3.67). In an act of 
both outrage and political distancing Leontes orders Antigonus to remove Paulina and 
                                                 
41 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). 
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“the bastard” (2.3.74, 2.3.76) from his sight: “Take’t up, I say. Give’t to thy crone” 
(2.3.77). Rather than offer benediction or words of joy, Lenontes’ first utterances to his 
daughter are a fourfold defamation; she is twice a “bastard” and twice an “it.” 
 Perdita’s reification is calcified through repetition. As if by trial, the first litany of 
“its” comes in Leontes’ response to Antigonus’ plea for her young life: 
Shall I live on, to see this bastard kneel 
And call me father? Better burn it now 
Than curse it then. But be it. Let it live.   (2.3.155-57) 
 
Though Leontes concedes to Antigonus to let the baby girl live, he does so with a caveat: 
                                                We enjoin thee, 
As thou art liegeman to us, that thou carry 
This female bastard hence, and that thou bear it 
To some remote and desert place, quite out 
Of our dominions; and that there thou leave it, 
Without more mercy, to it own protection 
And favour of the climate. As by strange fortune 
It came to us, I do in justice charge thee, 
On thy soul’s peril and thy body’s torture, 
That thou commend it strangely to some place 
Where chance may nurse or end it. Take it up.   (2.3.173-83) 
 
In both accountings I have italicized the repeated instances of reification in Leontes’ 
sustained condemnation. Perdita is rendered “it” eleven times by her father in this 
exchange alone. 
 By way of comparison, Mamillius is referred to by their father in a series of 
loving epithets: “this gentleman” (1.2.162), “young prince” (1.2.165), “my boy” 
(1.2.156), and “this squire” (1.2.173). The masculine, at least in Shakespeare’s Sicily, 
seems to recognize and respect only itself (Leontes recognizes his son), consigning both 
its feminine half (Hermione) and its feminine offspring (Perdita) to the politically 
oppressive and alienating status of object-orientation. Yet it is on the shores of Bohemia 
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that Shakespeare would remind us that all human life, both male and female, bears some 
thingly aspect. Meeting his son, who has just reported Antigonus’ now-infamous pursuit 
by a bear, the Old Shepherd remarks, “Thou metst with things dying, I / with things new-
born” (3.3.104-05).  If the pastoral may be read as a restorative to the vices of city and 
court, then it is worth noting that who is met, or rather what are met, on Bohemia’s 




 In his book Statues Michel Serres traces “thing” through its etymological relations 
to German and Latinate words for cause (causa, cosa, chose, Ding).
42
  In doing so, Serres 
observes that “things tend to be admitted to reality only by legal tribunals and 
assemblies—as if reality were a human fabrication.”43  By now it perhaps comes as no 
surprise that Hermione stands trial as a thing. Upon being accused she responds to her 
husband, “You speak a language that I understand not. / My life stands in the level of 
your dreams” (3.2.77-78). Hermione’s response corroborates Serres’ findings: her 
political reality as a thing is comprised entirely of human fabrication, one man’s 
fabrication to be exact. Though at this point in the play Hermione is not yet a statue, we 
might consider her predicament (as well as Leontes’) by way of Serres’ Statues. As Steve 
                                                 
42 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “All Things,” introduction to Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics and Objects 
(Punctum, 2012), 6, citing Michel Serres, Statues: Le second livre de fondations (Paris: Flammarion, 1987), 
294, 307. 
43 Ibid. Serres’ Statues has not yet been published in English, though and edition is forthcoming in February 




Connor has put it, “[f]or Serres, to be a subject in the world is primarily to be subject to 
the world. If the subject is that which can be distinguished from objects, it is therefore 
[t]hat which lies under that which lies before it, holds itself back: attentive, 
concentrated, humble, silent. Subject. This word retains the trace of an act of 
humility. The subject subjects itself to the dominion of that which forms and loses 
it. Yes, kills it. Only the object exists and I am nothing: it lies before me and I 
disappear beneath it.”44 
 
Despite the fact that Leontes has made his subject (and queen, and wife) an object, he 
nonetheless remains yoked to her object-status. It is as if the Biblical “one flesh” of 
marriage fails to dissolve even as personhood is calcified into objectivity. In terms of 
subject/object relation, Leontes’ plight before Hermione is that of the cuckold. Following 
Serres, it is indeed the case that “[t]he subject subjects itself to the dominion of that 
which forms and loses it.” That is, Leontes, believing himself now a cuckold, is thus a 
subject to the very object of his contempt, Hermione. In patriarchal terms, male systems 
of power are ever susceptible to disappearance beneath the feminine. This is the source of 
Leontes’ anxious masculinity. To whit, I have rendered below Serres’ concluding point as 
it may dialogue with The Winter’s Tale. Leontes’ rejoinder to Serres is in the play a 
reaction to Camillo’s suggestion that surely nothing has transpired between Hermione 
and Polixenes: 





LEONTES: Is this nothing? 
Why then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing, 
The covering sky is nothing, Bohemia nothing,  
My wife is nothing, nor nothing have these nothings 
If this be nothing.  (1.2.294-98) 
                                                 
44 Serres, Statues, 211, cited in Steven Connor, “Feeling Things,” Paper presented at Objects of Emotion, 





Read alongside Serres, Leontes, and indeed the whole world with him, dissolves into 
nothing if it is true that Hermione is guilty of infidelity. Leontes is merely being 
objective—and by objectifying Hermione has flipped his entire political world topsy-
turvy. This vexing concern for nothing, or as I will suggest, the female no-thing with its 
potential to dissolve masculine power structures, finds both locution and location in the 
discourse of early modern witch trials.    
 Drawing upon the Malleus Maleficarum (1487), Reginald Scot’s The Discoverie 
of Witchcraft (1584) relates one young man’s unfortunate encounter with a witch.46 The 
story is simple in its plot. A young man finds himself impotent and blames a witch. His 
impotency is far gone. In early modern clinical terms this account reports of his pubic 
region that “nothing could be seene or felt but his plaine body.” Despite the young man’s 
accusations otherwise, the witch denies any wrongdoing and admits that she cannot 
return his “instruments of venerie.” Not liking her response, the young man strangles her 
with a towel until she yields, and near the point of death cries out, “Let me go, and I will 
help thee.” Scot finishes his story thusly:  
And whilst he was loosing the towel, she put hir hand in his codpiece, and 
touched the place; saieng; Now has thou thy desire: and even at that instant he felt 
himself restored. 
 
Laurence Publicover reads Scot’s witch narrative as a testimony of the young man’s 
inability to gain an erection.
47
 It reads to me as something more than an anxiety about 
erectile dysfunction. The account seems to suggest, rather, that the young woman has (the 
                                                 
46 Reginald Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft (London: William Brome, 1584), 77-78, cited in Laurence 
Publicover, “Time and the Supernatural in The Winter’s Tale,” Shakespeare Studies (Shakespeare Society 
of Japan) 48 (2010): 19. All citations from Scott follow this source. For formatting and citation purposes, I 
have drafted my retelling of Scot’s account from Publicover’s summary and original source material.  
47 See n.45.  
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young man believes) rendered him not sexually dysfunctional but asexual. His “plaine 
body” becomes like that of an anatomically unthreatening Ken doll. Further, the young 
woman’s dismissal that she is unable “to return” (Publicover’s words) the young man’s 
“instruments of venerie,” implies their loss rather than malfunction.  
By my reading, this narrative is both an example of vicious misogyny 
(strangulation by towel) and the ability (potentiality) of the feminine to activate or dispel 
and displace male power systems: she put hir hand in his codpiece, and touched the 
place…and even at that instant he felt himself restored. Leontes’ repeated nothings find 
their selfsame lack in the “nothing” that “could be seene or felt” on the strange asexual 
groin of the young man’s “plaine body.” Deleuze would call the witch’s power to restore, 
dispel, or displace the young man’s phallus a deterritorialization. A deterritorializiation 
is a shedding of and moving beyond presumed power structures. It is the phallus and not 
the penis that is both under threat of erasure and that which holds the promise of 
restoration in Scot’s account. Power is at stake. The same is true in Sicily. 
 At multiple times in The Winter’s Tale charges of witchcraft surface. Hermione 
and Perdita, for example, both find themselves threatened with the stake. Before 
capitulating to Antigonus, Leontes orders both mother and child consigned to a witch’s 
fate: “Hence with it, and together with the dam / Commit them to the fire” (2.3.95-96).  
Thus from her entry into Sicily’s political sphere Perdita is associated with a disruptive 
power. This power also holds sway in Bohemia, threatening to upend social order there as 
well. Believing his son, “a sceptre’s heir” (4.4.407), betrothed to “a sheep-hook” 
(4.4.408), Polixenes first accuses Perdita of witchcraft, “And thou, fresh piece / Of 
excellent witchcraft” (4.4.410-11), before matching Leontes in misogynistic fervor: “I 
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will devise a death as cruel for thee / As thou art tender to’t” (4.4.428-29). Paulina too is 
charged with dark arts. Her reward for bringing Leontes his rightfully-born child is to be 
inveighed against as a witch: “Out! / A mankind witch! Hence with her, out o’door— ” 
(2.3.68-69). An editorial gloss is helpful here; “mankind” means manlike.48 Paulina is 
thus manlike in her disruptive agency. Taking up the door Leontes offers as a threshold 
for her exit, I would enter instead into a conversation that approaches Paulina in her 




 Julia Reinhard Lupton writes of Shakespeare’s “potential Pauls.”49 This is St. 
Paul as he is encountered in the allusive matrix of Shakespeare’s thinking, a Paul that is 
variously Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and philosophical.
50
 Shakespeare’s Paul is protean, 
and yet to follow his shifting forms is to consider “the key themes and parameters 
through which we can both encounter and account for the exegetical dimensions of 
Shakespearean dramaturgy.”51 What I hope to trace in my Pauline accounting of The 
Winter’s Tale is a Paul whose politics champion the radical otherness of life at the 
margins. The alterior are welcome at his table. This is a Paul who speaks for life in its 
wider key through a politics of lived compassion for all others, a compassion anchored in 
resurrection, grace, and love. The Paul of The Winter’s Tale is a Paul of potentiality. 
                                                 
48 See The Winter’s Tale, 223. 
49 Julia Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 221, emphasis in original. Lupton further explains her use of the term “potential” in 
n.7. 
50 Ibid., 219. 
51 Ibid., 220. 
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 For Critchley St. Paul’s potentiality always bears the spirit of reform.52 Following 
Critchley, “[t]he return to Paul is the attempt, and this is Heidegger’s word, at the 
destruction (Destruktion) or dismantling of a deadening tradition in the name of a 
proclamation of life.”53 We might think of Paulina’s proclamation to those witnessing 
Hermione’s statue and awaiting its (re)animation: “It is required / You do awake your 
faith” (5.3.94-95). This is followed by a second proclamation to Hermione, “Descend. Be 
stone no more. / … / Dear life redeems you” (5.3.99, 103). In these proclamations the 
deadly tradition of patriarchy’s fundamental dyads subject/object, male/female, and 
husband/wife begin to dismantle as static life becomes resurrected. I take this point up at 
length at the conclusion of this chapter. At present I would connect Pauline reform to its 
centralizing verse in Galatians 3:28—“There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor 
free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”54 This passage has 
been heralded as “The Magna Carta of Humanity” and “the most socially explosive 
statement in the New Testament.”55 Galatians 3:28 is also arguably the key to 





                                                 
52 Critchley, Faith of the Faithless, 155. 
53 Ibid., 156. 
54 NIV translation. 
55 Paul K. Jewett, Man as Male and Female: A Study in Sexual Relationships from a Theological Point of 
View (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 142. Klyne Snodgrass, “Galatians 3:28: Conundrum or Solution?”, 




A Hermeneutical Key 
 
 Randall Martin has suggested Paulina as a kind of hermeneutical key for 
Shakespeare’s Pauline thinking. Paulina-as-cipher, he argues, “has the potential to 
illuminate the interpretative significance of other Shakespearean allusions to Paul.”56 The 
correlation between Paul and Paulina is well documented by scholars.
57
  Building on this 
ground, I would pose that both Paulina and a Pauline Shakespeare must be similarly 
understood by way of St. Paul’s own cipher in Galatians 3:28. As Daniel Boyarin writes,  
Viewing Paul through the lens of Galatians, and especially through Galatians 
3:28-29, the baptismal declaration of the new humanity of no difference, 
constructs a particular Pauline object, a different Paul from the one constructed by 




It is important to recognize that “the baptismal declaration of the new humanity of no 
difference” to which Boyarin refers is a baptism of the spirit by grace. Thus Paul writes 
in 1 Corinthians 12:13a, “For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we 
be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free.”59 I have followed Boyarin’s 
                                                 
56 Randall Martin, “Paulina, Corinthian Women, and the Revisioning of Pauline and Early Modern 
Patriarchal Ideology in The Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare, the Bible, and the Form of the Book: Contested 
Scriptures, eds. Travis DeCook and Alan Galey (New York: Routledge, 2012), 57. 
57 Julia Reinhard Lupton reads this correlation “through the typological motifs of Leontes’ law corrected by 
Pauline grace and faith,” see Afterlives of the Saints: Hagiography, Typology, and Renaissance Literature 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 176-77. For Grace Tiffany, “Paulina is indeed Pauline in her 
bracing admonitions to Leontes to remain virtuous, repentant, and chaste (5.1.12-84), invoking Paul’s 
epistolary exhortations of the early Christian churches (“But fornication, & all uncleanness…, let it not be 
once named among you”; “Housbands, love your wives” [Eph. 5:3, 25]),” see “Calvinist Grace,” 428. 
Huston Diehl argues that Shakespeare explores his interest in mingling genres, myths, and religious 
thinking through Paulina who represents, for Shakespeare, Paul’s own hybridity as “both a Roman citizen 
and a Jew who converted to Christianity,” see Huston Diehl, “‘Does not the stone rebuke me?’: The Pauline 
Rebuke and Paulina’s Lawful Magic in The Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare and the Cultures of 
Performance, eds. Paul Yachnin and Patricia Badir (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 70. An additional 
bibliography on this subject can be found in Hunt, “Syncretistic Religion,” n.55. 
58 Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994), 5. 
59 Emphasis in original; on baptismal differentiation relative to Paul, see Acts 19:1-7. 
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methodology of reading Paul through Galatians 3:28-29. To better elucidate his point, 
Boyarin provides a “simple and dramatic example,” one fitting, I think, to Shakespeare’s 
own dramatic use of Paul and which I here submit to the same purpose:  
Traditionally, Philemon has been read as a support for the institution of slavery, 
as a return of Onesimus to his former slave status, taking the moment in 1 
Corinthians 7 where Paul tells slaves that they need not be free in order to be 
saved as determinative. If, however, we read Galatians 3:29 as our constant, with 
its declaration that there is no slave and free in Christ, then Philemon reads 
entirely differently, not as a commandment of Onesimus back into slavery but as a 
deft effort to pressure Philemon to free Onesimus. Tough texts are not infinitely 
indeterminate, neither do they dictate ineluctably only one possible interpretation, 




The onus of such responsibility, I would argue, begins with proper translation. 
 Luther, for example, gets it wrong. His translation of Galatians 3:28-29 reads, 
“There is neither Jew nor Grecian, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor 
female…for in Christ Jesus all states…are nothing.”61 Paul’s concluding couplet in v.28 
reads in the original Greek ouk eni arsen kai thēly, “neither is there male and female.” 
Paul distinguishes his final pairing from the preceding two by way of conjunction, kai 
(and), rather than disjunction, oude (nor). The Geneva Bible (1599) and King James 
(1611) also translate the final couplet “male nor female.” Paul’s original non-disjunctive 
final pairing is significant in that it marks a common humanity that is elided by the nor in 
Luther, the Geneva, and KJV translations, which, whether intentional or accidental, 
establish an opposition between the sexes. 
 When read through the historical matrix of scripture, Paul’s use of the conjunction 
kai to yoke male to female in shared humanity has the potential to undermine patriarchy. 
                                                 
60 Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 5. 




In the field of Biblical studies, for example, R.W. Hove has convincingly argued Paul’s 
arsen kai thēly, male and female, “to be a deliberate reference to Genesis 1:27, where 
God created mankind ‘male and female’ prior to the fall, and this was good.”62 Jack 
Cottrell reads the kai of Galatians in connection to laws concerning inheritance according 
to Deuteronomic Code.
63
 Under this system only free Jewish males inherited land left by 
their fathers.
64
 According to Paul in Galatians 3:29 this paradigm is suspended as the 
Abrahamic dispensation has become fulfilled in Christ: “And if ye be Christ’s, then are 
ye Abraham’s seed, and heirs according to the promise.” Similarly, in Galatians 4:7 Paul 
proclaims that all those who are saved by the grace of Jesus’ resurrection are co-heirs 
with Christ to the divine inheritance of eternal life. Verse 7 echoes the cipher of 3:28, “So 
you are no longer a slave, but God’s child; and since you are his child, God has made 
you also an heir.”65 Ceasing to figure inheritance from father to son and recognizing it 
instead through grace open to an equilateral co-humanity (male and female), patriarchy 
would likely fall within the span of a few generations.  
 Such readings of Galatians are certainly not without their critics.
66
 The Church 
Fathers including Ignatius of Antioch, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus, 
                                                 
62 R.W. Hove, Equality in Christ: Galatians 3:28 and the Gender Dispute (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1999), 
67-68, added emphasis is mine. 
63 Jack Cottrell, Gender roles and the Bible : Creation, the Fall, and Redemption : A Critique of Feminist 
Biblical Interpretation (Joplin, Mo.: College Press Pub. Co., 1994), 272-283. 
64 Deut. 21:15-17. 
65 Emphasis is mine. 
66 Boyarin’s reservations on this point are helpful: “While Paul’s impulse toward the founding of a non-
differentiated, non-hierarchical humanity was laudable in my opinion, many of its effects in terms of actual 
lives were not. In terms of ethnicity, his system required that all human cultural specificities—first and 
foremost, that of the Jews—be eradicated, whether or not the people in question were willing. Moreover, 
since of course, there is no such thing as cultural unspecificity, merging all into people into one common 
culture means ultimately (as it has meant in the history of European cultural imperialism) merging all 
people into the dominant culture. In terms of gender, for Paul (as indeed, for nearly everyone until now), 
autonomy and something like true equality for women were bought at the expense of sexuality and 
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Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom, as well as Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, for 
example, variously read Galatians 3:28 in the context of salvation and yet none of these 
“major teachers in the history of the church thought Galatians 3:28 abolished the male-
female role distinction.”67 My point is not that Paul abolishes gender roles in Galatians so 
much as he puts pressure on binary distinctions themselves. Following Boyarin, I choose 





My reading of Paul, and thus the Pauline in The Winter’s Tale, is enabled by the 
thinking of Deleuze and Guattari. These are not such strange bedfellows, though they 
may seem otherwise. As Em McAvan puts it, “Deleuze provides us neither with a master 
key for religion nor an outside from which to critique, instead he provides an occasion for 
transmutation, for becoming—the becoming-Deleuzian of religion and the becoming-
religious of Deleuze.”69 Scholarly volumes on Deleuze and religion certainly suggest as 
much.
70
 Bryan Reynolds’ work has shown both Shakespeare and the early modern period 
                                                                                                                                                 
maternity. Also, analogously to the culture question, the erasure of gender seems always to have ended up 
positing maleness as the norm to which women can ‘aspire,’” A Radical Jew, 8.  
67 S. Lewis Johnson Jr., “Role Distinctions in the Church: Galatians 3:28, “ in Recovering Biblical 
Manhood and Womanhood: A Response to Evangelical Feminism, eds. John Piper and Wayne Grudem 
(Wheaton: Crossway, 1991, 2006), 156. 
68 Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 9. 
69 Em McAvan, “The becoming-girl of the Virgin Mary,” Rhizomes 22 (2011): n.p. 
http://rhizomes.net/issue22/mcavan/index.html#_edn1. 
70 Mary Bryden, ed., Deleuze and Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001); Catherine Keller, Face of the 
Deep: A Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003); John D Caputo, The Weakness of God: A 
Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).   
131 
 
to similarly comportment with Deleuze’s thinking.71 My argument, though admittedly 
anachronistic, is that Galatians 3:28 as it is developed in both Paul and Shakespeare in 
The Winter’s Tale unfolds as a Deleuzian becoming-woman. 
The cartography of becoming begins, necessarily, with the concept of immanence. 
Immanence is the plane upon which becomings unfold. As Sotirin explains, “Deleuze’s 
philosophy is often called a philosophy of immanence because it is concerned with what 
a life can do, what a body can do when we think in terms of becomings, multiplicities, 
lines and intensities rather than essential forms, predetermined subjects, structured 
functions or transcendent values.”72 There is neither Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free, 
neither is there male and female. Becomings are possiblilites, potentialites. Becoming-
woman is a rupture of what Deleuze and Guattari call a molar entity, “the woman as 
defined by her form, endowed with organs and functions and assigned as a subject.”73 Put 
another way, the molar woman is the woman as she is formed under the biopolitics of 
patriarchal hegemony and misogynistic threat.  
Becoming-woman is a counter-theorem to this formulation. As defined by 
Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-woman is “not imitating or assuming the female form, 
but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of 
proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman, 
create the molecular woman.”74 Put simply, becoming-woman, the molecular woman, is 
                                                 
71 Bryan Reynolds, “The Devil’s House, ‘or worse’: Transversal Power and Anti-Theatrical Discourse in 
Early Modern England,” Theatre Journal 49.2 (1997): 142-67; Performing Transversally: Reimagining 
Shakespeare and the Critical Future (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Transversal Subjects: From Montaigne 
to Deleuze after Derrida (New York: Palgrave, 2009). 
72 Sotirin, “Becoming-woman,” 101. 




an unfolding of the potentiality of the feminine. It is a methodology for disrupting and 
displacing the masculine, dyadic, phallogocentric subject/object relations that undergird 
Western thinking, social construction, and politics. There is neither Jew nor Gentile, 
slave nor free, neither is there male and female.      
Like alternative readings of Galatians, Deleuzian becomings are not without their 
criticism. The most common indictment by feminist critics is that becoming-woman is 
always already a male ideation (indeed one theorized by a privileged white adult male) 
and thus traps real women in the molar rubric of male domination. “At the same time,” 
Sotirin writes, “becoming-woman has energized feminist thinking and activism in the 
work of Rosi Braidotti, Claire Colebrook, Moira Gatens, Camilla Griggers, Elizabeth 
Grosz, Tamsin Lorraiine, Dorothea Olkowski, and others.”75 
I end my discussion of becomings here by returning to the site of their origins, the 
plane of immanence:  
Deleuze and Guattari refer to this plane as a Body without Organs, a BwO: a body 
that is not organized in accord with biological functions, organic forms, or 
cultural-historical values. Rather, a BwO deconstructs these seemingly inviolable 
arrangements, deterritorializing particles, intensities, energies in molecular lines 




There is neither Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free, neither is there male and female. 
Galatians 3:28, my Pauline constant, resonates in the key of Deleuze. I wish to posit 
another religious association. In theological terms, a BwO is not unlike the body of 
Christ. The one is fueled by desire (for Deleuze a BwO is a desiring machine), the other 
sustained by agape, the desire to love thy neighbor as thyself. I refer not to the Eucharist, 
but the body of believers saved by grace and the baptism of the spirit through Christ’s 
                                                 
75 Sotirin, “Becoming-woman,” 104. 
76 Ibid., 101-02. 
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resurrection. Following this Pauline-Deleuzian line of flight, I wish to suggest that 
Shakespeare deconstructs the seemingly inviolable arrangements of patriarchal structure 
in The Winter’s Tale through the resurrection of Hermione-as-statue and the return of 




 Much has been written about the theme of resurrection in The Winter’s Tale.77 By 
the play’s conclusion two physical resurrections have occurred. Perdita, believed dead 
some sixteen years, is found to be alive and well in Bohemia, raised to think herself the 
Old Shepherd’s daughter. Hermione’s resurrection is a scene of theatrical awe for 
characters and audiences alike, as a seeming-statue is given movement, breath, and voice. 
Hunt argues that “[o]f all of Shakespeare’s plays, The Winter’s Tale uncharacteristically 
keeps the audience in the same state of ignorance endured by the onstage characters.”78 
Hermione’s resurrection is staged as follows: 
’Tis time. Descend. Be stone no more. Approach. 
Strike all that look upon with marvel. Come, 
I’ll fill your grave up. Stir. Nay, come away. 
Bequeath to death your numbness, for from him 
Dear life redeems you. (5.3.99-103) 
 
                                                 
77 See, for example, Richard Wilson, “Monstrous to Our Human Reason: The Empty Grave of The Winter’s 
Tale,” Sillages Critiques 13 (2011): n.p., http://sillagescritiques.revues.org/2348; Elizabeth Williamson, 
“Things Newly Performed: The Resurrection Tradition in Shakespeare’s Plays,” in Shakespeare and 
Religious Change, eds. Kenneth J.E. Graham and Philip D. Collington, 110-32 (New York: Palgrave, 
2009); Sarah Beckwith, “Shakespeare’s Resurrections,” in Shakespeare and the Middle Ages, eds. Curtis 
Perry and John Watkins, 45-67 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a book length treatment of the 
resurrection theme in Shakespeare, see Sean Benson, Shakespearean Resurrection: The Art of Almost 
Raising the Dead (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2009). 
78 Maurice Hunt, “Visionary Christianity in Shakespeare’s Late Romances,” CLA Journal 47 (2004): 223. 
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Adam Max Cohen reads this resurrection as “profoundly Christian,” allegorizing Paulina 
as a type of Christ exchanging her body for Hermione’s “in a sacrificial act” recalling 
Christ’s death and atonement for mankind’s sins (“Come, / I’ll fill your grave up…Dear 
life redeems you”).79 For Richard Wilson it is Hermione who arises from her grave 
Christ-like, offering redemption to The Winter’s Tale’s fallen world.80 Opinions vary. 
Within a religious framework, particularly that of Pauline theology, resurrection 
symbolizes a new life in Christ, the opportunity to live a life renewed in the service of 
others. Thinking politically, resurrection represents the possibility for new political 
associations and new opportunities for engaging life within the political sphere. 
 Resurrection, however, is not always linked to positive transformation in the early 
modern period. As Elizabeth Williamson has shown, “Shakespeare’s play closely 
resembles other Jacobean resurrection plays…all of which revolve around mistreated 
women.”81 Plays of this type include Thomas Heywood’s How a Man May Choose a 
Good Wife from a Bad (1602), The Second Maiden’s Tragedy (1611), and John 
Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi (1614).82 The early modern trope of the moving statue is 
derived from the tale of Pygmalion in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. This is a troubling text for 
its female characters. “Narratives of rape and misogyny frame the figure of the animated 
statue,” as Lynn Enterline reminds us.83 Indeed, in the Ovidian story, “Pygmalion’s 
                                                 
79 Adam Max Cohen, Wonder in Shakespeare (New York: Palgrave, 2012), 30. 
80 Wilson, “Monstrous to Our Human Reason,” para. 24. 
81 Williamson, “Things Newly Performed,” 111. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Lynn Enterline, “‘You speak a language that I understand not’: The Rhetoric of Animation in The 
Winter’s Tale,” Shakespeare Quarterly 48.1 (1997): 19. 
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rejection of women…is based on a misogynistic disdain for the entire sex.”84 The 
Winter’s Tale is no My Fair Lady, and Leontes is no Rex Harrison nor Hermione an 
Audrey Hepburn. If The Winter’s Tale is indeed “the period’s most famous version of 
Pygmalion” as Sarah Annes Brown maintains, then Shakespeare’s appropriation of Ovid 
retains some of the original’s rough cast.85 Enterline contends that Shakespeare’s 
evocation is “a story that self-consciously proposes a close yet opaque alliance between 
aesthetics and misogyny.”86 By this reading, one aesthetic of Hermione-as-statue is that 





In his introduction to Inhuman Nature, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen provides an 
alternate aesthetic approach to Enterline’s “opaque alliance between aesthetics and 
misogyny.”87 Cohen renders the relationships between the human and stone through the 
statuary example of Rodin’s sculpture Le Penseur. Cohen’s is a powerful image of 
masculine anthropocentrism and its instability. It bears repeating at length: 
Auguste Rodin’s iconic bronze sculpture Le Penseur [The Thinker] seems an 
entire world: a body stripped bare and arched into a self-contained emblem for 
Philosophy, a human figure curved almost into the globe itself. Its muscular 
autonomy suggests the inward vectors of contemplation, the privacy of 
cognition—as well as their unthought gendering (Rodin’s Thinker offers an 
                                                 
84 Sarah Annes Brown, “Queering Pygmalion: Ovid, Euripides, and The Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare’s 
Erotic Mythology and Ovidian Renaissance Culture, ed. Agnès Lafont (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 139. 
85 Ibid., 146-47. 
86 Enterline, “You speak a language,” 19. 




ostentatiously male body). But what of that which supports philosophy’s 
introspection, the boulder that affords foundation? Without the stone (sometimes 
fashioned of bronze, sometimes of granite), the numerous castings of this statue 




Just as The Thinker would “tumble into indignity” without the support of its stone, 
Leontes unwittingly erects his own precarious monument to thinking. “If I mistake / In 
those foundations which I build upon,” he tells Hermione, “The centre is not big enough 
to bear / A schoolboy’s top” (2.1.102-05). Leontes’ association is apt. Though he is 
unaware, the center of the statue he has built in the form of his wife cannot bear even the 
shift of “A schoolboy’s top” (there is simply no wiggle room), and so, like Humpty 
Dumpty, it must topple to the ground. Thus we might conceive of Hermione’s descent 
from her plinth as a movement away from misogynist capture.  
Cohen continues: 
Stone, for example, enables movement and violence, extends cognition, and 
invites world-building. Calculus, the study that makes possible chemistry and 
engineering, is a Latin word that means “small stone,” a counter that glides along 
an abacus, the means by which we outsource our reckonings to pebbles and string. 
“Calculus” is in turn intimately related to the support of body and dwelling, 
calcium, the mineral that enables flesh to swim, to fly, to run. This same 
substance under subterranean pressure yields limestone and marble, matter for 
courts and temples. Always supported by objects, substances, and ecologies, the 




Stone as “matter for courts and temples” returns the conversation once more to the 
religious and the political, and to their shared connectivity. It is also to the 
uncompanioned that Leontes directs his attention only moments after Hermione has been 
resurrected into Sicilian society. Polixenes and Leontes, for example, sanction in accord 
the “troth-plight” (5.3.152) between Florizel and Perdita, an act forecasting the union of 
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their kingdoms in future harmony. The old are to be similarly yoked in marriage as 
Leontes further promises the widowed Paulina to his off-again, on-again advisor Camillo.   
 Taking up the theme of reunion as a re-union of and in marriage, Tiffany reads 
Leontes as a changed man at the play’s close. By her account, “Leones’ redemption is 
evidenced in his time-nurtured (and rewarded) wish not for a controllable and objectified 
statue of a wife but for a living woman.”90 Such a reading comports with St. Paul’s 
instructions for how husbands are to treat their wives under the new covenant of grace. In 
1 Corinthians Paul counsels believers to “Let the husband render unto the wife due 
benevolence: and likewise also the wife unto the husband.”91 This is a “one flesh” of 
mutual respect. In his epistle to the Ephesians Paul further connects a husband’s actions 
in marriage to the Christ-event itself: “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also 
loved (ēgapēsen) the church, and gave himself for it.”92 Christ’s love for the church is 
agape, the selfless and self-sacrificing care for the other. If we are to read the truth of 
intent by action, then Leontes’ love for Hermione throughout the play, even by its close, 
suggests an inclination more toward self-preservation than self-sacrifice.  
Publicover argues that Hermione’s so-called resurrection is an “un-supernatural” 
and decisively political action.
93
  By his telling, Hermione’s absence and sudden re-
emergence into the Sicilian polity after sixteen years “dangerously psychologises that 
absence; it registers the possibility that the queen has not, and perhaps cannot, forgive the 
                                                 
90 Tiffany, “Calvinist Grace,” 436. 
91 1 Cor. 7:3. 
92 Eph. 5:25. 
93 Publicover, “Time and the Supernatural,” 23. 
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king for his past crimes.”94 Publicover may have the right of it. Hermione’s speech would 
seem to corroborate: 
                                                       I, 
Knowing by Paulia that the oracle 
Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserved 
Myself to see the issue. (5.3.126-29) 
 
There is no mention here of a wife’s desire to be reconciled to her husband. There is also 
no sense of queenly duty to an unjust king. Rather, Hermione’s re-emergence into the 
social and political sphere in Sicily (she is once again the queen) is activated by a 
mother’s affection for her daughter. For Shakespeare, I would suggest, this affect has the 
political potentiality to disrupt patriarchy’s power.    
Judy Schavrien, for example, argues that The Winter’s Tale displays a 
Shakespeare who “envision[s] a rebalancing of hyper-masculine internal and external life 
by way of the Feminine, both youthful and mature.”95 I tend to agree. Hermione’s final 
speech act begins as one of benediction over her daughter (“You gods, look down, / And 
from your sacred vials pour your graces / Upon my daughter’s head,” 5.3.122-24) and 
continues only as the address of one female to another. She never speaks to Leontes. 
Neither does he once speak to her directly after she has proved to be a living woman and 
not a mute statue. Perhaps, then, Leontes’ own speech act that would instate the 
marriages expected at a comedy’s close should give us pause for suspicion. Publicover 
has suggested that Leontes “is trying to deflect our attention from the still-strained 
relations between himself and his wife.”96 By this reading these terminal marriages (in 
                                                 
94 Ibid., emphasis in original.  
95 Judy Schavrien, “Paradigm Shift, Then and Now: The Shakespearean Winter’s Tale and Renewal 
Through the Feminine,” International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 28 (2009): 25. 
96 Publicover, “Time and the Supernatural,” 25. 
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terms of plot and plotting) are “an awkward attempt [by Leontes] to assert authority—
both over his subjects and over the play’s generic structure.”97   
It is important to remember, however, that these marriages are never realized. The 
Winter’s Tale’s conclusion remains open ended, suggesting, I would argue, the potential 
for its politics (Paulitics) to be as well. Though Paulina is promised to Camillo, their 
imminent marriage can never fully interrupt the flow of its world’s present biopolitical 
course. To return momentarily to Foucault, Paulina’s body, now in its winter, is well past 
childbearing years and is thus shut off from a physical renewal of a biopolitical futurity 
(of the feminine) through her offspring. The physical body alone cannot a new politics 
make. However, the Mediterranean setting of The Winter’s Tale and its Pauline 
associations should not be overlooked. Martin contends that Shakespeare uses the 
character of Paulina to analogize “the assumptions of first-century women in Corinth, 
Ephesus, and other Mediterranean centers of cross-cultural spirituality.” 98  In so doing, 
Martin continues, “Paulina and Hermione reconnect the regenerative powers of the 
female body to spiritual (re-)creation in the physical world through the kinetic energy and 
affective performativity of their stage action.”99 Throughout the play Leontes yields to 
Paulina’s—and only Paulina’s— “affectivive performativity.” At her direction he both 
mourns the loss of his son, wife, and daughter, and pledges never to remarry unless 
Paulina approves the match. Shakespeare even closes the action of his play with a final 
deferral by Leontes: “Good Paulina, / Lead us from hence” (5.3.152-53). 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 




Shakespeare also affords the opportunity to consider an alternate political future 
through his young lovers Perdita and Florizel. Like Paulina and Camillo they too are 
promised to marry at The Winter’s Tale’s end. Yet their promise of marriage precedes 
any authorization by patriarchal authority (a source of much trouble in the Bohemian 
pasturelands). Florizel and Perdita’s is a choice to marry they have made for themselves, 
answering perhaps Paul’s charge in 1 Corinthians 7, “Let the husband render unto the 
wife due benevolence: and likewise also the wife unto the husband.” Deleuze might call 
their unsanctioned betrothal a deterritorialization, one that is, perhaps, self-sacrificing in 
its nature. Florizel’s willingness to sacrifice his “self” qua prince, to exchange highborn 
status for low, suggests the New Testament’s central (political) inversion of the master 
becoming the servant, and might thus be read as a gesture in this direction.     
 
The Recuperative Feminine 
 
 Political futures vary. At the close of The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare leaves open 
a potential politics through what Deleuze and Guattari term becoming-girl. Why girl? As 
Deleuze and Guattari put it 
Girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in 
everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular sexes on 





In short, girls possess a powerful pre-sexual and thus pre-political line of flight. 
Shakespeare anticipates such a line of flight as he scripts Polixenes and Leontes’ youth as 
just such a world. Upon Polixenes’ report, he and Leontes 
                                                 
100 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 277. 
141 
 
were as twinned lambs that did frisk i’th’ sun, 
And bleat the one at th’other. What we changed 
Was innocence for innocence. We knew not  
The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dreamed 
That any did. Had we pursued that life, 
And our weak spirits ne’er been higher reared 
With stronger blood, we should have answered heaven 
Boldly, ‘Not guilty’, the imposition cleared 
Hereditary ours.  (1.2.69-77) 
 
By this account it is only through sexual awareness (differentiation) that man falls into 
politics. In the asexual remembrance of the pastoral of his shared youth with Leontes “as 
twinned lambs,” Polixenes admits there was no economy of exploitation. Rather, only 
“innocence for innocence” was exchanged. Polixenes is Augustinian in his memory; the 
fall into sin (“the imposition…Hereditary ours”) arrives through an awakened sexual 
desire (“our weak spirits ne’er been higher reared / With stronger blood”). 
 Following a more misogynist reading of Augustine, Polixenes blames women for 
both his and Leontes’ fall: 
HERMIONE:       By this we gather 
You have tripped since. 
 
POLIXENES:               O my most sacred lady, 
Temptations have since then been born to’s; for 
In those unfledged days was my wife a girl.  
Your precious self had then not crossed the eyes 
Of my young playfellow. 
 
HERMIONE:                 Grace to boot! 
Of this make no conclusion, lest you say 
Your queen and I are devils.   (1.2.78-87) 
 
Despite his endearing, “most sacred lady,” Polixenes never answers Hermione’s charge 
of being called “devil.” Polixenes, it would seem, is tacitly in agreement. What surprises 
more, perhaps, is that Leontes fondly remembers the becoming-girl of his youth as well: 
methoughts I did recoil 
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Twenty-three years, and saw myself unbreeched, 
In my green velvet coat; my dagger muzzled, 
Lest it should bite its master, and so prove, 
As ornament oft does, too dangerous. (1.2.156-60) 
 
Not only is this a fond remembrance, it is an open censure of the very patriarchal system 
with its phallogocentrism (“my dagger”) that, un-muzzled during the play’s course, has 
indeed turned to bite its master.   
 From these exchanges we might conclude that, in The Winter’s Tale, the fall into 
sin is concurrent with the fall into politics. Princes become kings only when they are 
sexually awakened by their respective queens. Yet with this sexual desire comes “[t]he 
doctrine of ill-doing,” to quote Polixenes, a doctrine both he and Leontes have shown to 
be decidedly misogynist. If this correlation holds, then becoming-girl offers a restorative 
from this political fall, as Polixenes and Leontes’ same childhood narratives suggest. It 
should therefore come as no surprise when Shakespeare concludes his play by 
reintroducing Perdita, a literal example of becoming-girl, into Sicilian polity in the play’s 
final scene. 
Becoming-girl’s power, as Deleuze and Guattari theorize it, is love. “[K]nowing 
how to love,” they argue, is the “immanent end of becoming.”101 Following a Pauline line 
of flight (Paulitics), the immanent end of becoming is to live actively in loving service to 
all others without the political boundaries of Jew, Greek, slave, free, male, and female. 
Becoming, following Paul, is to follow not a theology of words but of action 
(immanence), and the operative action is always love (agape). Critchley has been quoted 
as saying love is “the most extraordinary fiction,” what he calls a supreme fiction, “a 
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fiction that we know to be a fiction…but in which we nonetheless believe.”102 
Chritchley’s thoughts on love as a fiction are telling: 
I think we’re confused about love, and we don’t know what the concept means 
anymore. Love isn’t a contract. Love isn’t an exchange of favors. Love isn’t, you 
know, “you do this and I’ll do that.” The two formulations that I use in [The Faith 
of the Faithless] are sort of muddled together: to love is to give what one does not 
have, and receive that over which one has no power…To love is to orientate 
oneself toward something much more radical. But it also implies a giving up of 
one’s power.103 
 
This may well be read as a secular excursus on agape. Under such love, subject/object 
distinctions dissolve: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. I have already suggested 
that we consider Perdita and Florizel’s love as one premised on agape. So, is love a 
fiction? I’m not sure it really matters. “Fiction is something that needs to be accepted,” 
Critchley maintains, “[t]he question is, then, how might we manipulate the fictionality of 
political experience, in order to do something else?”104 Shakespeare, I would argue, pens 
such a fiction in The Winter’s Tale, both speculative and supreme, one that remains open 





                                                 






Thinking Hospitably with Timon of Athens: Toward an Ethics of Stewardship 
Use hospitality one to another without grudging. As every man hath received the 
gift, even so minister the same to one another, as good stewards of the manifold 
grace of God. 
—1 Peter 4:9-101 
 
You do mistake my love.  
I gave it freely ever, and there’s none 
Can truly say he gives if he receives.  
If our betters play at that game, we must not dare  
To imitate them. 
—Shakespeare, Timon of Athens, 1.2.8-12 
 
 
All too often, to think about hospitality is to become affronted by the 
inhospitable.
2
 According to Marx’s famous reading, inhospitality in Timon of Athens is 
brought into effect by gold, what he defines as “the alienated ability of mankind” and 
what Timon rebukes as humanity’s “common whore…that puts odds / Among the rout of 
nations” (4.3.43-44).3 Recent productions channel such Marxist anxieties: the National 
Theatre’s 2012 production, for example, has been hailed as “a parable of the crisis of the 
modern business elite”; across the pond, 2013 promotional material by the Philadelphia 
Artists’ Collective describes Timon as an “uncomfortably timely depiction of personal 
struggle amidst financial meltdown”; and a review of American Shakespeare Center’s 
2014 staging reports that “[t]he play has been given more airing in the past few years 
                                                 
1 All Bible citations follow the King James Version unless otherwise noted. For the sake of textual 
consistency with other early modern English texts cited herein, Hebrew Bible references use the KJV Old 
Testament translations. All references to New Testament Greek cite Eberhard Nestle, Greek New Testament 
with Critical Apparatus (London: British and Foreign Bible Society, 1904) unless otherwise noted. 
2 I am grateful for the participants in the SAA 2013 seminar on “Shakespeare and Hospitality,” where this 
line of thought was initially brought to my attention. 
3 Karl Marx, “The Power of Money in Bourgeios Society,” in The Marx-Engles Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 103, emphasis in original. All references to Timon follow The Norton 
Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition, Tragedies, eds. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. 
Howard, and Katherine Eisaman Maus (New York: Norton, 2008). 
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because of its resonance in a time of paper-wealthy men overextending themselves and 
creating bank crises and economic turmoil for the rest of us.”4 I would suggest, however, 
that these anxieties in both their contemporary and early modern stagings go deeper than 
Marxism and our own fiscal anxiety alone can gloss. As G. Wilson Knight writes, Timon 
of Athens “is far more than an economic extravaganza.”5 If it is not the specter of the 
Market, then what in Timon do we continue to find so haunting? 
Derrida turns to Shakespeare to create a word, hauntology, and like Hamlet’s 
Ghost (or Marx’s specter), I would propose there is a spirit which haunts Timon.6  This 
spirit, I suggest, is a pneumatological call for hospitality in its biblical sense, which is at 
once material and also, we might think along Lévinasian lines here, a spiritually-invoked 
action in and through which God comes to mind.
7
 Theologian Amos Yong writes that 
true hospitality is a material practice underwritten by spiritual (pneumatological) 
precedent.
8
 From a theological perspective, the material care for another’s physical well 
being (food, drink, clothing, shelter, etc) is rooted in the spiritual mandate to love thy 
                                                 
4 Paul Mason, “Timon of Athens: The Power of Money,” The Guardian, July 20, 2012, accessed May 23, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2012/jul/20/timon-of-athens-paul-mason. Philadelphia Artists’ 
Collective, “Timon of Athens,” accessed May 23, 2014, http://www.philartistscollective.org/timon-of-
athens.html. Eric Minton, “Timon of Athens: Burnishing a Flawed Play into a Masterpiece,” 
Shakespeareances.com, February 11, 2014, accessed May 23, 2014, 
http://www.shakespeareances.com/willpower/onstage/Timon-04-ASC14.html.      
5 G. Wilson Knight, “Timon of Athens and its Dramatic Descendants,” in Shakespeare and Religion: Essays 
of Forty Years (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), 220. While it is not my intent to elide Marxist 
associations with Timon, the aim of this chapter is to move beyond a wholly economic reading of the play 
and to direct attention instead to the religious nuances Shakespeare encodes in the practice of hospitality 
within and without Timon’s Athens.    
6 On Derrida’s hauntology, see Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), esp. 9, 63, and 202.  
7 For Lévinas any ethical act is born from the divine injunction to place the other over the self and in doing 
so the face of God is witnessed in the face of the other, thus bringing God to mind. See, Of God Who 
Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 168.   
8 Amos Yong, Hospitality and the Other: Pentecost, Christian Practices, and the Neighbor (New York: 
Orbis Books, 2008), see especially Yong’s articulation of what he calls “a pneumatological and 
performative theology,” 39. 
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neighbor as thyself. This neighbor love is the practice of agape, the self-denying biblical 
concern for the other. Between roughly the 1580s and 1630s there was a revival in the 
understanding of Christian charity as agape in early modern England; concomitant was 
the discussion in sermons and conduct literature regarding the degree to which agape’s 
practice (or, indeed, its deficit) inhered to the cultural understanding of both stewardship 
and hospitality.
9
 This emphasis on agape will be taken up in due course, for now suffice 
it to say that Shakespeare and his contemporaries understood well this comportment of 
hospitality. To read Timon, I argue, is thus to experience hospitality’s failure as a material 
practice alone and to witness the inhospitality of the wholly material. In Timon 
Shakespeare treats both hospitality’s imminent death and its possible (immanent) 
resurrection through acts of stewardship funded by agape.  
Religion’s echo intentionally resonates in my pneumatic language. And although 
it may seem “odd perhaps to consider Timon of Athens a religious play,” as Julia Lupton 
reminds, “the word religion recurs three times in Timon, more than in any other play by 
Shakespeare.”10 Working within the genealogy of Shakespeare’s religious allusions, 
Thomas Carter’s influential work on the subject of Shakespeare and the Bible finds no 
less than 35 references in Timon, indicating a deep scriptural archive underwriting this 
play.
11
 In a similar vein, both Knight and James Bulman have called attention to the 
                                                 
9 I borrow my range of dates here from Felicity Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality in Early Modern England,” 
Past & Present 102 (1984): 66-93; my argument for the period’s turn (or return) to an emphasis on the 
practice of agape follows Anders Nygren, Eros and Agape. Part I: A Study of the Christian Idea of Love. 
Part II: The History of Christian Love, trans. Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953).  
10 Julia Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 144. When thought in terms of Biblical numerology, religion’s triple repetition may 
carry further significance.  
11Thomas Carter, Shakespeare and Holy Scripture with the Version He Used (London: Hodder and 
Stroughton, 1905), 444-49. In his recent monograph The Bible in Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University 
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play’s likeness to a parable.12 I would propose, however, that Shakespeare approaches 
Timon not as parable or allegory but rather as paradigm, one which resonates in the key 
of hospitality across the Hebrew and Christian Bibles in what has been called Timon’s 
“greekjew world,” or what historian of religion Daniel Boyarin describes as the 
“Hellenistic Jewish cultural koine” of the Mediterranean in the first-century Near East.13 
By paradigm, I mean a model of lived practice. The paradigm of hospitality I will be 
tracking across Shakespeare’s Athens and its outer wilds (i.e. agape in praxis) does, 
however, draw deeply upon two specific parables. When Shakespeare introduces Timon 
onto his stage he does so through direct allusion to the Parable of the Five Talents, a story 
espousing a biblical understanding of stewardship. Similarly, in his self-sacrificing care 
of and for Timon, Flavius, the play’s exemplary steward, enacts the model of hospitality 
recounted in the Parable of the Good Samaritan. Both of these parables, in turn, comport 
as agape in their call for lived practice. Taking up this paradigm, Shakespeare seems to 
ask his audiences both then and now, through this particular Athens and the actions of 
these particular Athenians, to consider the very real possibility of hospitality as 
stewardship.  
Timon of Athens lends itself especially to dilation upon stewardship. Twelve of 
the twenty references to the term steward in Shakespeare’s oeuvre recur in Timon, more 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 2013), Hannibal Hamlin describes Carter’s “scholarly reference work” as “the major precursor to 
twentieth-century studies” on the subject, 64. 
12 G. Wilson Knight, “The Pilgrimage of Hate: An Essay on Timon of Athens,” in The Wheel of Fire: 
Interpretations of Shakespearean Tragedy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 251. James Bulman, The Heroic 
Idiom of Shakespearean Tragedy (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1985), 126.  
13 Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare, 132. Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identiy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 14. 
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than in any other play.
14
 In its Hebrew and Greek usages, biblical stewardship concerns 
itself with the care of and for others, reaching well beyond the term’s modern 
understanding as financial, property, and estate management. This biblical idiom gives 
emphasis to care, and it is indeed the case that Shakespeare gives great care to the idea of 
stewardship in Timon, both as a concept and its practice as a form of hospitality.  
My argument is concerned not with tracking typologies but with disclosing 
models of behavior. The figure of Abraham offers one such through-line connecting the 
Hebrew and Christian in Timon’s greekjew milieu of the in/hospitable. Ken Jackson’s 
brilliant reading, for example, turns to the Abrahamic (Isaac’s near sacrifice and Timon’s 
desire for a pure gift) by way of Derrida in order to parse the play’s problematic 
hospitality as it arises from a flawed system of gift-exchange. For Derrida, hospitality 
defined through any act of gift giving is impossible because such an act is always already 
caught up within an inescapable system of exchange that both expects and demands 
reciprocity. In Derridean terms, “there is no gift in gift exchange; there is only 
exchange.”15 The gift according to Derrida is thus both impossible and the impossible 
since there can never be an act of gift giving that does not presuppose exchange. 
Jackson’s exploration of the impossible gift in Timon offers a nuanced understanding of 
hospitality relative to exchange while also seeking to push “down through” the Market 
sensibilities often perceived as underwriting Christian theology.
 16
 Yet the emphasis of 
such an argument, however illuminating, remains largely focused on the system of 
                                                 
14 John A. Bartlett, A Complete Concordance, or Verbal Index to Words, Phrases, and Passages in the 
Dramatic Works of Shakespeare, With a Supplementary Concordance to the Poems (London: Macmillan, 
1972),  s.v. “Steward.” 
15 Ken Jackson, “‘One Wish’ or the Possibility of the Impossible: Derrida, the Gift, and God in Timon of 
Athens.” Shakespeare Quarterly 52.1 (2001): 39. 
16 Ibid., 36, emphasis in original. 
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exchange itself. Working within a similar biblical ambit, this chapter attempts to shift 
attention away from reading Timon in terms of an economic model in order to attend to 
Shakespeare’s representation of relational dwelling and its failures within the oikos. And 
while it is true that oikos serves as the root for our modern (and early modern) economic, 
in order to move beyond this economic circuit of thinking I here use the term in a 
phenomenological sense of lived and shared proximity to and existence with others. 
The terms I wish to use—dwelling, oikos, hospitality as stewardship—can be 
defined properly only in the process, but some prefatory discussion is helpful. I use 
dwelling in its Heideggerian sense and as the Hebraic yashab. This is a neighborly 
nearness; it is the state of being in proximal relationship to and with others. Dwelling is a 
lived nearness with the express desire to secure an other’s care, safety, and flourishing.17 
In what follows I use the term oikos in a tertiary strain to mark the space for dwelling as 
person, home, and wider community. The degree to which oikos denotes “home” or even 
“community” likely needs no further gloss at this juncture. However, the person as oikos 
is a concept that requires more explanation. I use the term here in the sense of dwelling, 
or rather in-dwelling, as in the in-dwelling of the spirit—the Greek pneuma and its 
Hebrew counterpart ruach—the divine life force of biblical tradition that animates 
humans exclusively and is distinguished from soul (nephesh), the aspect the human 
shares with the animal in their collective creaturely estate.
18
 I have already defined 
biblical stewardship as the relational care of and for others. It is also a form of giving like 
                                                 
17 The Heideggerian aspect of this definition is derived from Heidegger’s essays “Building Dwelling 
Thinking,” and “Letter on Humanism,” both collected in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: 
Harper Perennial, 2008). For the Hebrew aspect in yashab, see James L. Strong, The New Strong’s 
Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990).    
18 For the correlation between pneuma, ruach, and nephesh, see Strong’s.    
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tithing, but with a caveat: stewardship is a giving back of what is not truly one’s own to 
begin with, but rather of what one has been given by God. Biblical stewardship enters 
Western thought through the Genesis narrative, which reports mankind’s first vocation 
and vocative calling as the caring of and for all creaturely life.
19
 Genesis also narrates 
stewardship’s first encounter with the inhospitable. The story of Cain and Abel tells both 
the first acts of tithing and murder, yoking the two together in a correlation to which 
Timon returns at its conclusion with Alcibiades’ acceptance of a tenth of Athenian lives 
in lieu of full scale invasion (5.5.31-35, 54-58). Cain’s query to God—“Am I my 
brother’s keeper?”—is answered time and again across the Hebrew and Christian Bibles: 
Yes you are.
20
         
My reading of Timon seeks to shift critical attention away from gift exchange, 
biblical or otherwise, in order to better attend to hospitality in its vocation as stewardship, 
a paradigm that offers not only an alternative economics but one that also better services 
the alterior, a term of philosophical shorthand used to designate the other in his or her 
alienating exteriority or estate as a lower class of being (subaltern).
21
 My alterior 
motives—that is, my concern with an ethics of and for the other—follows Timon’s 
                                                 
19 On the vocative call in Genesis, see 1:26-28 per mankind’s rule/dominion (radah) as benevolent 
stewardship over the creatures of the earth, and 2:15 per the divine injunction to cultivate (abad) and care 
(shamar) for Eden/earth. Julia Lupton and Laurie Shannon write of creaturely life in Shakespeare relative 
to biblical tradition, see Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare, 131-59, and Shannon, The Accommodated 
Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 29-81. On 
vocative calling in the Pauline tradition see Paul’s opening addresses in Rom. 1:1-2, 1 Cor. 1:1, 2 Cor. 1:1, 
and Col. 1:1. Regarding the calling of all believers, see Eph. 1:4-14. Simon Critchley advances the ethico-
political importance of vocative calling in his recent monograph, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in 
Political Theology (London: Verso, 2012).  
20 Gen. 4:9. 
21 The alterior’s aspect of exteriority is taken from Lévinas, see Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael 
B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak parses the alterior in 
terms of class and subaltern status in her essay “Who Claims Alterity?” in Remaking History, eds. Barbara 
Kruger and Phil Mariani (Seattle: Bay Press, 1989), 269-92. 
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necessarily spiritual tack to the degree that within this particular Athenian locale 
Shakespeare gives us pause to consider hospitality beyond a wholly material register; that 
is, beyond a system of inescapable exchange and the aporia of Derrida’s impossible gift. 
In order to do so my close reading of the play must necessarily be deferred. Such 
an argument requires a foundation established in the historical understanding of 
hospitality and stewardship in early modern England. Following such archival work, I 
turn attention to Timon relative to its parable allusions as a paradigm for lived action, first 
by reading Timon in the context of the parable of Five Talents. I conclude by turning to 
Flavius in conjunction with the parable of the Good Samaritan and its call for hospitality 




 Felicity Heal has uncovered a vast archive of early modern English hospitality 
literature written between the 1580s and 1630s.
22
 On Heal’s report this body of literature 
is not exclusive to one particular genre but rather extends itself through the broader aegis 
of “writing addressed to social problems.”23 Sermons and conduct literature figure 
prominently in this discussion as one might expect, yet I would suggest that Shakespeare 
is equally invested in such social commentary in Timon of Athens which takes up the 
social problem of hospitality in its material practice divorced from spiritual foundation. 
English recognition of hospitality’s pneumatic base in the period is demonstrated by 
                                                 
22 For a brief yet thorough analysis of this topic, see Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality.” She provides a book-
length treatment of early modern English hospitality in Hospitality in Early Modern England (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990).  
23 Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality,” 68. 
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Heal’s archival work which attests that “for most authors revealed religion, and 
especially the New Testament, provided the fundamental injunctions enjoining a 
householder to be hospitable,” often citing Matthew 25:35-36, Romans 12:13, and 
Hebrews 13:2 as hospitality’s spiritual loci.24 In early modern England, however, it was 
also true that hospitality’s basis was not always limited to scriptural foundation alone. 
Although “scripture provided the most powerful spur to hospitable behaviour,” as Heal 
reminds, the Greek and Latinate thinking of Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca each “provided 
analyses of generous behaviour that were peculiarly pertinent to the host.”25 Despite 
arguments in favor of remembering the Renaissance as the rise of secularism (both within 
England and without), the English voice and cultural weight in the period given to 
hospitality’s spiritual imperative remains worthy of further address.26   
Timon, believed to be written between 1604-06 and printed in the First Folio of 
1623, correlates with Heal’s archival “chorus of lamentation” drafted to address the 
perceived decline in the proper practice of hospitality in early modern England.
27
 
Whether by scriptural or secular precedent, it was a commonly held opinion that nobility 
especially and gentility as well were called to be good hosts. Thus Clement Ellis writes 
typologically of the Englishman’s estate in The Gentile Sinner; or, England’s Brave 
Gentlemen (1660) that the nobleman or gentry is expected to keep “Hospitality his 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 72. 
25 Ibid., 73. On Greek and Roman sources as bases for early modern English treatises on hospitality, see 
Heal’s n.30. 
26 One example of the Renaissance secular turn I am describing here can be found in Jonathan Dollimore’s 
influential work Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and His 
Contemporaries (New York: Palgrave, 1984, 1989, 2004).   
27 Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality,” 80. John Jowett’s introduction to The Oxford Shakespeare’s Timon of 
Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) provides a convincing argument for Timon’s drafting 
sometime between 1604 and 1606.  
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Housekeeper, Providence his Steward, Charity his Treasurer.”28 Ellis’ typological 
associations encode the pneumatological understanding of hospitality in the period that I 
will be tracing through Shakespeare’s Athens.  
Hospitality as housekeeper marks the domestic arts of household management. 
Yet when the oikos is considered as a site of domesticity (home) as well as of selfhood 
relative to the in-dwelling of the spirit, the practice of hospitality bears a decidedly 
spiritual aspect, which is to say that a spiritually underwritten hospitality is a practice of 
immanence requiring the lived action of service to and for others: proper housekeeping in 
deed. The steward in Ellis’ typology is providence, a term signifying both prudence and 
the prudent management of one’s resources (actions befitting a steward), as well as a 
scriptural bearing in the Pauline sense of God’s grace given providentially to guide the 
course and direction of a believer’s life. Charity, which I will show in what follows to be 
the Christian practice of agape, a self-sacrificing and other-servicing love, is that which 
funds the treasury of Ellis’ typology of hospitality.  
In order to map such a pneumatically charged understanding of hospitality in 
Timon it is helpful to consider contemporary arguments for hospitality’s decline. To put it 
simply, the cultural ideation of hospitality underwent a shift from a spiritual to a secular 
base during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For Heal the occasion of writing on 
hospitality’s traditional values at this time reveals in the authors an existential crisis of 
sorts. That is, these writers, she argues, seem “acutely aware” that they are living through 
a historic moment, a period of epochal transit marked by “immediate economic 
                                                 
28 Clement Ellis, The Gentle Sinner; or, England’s Brave Gentlemen (Oxford: Printed by Henry Hall, 
1660), 179, quoted in Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality, 70. 
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difficulties and by the shifting social attitudes of the elite.”29 Clergyman Thomas Adams 
maps the shifting social attitudes of the elite along the trajectory of their coin. Rather than 
practicing a scripturally ordained hospitality where one’s wealth is used in the service of 
others, Adams’ inveighs against his countrymen, “But where is your Hospitality after all 
this? you can tell me; nay I can tell you. Bestowed amongst Silk-men, Mercers; yea, vpon 
Taylers, Players, Harlots; and other insatiable beggers of the same ranke.”30  
David Hawkes has also argued that the denouement of hospitality in seventeenth 
century England follows the flow of coin. Where Adams finds prodigal spending as the 
cause for hospitality’s demise, Hawkes suggests that the immediate economic difficulties 
and shifting social attitudes of the elite signaled by Heal can be traced to enclosure in the 
Jacobean period. Under the process of enclosure vast country holdings were sold for 
ready money, moving the landed gentry into smaller (albeit well provisioned) urban 
homes compared to their once-sprawling estates. As the gentry downsized to well-
appointed city accommodations, this same process of enclosure transformed the 
peasantry into the proletariat. “Deprived of the means of subsistence,” Hawkes writes, 
“landless peasants were forced to sell their labor power, to exchange their time for cash, 
to translate their lives into the form of financial representation.”31 By Hawkes’ Marxian 
reading this materialist shift and Market ideology signaled nothing less than the death of 
                                                 
29 Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality,” 80. 
30 Thomas Adams, The happines of the church, or, A description of those spirituall perogatiues vvherewith 
Christ hath endowed her considered in some contemplations vpon part of the 12 chapter of the Hebrewes: 
together with certain other mediations and discourses vpon other portions of Holy Scriptures, the titles 
wherof immediately precede the booke: being the summe of diuerse sermons preached in S. Gregories 
London (London: Printed by G.P., 1619), 229. 





 Samuel Johnson, writing in 1772 at nearly a 150 year remove from the close 
of the Jacobean period would seem to confirm Hawkes’ position. “Ancient hospitality,” 
Dr. Johnson opines, was practicable only “in an uncommercial country…But in a 
commercial country, a busy country, time becomes precious, and therefore hospitality is 
not so much valued.”33 Yet I would suggest that Shakespeare’s Athens is no less busy 
than his (or Johnson’s) contemporary London. The ready hospitality of Timon’s first two 
acts is marked by Ventidius’ release from prison on Timon’s surety, a sumptuous multi-
course banquet, lavish entertainments, and the conferring of jewels by the host to his 
guests, all of which present audiences with a very busy Timon and an urgent sense of 
hospitality. 
Much of my reading of hospitality as stewardship in Timon turns on the character 
of Flavius, his steward, thus a brief explanation of the estate steward’s role in early 
modern England is helpful. In the more modern sense of stewardship as an economic 
vocation, the steward’s primary role was the management of his Lord’s estate. In this 
comportment the steward was effectively an ambassador, “serving as his master’s voice, 
as well as his eyes and ears,” whether speaking on the Lord’s behalf to tenants, 
craftsmen, nobles, lawyers, or magistrates.
34
 The steward’s vocation required him to be 
equally adept at navigating social interactions among the lower and upper classes alike 
with the full weight of his master’s authority. It is in this capacity that D.R. Hainsworth 
has described the steward as “a ‘mediator’ in the anthropological sense of the word.”35 
                                                 
32 For more on this point see Hawkes, The Culture of Usury in Early Modern England, 95-114. 
33 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 423. 
34 D.R. Hainsworth, Stewards, Lords, and People: The Estate Steward and his World in Later Stuart 




And while it is true that the steward was tasked with meeting all expenses of estate 
income, including the taking in of “rents, fines and dues and transmitting that money to 
London,” this role, even in its ostensibly secular turn, continued to bear the carriage of 
spiritual charge.
36
 As a role more broadly understood, the steward in early modern 
England was a vocation unique in its capacity to demonstrate flow between traditional 
oikos in the form of the estate steward and stewardship in its biblical association as the 
vocational calling of all humankind. 
Shakespeare contrasts the poor steward in Timon with proper stewardship in 
Flavius, whom Timon in his misanthropic spiral singles out as humanity’s “one honest 
man” (4.3.489).37 I will turn to close readings of Timon and Flavius relative to this 
position in due course. First, however, it is necessary to recognize the degree to which 
stewardship was understood in the period to be the vocational calling of humanity 
irrespective of class distinction. Under this paradigm whether highborn or low all were 
called to the service of others. It is in this vein that critics have suggested Flavius’ 
singular honesty signaled by Timon’s “one honest man” as flowing from a biblical 
paradigm of stewardship. Maurice Hunt, for example, sees the character of Flavius as 
Shakespeare’s attempt “to recapture an ideal image of the steward,” one who “comes 
closest to expressing a cardinal principle of Christianity.”38 This is a Shakespeare seeking 
to return hospitality to its biblical dwelling. The cardinal principle of Christianity to 
which Hunt refers is charity, as witnessed by 1 Peter 4:8: “And above all things have 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 34. 
37 In his identification as a singular honest man, Flavius recalls the Antedeluvian Enoch and his great-
grandson Noah, men set apart for their righteousness in a wicked world. 




fervent charity among yourselves: for charity shall cover the multitude of sins.”39 This 
chapter opens with a rejoining Petrine passage (1 Peter 4:9-10) which yokes hospitality to 
stewardship. We see charity given its cardinal direction, to borrow Hunt’s phrasing, in the 
marginal notes for these verses in the Geneva Bible, long considered to be the scriptural 
text used by Shakespeare: 
Of all the duties of charity, he [God] commendeth one, namely, which was at that 
time most necessary, to wit, hospitality, which he will have to be voluntary and 
most courteous and bountiful. He showeth the use of charity, to wit, that every 
man bestow that gift which he hath received to the profit of his neighbor. A 
reason, because that what gift soever we have we have received it of God upon 




Per the Geneva’s annotations biblical stewardship is understood as the management of 
funds from on high as gifts entrusted by God whose expenditure is expected to profit 
one’s neighbor. In its original Greek, what the KJV translates twice as charity in v.8 is 
literally love (agapēn and agapē respectively), thus positioning hospitality as stewardship 
and operant under the banner of agape.
41
 
 Slavoj Žižek offers his own definition of Pauline agape as “a self-suppressing 
duty to love neighbours and care for them, as hard work, as something to be 
accomplished through the strenuous effort of fighting and inhibiting one’s spontaneous 
                                                 
39 Emphasis is mine. 
40 The Geneva Bible: A Facsimile of the 1560 Edition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 
emphasis here is mine. On Shakespeare’s use of the Geneva Bible see Naseeb Shaheen, Biblical References 
in Shakespeare’s Plays (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1999); John W. Velz, “Shakespeare and 
the Geneva Bible: The Circumstances,” in Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Jonson: New Directions in 
Biography, eds. Takashi Kozuka and J.R. Mulryne (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), 113-18; and Leland 
Reyken, “Shakespeare and the Geneva Bible,” Reformation 21 (2009), 
http://www.reformation21.org/articles/shakespeare-and-the-geneva-bible.php. Hannibal Hamlin’s recent 
work, The Bible in Shakespeare, correlates Shakespeare’s use of the Geneva Bible but does not suggest it 
as the playwright’s primary or singular Biblical text.      
41 Nestle, Greek New Testament.  
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‘pathological’ inclinations.”42 Although Žižek’s framing of agape is designed to be 
somewhat critical of its theological intent (Žižek would redefine this love instead as “the 
modest dispensing of spontaneous goodness”), it nonetheless exemplifies the immanent 
imperative in this biblical calling.
43
 That is, agape in its scriptural charge is work; it is an 
injunction to lived action (immanence), to charitable work that indeed proves hard as it 
requires the deferral of innate human pathological narcissism manifested throughout 
history as a concern for the self over the other.
44
 
 Swedish theologian Anders Nygren exemplifies well the understanding of agape 
as a vocational calling. Following Nygren,  
Such a love as this cannot be shown by man towards God, since man’s love for 
God at its best is never more than a response to God’s prior love for man. But 




Nygren argues that this recognition of agape in its carriage among mankind experienced 
a cultural resurgence during the early modern period. By Nygren’s account the 
Reformation witnessed a paradigmatic return to agape, one previously unacknowledged 
across human history since the days of the first century Church.
46
 More importantly, 
perhaps, Nygren’s explanation of agape comports this mode of love as active human-to-
human praxis rather than inert theorization.  
                                                 
42 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (New York: 
Verso, 2000), 100, emphasis in the original. 
43 Ibid. 
44 I use “pathological” here in its theological comportment of original sin.   
45 Philip S. Watson, preface to Agape and Eros. Part I: A Study of the Christian Idea of Love. Part II: The 
History of the Christian Idea of Love, by Anders Nygren (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), ix.  
46 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 28 and 681. 
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The scriptural precedent of agape is perhaps best defined in the biblical command 
to “love thy neighbour as thyself.”47 The neighbor love of the Great Commandment, 
which summarizes both the Law and the Prophets, is an injunction to practice agape 
without discrimination: “ Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, 
and hate thine enemy:
 
but I say unto you, love your enemies, and pray for them that 
persecute you…For if ye love them that love you, what reward have ye? do not even the 
publicans do the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? 
do not even the Gentiles do the same?”48 Scholars of religion have found in Jesus’ 
injunction to love one’s enemies a call not only to neighbor love but for human-to-human 
care (charity as agape) as well as the erasure of the distinctions neighbor and enemy in 
favor of recognizing the shared humanness and humanity of our common creaturely 
estate.
49
 As Anna Wierzbicka writes, 
It is against this background, I think, that Jesus’ teaching on loving one’s enemies 
should be explicated: everyone, and, consequently, even one’s enemies, are to be 
seen as one’s neighbors, and so one’s enemies, too, are to be treated just as the 
Old Testament taught that one’s neighbors were to be treated. In one word, they 
are to be treated with agape, that is, roughly speaking, ‘love.’50 
 
This love is nothing short of hospitality funded by agape, a premise central to the 
parables of the Five Talents and Good Samaritan, particularly as they conscripted by 
Shakespeare in the drafting of his Athens and its outer environs. 
                                                 
47 Mt. 22:39; Mk. 12:31; Lk. 10:27. For a postmodern philosophical and theological discussion of the 
imperative to love one’s neighbor, see Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, The Neighbor: 
Three Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).     
48 Mt. 5:43-44, 46-47 (ASV). On the Great Commandment in relation to the Law and the Prophets, see Mt. 
22:40. 
49 On this see Robert Banks, Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975) and Robert W. Funk, et al., The Five Gospels: What Did Jesus Really Say? (New 
York: Macmillan, 1993). 
50
 Anna Wierzbicka, What did Jesus Mean? Explaining the Sermon on the Mount and the Parables in 
Simple and Universal Human Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 116. 
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 In Timon’s domestic sphere Shakespeare would seem to take up an advocacy for 
the praxis of agape demonstrated most readily by Timon’s failures and Flavius’ actions, 
that is, through their respective acts of stewardship. It is to these characterizations that the 
remaining two sections of my argument direct their attention. Here I would stress that 
such theological understanding of stewardship was common in Renaissance England. As 
Hainsworth reminds, “[s]tewardship was not a vague concept in the early modern period 
as it tends to be today.”51 Yet it is the scholar and Jacobean Biblical translator John Bois 
who perhaps best encapsulates the early modern English theological understanding of 
stewardship I have been tracing: 
All of vs then are stewards, and disposers of some goods of God: Clergie men are 
stewards of Gods house, which is the Church; all Magistrates are stewards of the 
common house, which is the weale publike; Masters are stewards of their own 
priuate houses; al men are stewards and clerks of the priuie closet of their 
conscience. There is none so mighty that is greater or so meane that is lesse than a 




In Bois’ formulation one finds an understanding of stewardship’s alternate economics as 
oikos-pneumatics. This is a spiritual economy under whose management are the 
overlapping oikoi of the individual, home, community or state.  
 I would tarry with biblical stewardship for but a few moments longer before 
turning attention to Timon proper. The New Testament Greek for steward, oikonomos, 
captures the vocation’s economic and spiritual aspects in a manner English cannot. In its 
Greek transliteration the vocation of steward (oikonomos) bears obvious etymological 
correlation with the oikos. As a spiritual employment it should be noted that the steward 
                                                 
51 Hainsworth, Stewards, Lords, and People, 1. 
52 John Bois, An Exposition of the Dominicall Epistles and Gospels (London: n.p., 1616), 202, quoted in 
Timothy Vande Brake, “The Unjust Steward: Representations on the Early Modern Page and Stage” (PhD 
diss., University of Alabama, 2000), 86. 
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was generally a freedman, that is, a slave released from forced legal servitude.
53
 From a 
Pauline theological position, then, the steward is one who is freed from the slavery of sin 
and (as) forced legal servitude; or, one might say that the steward is employed under the 
auspices of Grace rather than Law.
54
 From this scriptural vantage, as Bois confirms, all 
who are saved by grace are thus stewards and therefore called to extend hospitality 
(agape) to others. As Yong puts it, “because Christian hospitality proceeds from the 
magnanimous hospitality of God, it is founded on the incarnational and pentecostal logic 
of abundance rather than that of human economies of exchange and scarcity.”55  
Yong’s description of Christian hospitality charts what I have termed as the 
practice of oikos-pneumatics, an alternate economics funded by agape that takes as its 
management the care and well-being of others. I here use the term funded in the sense of 
the Latin fundus, as a building ground or site of foundation. Agape in its comportment as 
hospitality has been recently taken up by Caron Gentry who argues that hospitality in its 
acknowledgement of “the deep responsibility the self has for others” is, in effect, agape.56 
As a contemporary of Shakespeare’s, Thomas Adams demonstrates this understanding of 
agape in the call for his parishioners (and readers of his sermon) to “Walke in Loue” by 
enacting hospitality. As Adams enjoins, 
He [St. Paul] doth not say, talke of it, but walke in it. This precept is for course, 
not discourse. Loue sittes at the doore of many mens lips, but hath no dwelling in 
the heart. We may say truely of that charitie; it is not at home.
57
 
                                                 
53 On this aspect, see Strong’s and Joseph Thayer, Thayer’s Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996), s.v. “oikonomos.” 
54 On Paul’s thinking regarding the Law’s relation to Grace, see Romans 7. 
55 Yong, Hospitality and the Other, 118. 
56 Caron E. Gentry, Offering Hospitality: Questioning Christian Approaches to War (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 8. For Gentry’s extended discussion of hospitality as agape, see 
49-62. 
57 Adams, The happiness of the church, 131-32. 
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It is at this juncture that I would now turn attention to Timon of Athens and the 
stewardship Shakespeare scripts therein by testing the mettle of Athenian hospitality 




While Timon certainly lends itself to Marxian interpretation, what is perhaps more 
striking is that Marx’s own engagement with the play concludes not with a critique of 
monetized objectification but arrives rather at the juncture of love and alienation:  
Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then 
you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc…If you love without 
evoking love in return—that is, if your loving as loving does not produce 
reciprocal love; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you 
do not make yourself a loved person, then your love is impotent—a misfortune.58 
 
The failure of love is arguably Timon’s misfortune, yet Marx’s formulation ever places 
love and its impotency within an inescapable system of exchange. Shakespeare, I would 
propose, invites us through his Athenian tragedy to consider the possibility of an alternate 
economics (oikos-pneumatics) whose currency is love and whose concern is its proper 
management. 
Even if one subscribes to the paradigm of hospitality as gift-exchange, it 
nevertheless remains that Shakespeare writes of Timon’s giving in a decidedly biblical 
mode. His first appearance on stage is in conversation with Ventidius’ messenger who 
pleads on his master’s behalf for Timon to pay the noble’s five talent debt. As if to signal 
                                                 
58 Marx, “The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society,” 105. On Timon as the Shakespeare to teach Marx, 
see Gabriel Egan, “Materialism: Timon of Athens,” in Shakespeare (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007), 225-47. 
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exchange, the messenger responds to Timon’s pledge of surety, “Your lordship ever 
binds him” (1.1.106). Yet Timon’s rejoinder confirms no as-yet expectation of 
reciprocity; in fact, it speaks of quite the opposite. In a Torahic gesture reminiscent of the 
call to care for widows, orphans, the lame and poor,
 59
 Timon enjoins the messenger: 
Commend me to him. I will send his ransom; 
And, being enfranchised, bid him come to me. 
’Tis not enough to help the feeble up, 
But to support him after.  (1.1.107-10) 
 
The koine of Timon’s response recalls both the Hebraic yashab and Christian 
stewardship. Despite its initial fiscal gesture in paying the ransom, Timon’s express 
concern is to “support” his enfeebled friend. Relative to yashab we might consider such 
support as a spiritual-architectural propping up, a “support” for dwelling intimated by 
Timon’s desire conveyed to the messenger, “bid him come to me.” By his own account, 
proximity (yashab) is at the center of Timon’s action. True to the Hellenistic Jewish 
composite of Shakespeare’s Athens, Timon’s response also marks an act of Christian 
stewardship, dispensing the wealth in his charge (whose Hellenized koine and material 
coin are equally funded by agape) for the good of others, in this case Ventidius’ release 
from bondage. 
The specific monetary amount owed by Ventidius overtly recalls the Parable of 
the Five Talents.
60
 The story tells of a master who before going on a journey divides his 
                                                 
59 Examples of Torahic injunction to help those less fortunate are found most expressively in Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy; see, Lev. 25:25, 25:35, 25:39; Deut. 10:18, 15:7, 15:11. 
60 For the full scriptural account of this parable, see Mt. 25:14-30. Grace argues that Timon is a play with 
allusive connections to Jesus’ parables concerning talents, particularly the Matthean parable of the hidden 
talent and the two Lukean parables of talents (“the lord who feasts the poor at his banquet and that of the 
unjust steward who wastes his master’s goods”), see Grace Tiffany, “Shakespeare’s Parables,” Reformation 
16 (2011): 154. Due to the specific sum stipulated as Ventidius’ bond, I have elected instead to focus my 
attention on the Parable of the Five Talents.  
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wealth among three servants, “every man according to his several ability.”61 Upon the 
master’s return the first and second servants have doubled the value of that with which 
they were entrusted. Hearing of their gain the master famously replies: “Well done, thou 
good and faithful servant: thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler 
over many things.”62 Unlike his peers, the third servant digs a hole in the earth and hides 
his money in an act that reverses Timon’s digging in the wilderness outside Athens’ 
walls. When the master questions the final servant and learns that he has not cultivated 
his investment, the servant is stripped of his status and the parable delivers its warning: 
“For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him 
that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.”63 
As a paradigm for lived action, there is much in this parable that bears exegesis, 
both in terms of scriptural intent and Shakespeare’s development thereof in Timon’s 
Athens. First is the matter of Ventidius’ five talent debt and its subsequent payment by 
Timon; this sum in its original historical context is exorbitant. A talent in the Greco-
Roman world of the first century A.D. was the measurement of roughly twenty years’ 
wages for a common laborer.
64
 Whether in its Shakespearean or scriptural purview such 
wealth is staggering. The payment of a five talent debt accounts to approximately one 
hundred years’ wages, a sum well beyond the scope of even an abundant life’s full earned 
income; taking into account the servant’s ability in the parable’s to double his five talent 
trust the aggregate is even more impressive.  
                                                 
61 Mt. 25:1; the talent allotments are as follows: the first servant receives five talents, the second two 
talents, and the third one talent. 
62 Mt. 25:21, 23. 
63 Mt. 25:29.  
64 Arland J. Hultgren, The Parables of Jesus: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 274-75. 
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Biblical scholar Arland Hultgren has suggested that Jesus casts his parable as the 
management of such near otherworldly wealth in order to convey the duty and risk 
involved in spiritually funded stewardship.
65
 The first two servants who double the value 
of the talents entrusted to them by their master do so specifically by engaging in 
business.
66
 These two “good and faithful” servants yield return on their master’s deposit 
only by risking the loss of the respective talents entrusted to them and through the hard 
work of those talents’ cultivation. Returning to the original Greek of the parable, 
Hultgren confirms “[t]hat the two may have simply made wise investments is ruled out 
by what is said to the third slave at 25:27.”67 Thus the parable’s fiduciary fecundity 
demonstrates its achievement not by matter of investment but manner of work, an aspect 
recalling the labor incumbent to Žižek’s definition of agape. Such work requires risk, a 
hazard the third servant is unwilling to take (hence his action of burying his apportioned 
talent until the master’s return). In the parable’s Shakespearean expression there is 
similarly no sense of work but merely ready (albeit dwindling) money relative to Timon. 
In effect, Timon might as well have buried his wealth in the ground; the negative return 
on investment is essentially the same. As a paradigm of lived action, Timon also enacts 
no true sense of stewardship in its Christian vocation but rather demonstrates prodigality, 
a point to which I will shortly return. First, however, it is necessary to understand the 
non-monetary aspect of talent in order to weigh the measure of the parable’s full meaning 
in scripture and Shakespeare.   
                                                 
65 Ibid., 275. 
66 Ibid. For further discussion on this point, see Hultgren, nn. 11-12. 
67 Ibid.; v.27 reads, “Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my 
coming I should have received mine own with usury.” 
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An interesting shift occurred in the etymological genealogy of talent between the 
fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the OED’s account, the term came to signify 
mental endowment or natural ability (i.e. a person’s “talents”), a meaning derived, we are 
told, “[f]rom the parable of the talents.”68 Thus to cultivate one’s talents is to work to 
enhance the God-given endowments and abilities apportioned to “every man according to 
his several ability.”69 Although such a change in thinking relative to talent first occurred 
in Lydgate’s Minor Poems (ca. 1430), this historical shift in denotation flourished 
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as witnessed by its use in William 
Bonde’s Pylgrimage of Perfection (1526), John Dee’s letters (1574), Thomas Heywood’s 
Fayre Mayde of the Exchange (1607), and John Collier’s Miscellany upon Moral 
Subjects (1695), to name but a few.
70
  
With its double repetition of “Well done, thou good and faithful servant” and its 
caution against poor management, the parable of talents speaks directly of stewardship. 
Jesus’ point is pneumatic, exhibiting concern for spiritual return on (God’s) investment; 
that is, the development of one’s “talents” for an invested return in the lives of others. 
The message of the parable is therefore not to increase monetary wealth but the number 
of lives touched by the Gospel’s good news.71 It expresses concern for the stewardship of 
people. The Parable of the Five Talents concerns the use of one’s “talents” for the growth 
of the Church through the giving of one’s life (one’s special abilities or talents) to others 
                                                 
68 OED, s.v. “talent.” The reference to the parable of talents is specific to the Matthean story of the Five 
Talents, “Matt. xxv. 14-30, etc,” rather than the Lukean parables similarly concerned with talents. 
69 Mt. 25:1. 
70 OED, s.v. “talent.” 
71 See Mk. 16:15, echoing Ps. 22:27. 
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out of the economic (oiko-pneumatic) inheritance funded by and through agape per the 
injunction given in the Great Commandment: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
72
 
Shakespeare intimately connects Timon with the Five Talents by bookending his 
character with allusions to this parable. Timon’s first entry onto the stage in Act One is a 
direct scriptural gesture through his payment of a five talent debt (ostensibly an act of 
neighbor love). His latter connection is a matter of lexical historiography: reminiscent of 
the third servant’s poor banking methods, Timon finds a wealth of buried “talents” (a 
mark of unfaithful service) in the Athenian wilds of Act Four.
73
 Unlike the ethics of the 
parable, however, Timon’s management of his talents yields an inverse of return. Rather 
than the ostensible neighbor love of Timon philanthropos, Act Three culminates with his 
tragic spiral into misanthropy and complete distain for the entire human race, duly noted 
by his terse declamation, “Heceforth hated be / Of Timon man and all humanity” (3.7.96-
97) and the even more emphatic, “I am Misanthropos, and hate mankind” (4.3.52). 
Despite this tragic shift, however, Timon’s initial actions on the stage (and page) 
nevertheless bear the carriage of seemingly genuine charity. We should remember that 
his first two actions are to pay for Ventidius’ release from prison and to raise his 
servingman Lucilius to equal marriageable (i.e. economic) weight with the Old 
Athenian’s daughter.74 Scholars, however, remain divided on this point. Reading Timon’s 
actions with a more cynical eye, Grace Tiffany has argued that “Timon’s apparent 
                                                 
72 On the aspect of the Parable of the Five Talents as the giving of one’s life qua talents, see Ronald E. 
Vallet, Stepping Stones of the Steward: A Faith Journey Through Jesus’ Parables (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1994), 75. 
73 On the burial of money for safekeeping as a common practice in the time of Jesus, see Hultgren, The 
Parables of Jesus, 275.  
74 See 1.1. These two exchanges follow on the heels of one another; as Ventidius’ messenger leaves with 
Timon’s surety of bond, the Old Athenian comes forward with his complaint. 
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magnanimity” is nothing but “an investment without collateral, an ancient Ponzi 
scheme.”75 L.C. Knights maintains that “it is not moral truth we recognize but self-
indulgence in easy emotion” in Timon’s generous gestures.76 Yet the initial exchange 
between Timon and Ventidius in 1.2 suggests otherwise.  
Ventidius’ first words report an inclination toward repayment. “I do return those 
talents,” he tells Timon, “Doubled with thanks and service, from whose help / I derived 
liberty” (1.2.5-7). In parable-echoing language Ventidius would double the return of 
Timon’s five talent trust. Shakespeare, however, offers a clever caveat in Ventidius’ 
elocution: what is doubled is not the monetary sum but rather “thanks and service” for his 
“derived liberty,” bringing to mind the aspect of the steward as oikonomos, one released 
from bondage under the law. As if speaking the same language of stewardship, Timon, it 
would seem, interprets his answer and its action as that of dutiful hospitality, rejecting 
Ventidius’ offer of remuneration: 
                                  O, by no means, 
Honest Ventidius. You do mistake my love. 
I gave it freely ever, and there’s none 
Can truly say he gives if he receives. 
If our betters play at that game, we must not dare 
To imitate them. (1.2.7-12)  
 
Unfortunately, Timon will indeed imitate those betters who play at the game of 
reciprocity (equal or greater return on investment). By the close of Act Two he dispatches 
servants “severally” to Lucius, Lucullus, and Sempronius requesting a return of fifty 
talents from each (2.2.181-87), and to the Athenian Senators he sues for an excessive one 
thousand talents (2.2.190-93). This desire (need) for reciprocal return or its excess serves 
                                                 
75 Tiffany, “Shakespeare’s Parables,” 156. 
76 L.C. Knights, “Timon of Athens,” in The Morality of Art: Essays Presented to G. Wilson Knight by his 
Colleagues and Friends, ed. D.W. Jefferson (London: Routledge, 1969), 3. 
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as a measure of Timon’s poor and indeed conflicted understanding of stewardship. At this 
moment, however, his account to Ventidius directs attention to mistaken “love.” I would 
posit that here Timon implicitly calls to mind agape as a hospitality of relational dwelling 
in “support” of a friend in need.  
When next Timon acknowledges to those gathered around his table that “We are 
born to do benefits” (1.2.95), he tacitly invokes our recurrent passage in 1Peter, “Use 
hospitality one to another without grudging. As every man hath received the gift, even so 
minister the same to one another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.” 
According to Jackson, “No character pushes down through Christianity in its desire for 
the ‘other and…utterly other’ in a way Timon does, forcing us to consider where that 
response and responsibility to ‘give’ comes from.”77 For Lévinas, the desire for the other 
espoused in the Gospels is “already read” in the prophet Isaiah.78 I would suggest that 
Timon’s responsibility to give comes from the nuanced distinction in the period between 
Christian and secular liberality, the former funded by agape and the latter by the desire 
for reciprocity. 
The Renaissance idea of inner beauty manifested by outward appearance extended 
to the conceptualization of liberal hospitality. “The idea of an indissoluble link between 
gentility and household generosity,” Heal writes, “was here reinforced by an argument 
that liberality was the particular prerogative of gentlemen and one of the most visible 
manifestations of true, that is inner, nobility.”79 For Shakespeare’s contemporary 
audience, then, it would likely be expected that Timon manifest his nobility through 
                                                 
77 Jackson, “‘One Wish,’” 37. 
78 Emmanuel Lévinas, “Judaism and Christianity,” in In The Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 162. 
79 Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality,” 73. 
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liberal action. In its secular turn, however, such liberal generosity was reserved only for 
peers or near social equals. That is, liberal hosts expected return on their expenditure. 
Shakespeare offers a glimpse of such opinion in a passing remark between two Lords 
concerning Timon’s coveted (if unwise) hospitality: 
                               Plutus the god of gold 
Is but his steward; no meed but he repays 
Sevenfold above itself; no gift to him 
But breeds the giver a return exceeding 
All use of quittance.  (1.2.275-79) 
 
It is thus that Timon’s magnanimity was understood by his peers. To extend hospitality to 
Timon is to expect to receive “a return exceeding / All use of quittance.” His good graces 
on such summation prove a wise investment, one guaranteeing a return “Sevenfold above 
itself.” 
 Counterpoised to such secular understanding of liberality was its Christian 
practice of freely giving to those in need, with an emphasis given to persons of lower 
social status. In Nevv Booke of Spirituall Physick for Dyuerse Diseases of the Nobilitie 
and Gentlemen of Englande (1555), William Turner argued that English hospitality 
suffered a “dropsye,” a socio-spiritual disease in the form of secular liberality. On this 
same point Adams writes his own parable over a half century later concerning English 
hospitality’s demise: 
A great man had curiously engrauen at the gate of his Pallace, the image of 
Bountie, or Hospitalitie. The needie Trauellers with ioy spying it, approach thither 
in hopefull expectation of succour. But still silence or an emptie Eccho answers 
all their cries and knockes: for hospitality may stand at the gate, but there is none 
in the house. One among the rest (his hungry trust thus often abused) resolues to 
plucke downe the Image. With these words; If there be neither meate nor drinke 
in the house, what needs there a Signe? Great Portals in the Countrey, and 
coloured Posts in the Cittie, promise the poore Beggar liberall reliefe; but they are 
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often but Images…For Charitie is not at home: onely the shadow without…giues 




On Adams’ account it is the poor and disenfranchised, the “needie Trauellers” of this 
world, who desperately need receipt of liberal hospitality, not well-apportioned 
gentlemen and nobles who cannot know the “faire and fruitlesse hopes” suffered by those 
unfortunates whose “cries and knockes” remain unanswered without their doors. 
Hospitality as secular liberality is thus, following Adams, an act of idolatry, a mere 
“Image” of true (Christian) hospitality, its “emptie Eccho.” As with Adams, for Turner 
the onus of hospitality falls especially upon the nobility since they have been graced with 
the burdensome gift of great wealth and the subsequent responsibility to steward it 
wisely.
81
 It is from this perspective that I would read Timon’s misplaced hospitality in 
order to better understand its failure. 
The grand hospitality of Timon’s initial banquet scene opens as guests rise in 
ceremony at Timon’s entry into the hall. Yet in a gesture that seems at first a gentle 
reproof, he waives them off:  
Ceremony was but devised at first 
To set a gloss on faint deeds, hollow welcomes, 
Recanting goodness, sorry ere ’tis shown; 
But where there is true friendship, there needs none. 
Pray sit. More welcome are ye to my fortunes 
Than my fortunes to me. (1.2.14-19) 
 
Here Timon reads his guests’ collective act of reciprocal hospitality, showing deference 
to the host through “Ceremony,” as a “hollow welcome.” While it is true that Timon does 
not do so in censure but graciousness (his point is that true friendship needs no such 
                                                 
80 Adams, The happiness of the church, 132. 
81 Turner’s opinion is intimated in his title alone. However, this aspect of his argument is taken up more 
fully in my discussion of prodigality.  
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pomp), his comment nonetheless calls attention to the dissembling nature of their (no 
doubt social and socialized) response whose intent Shakespeare pens as a desire “To set a 
gloss on faint deeds.” 
 Tragically, at this point in his own narrative Timon does not realize he is caught 
up within such a false economy of hospitality. He will realize all but too late that his own 
hospitality has been coveted and abused by hollow “trencher-friends” who prove 
themselves to be naught but “detested parasites” and “Courteous destroyers” (3.7.88, 86, 
87) of his goodwill. The gathered nobles are clever actors at table and further dissemble 
by way of an entreaty that continues to “gloss” their “faint deeds”: 
Might we but have that happiness, my  
lord, that you would use our hearts, whereby we might 
express some part of our zeals, we should think ourselves for 
ever perfect. (1.2.80-83, emphasis is mine) 
This is the very secular liberality censured by Turner. As my italicization shows, the 
nobles’ intention is self-gratification not hospitality’s comportment as service to the other 
understood in the period. In a Hamlet-esque turn, their speech act is seeming hospitality 
only. The voiced desire to give something of themselves to and to be used by Timon 
reveals instead an expectation of return—even if only by payment in self-aggrandizement 
(“we should think ourselves for / ever perfect”). That is, they do what custom among 
peers dictates: you offer to return the hospitality you have received, even if only as an 
empty rhetorical flourish designed to maintain social appearances. 
 Timon’s response to their entreaty, however, begins to show the cracks in the 
foundation of his hospitality. “O, no doubt, my good friends, but the gods themselves / 
have provided that I shall have much help from you / How had you been my friends 
else?” (1.2.84-86). Perhaps subconsciously, Timon here admits that he indeed harbors 
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some expectation of reciprocity (“the gods themselves / have provided that I shall have 
much help from you”). His interrogative quip, “How had you been my friends else,” no 
doubt voiced cheerfully and with good-humored charm, further suggests such assumption 
of use. The term friend recurs four times in this extended speech alone, suggesting its 
urgency for Timon.
82
 Indeed his earlier espousal that “We are born to do benefits,” 
continues with the admission, “and / what better or properer can we call our own than the 
riches of / our friends?” (1.2.95-97). These friends are of course themselves rich as nearly 
all well-moneyed men, the poet and painter notwithstanding. Embedded in Timon’s 
generous speech is thus potential gold to be mined should occasion arise. It is important 
to note that the poor, homeless, or otherwise abject are not those shown welcome at 
Timon’s table, despite the intent purported otherwise in his hospitable speech to 
Ventidius’ messenger (“’Tis not enough to help the feeble up, / But to support him after,” 
1.1.109-10). Rather, those “feeble” gathered to benefit from Timon’s hospitality are those 
who can return the favor—even if they ultimately fail to do so. 
 It was widely recognized in the period that opposition or hindrances to hospitality 
as Christian liberality existed in two common forms. As Turner phrases it, “lyberalitie is 
set betwene .ii. vices, y
t
 is, prodigalitie & couetusnes.”83 Such opinion is confirmed by 
the unnamed author I.M. whose treatise A Health to the Gentlemanly Profession of 
Servingman (1598) follows a similar cultural-medical frame with regard to the declining 
health of English hospitality as Turner’s Nevv Booke of Spirituall Physik:  
According to thy abilitie mainteyne Hospitalitie: for that is the harbourer of two 
hopes, prayse and prayers: yet let Liberalitie be the Linke to light thee, lest 
                                                 
82 cf. 1.2.84-100. 
83 William Turner, A nevv booke of spirituall physik for dyuerse diseases of the nobilitie and gentlemen of 
Englande, made by William Turner doctor of Physik (Emden: Printed by Egidius van der Erve, 1555), 67. 
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Covetousnes might corrupt, or Prodigalitie procure penurie. In Medio concistet 
virtus [sic], every meane betwixt two extreames is a vertue: so is liberalitie, 





The mean that yields harmony for Turner resonates as discord in Timon where the 
preservation of means (available resources, money) trumps hospitable action for 
everyone but an unwise Timon. The treatise also equates covetousness with avarice, a 
transaction concomitant with the behavior of Shakespeare’s Athenian nobles in their 
refusal to remit Timon any form of financial aid. Lucullus perhaps voices such 
accounting best: “this is no time to lend money, / especially upon bare friendship without 
security” (3.1.37-38).  
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the understanding of true Christian 
hospitality (liberality) was driven by alterior motives: the poor were given priority. 
Thomas Tusser’s Five Hundred Points of Good Husbandrie (1557) confirms as much in 
verse: 
Of all other dooings house keeping is cheefe, 
 for daily it helpeth the poore with releefe; 
 The neighbour, the stranger, and all that have neede,  




By the close of Act Three Timon is one in such need. Penniless and misanthropic, like 
Lear he soon finds himself bare and unaccommodated, alone at the mercy of the Athenian 
wild. As if failing to heed the Gentlemanly Profession’s warning, it is thus for Timon that 
prodigality procures penury. Apemantus therefore rightfully asks, “Thou giv’st so long, 
                                                 
84 I.M., A Health to the Gentlemanly Profession of Servingman (London: S.T.C. 17140, 1598), reprinted in 
Inedited Tracts Illustrating the Manners of Englishmen during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. 
W.C. Hazlitt (London: Roxburghe Club, 1868), 109; quoted in Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality,” 74. 
85 Thomas Tusser, Five Hundred Points of Good Husbandrie, eds. W. Payne and S. Heritage (London: n.p. 
1878),  67. 
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Timon, I fear me thou wilt / give away thyself in paper shortly. What needs these feasts, / 
pomps, and vainglories?” (1.2.238-40). The cynic’s concern is confirmed by the steward:  
His promises fly so beyond his state 
That what he speaks is all in debt, he owes 
For every word. He is so kind that he now 
Pay interest for’t. (1.2.192-95) 
 
It is not covetousness nor avarice, but prodigality that is the cause of Timon’s demise. 
Flavius discerns what Timon does not. In Act Two, with creditors enclosing, the 
steward pulls his master aside in a moment of intimate reproach so that he may help 
Timon understand the gravity of his situation: 
‘Heavens,’ have I said, ‘the bounty of this lord! 
How many prodigal bits have slaves and peasants 
This night englutted! Who is not Timon’s? 
What heart, head, sword, force, means, but is Lord Timon’s? 
Great Timon, noble, worthy, royal Timon! 
Ah, when the means are gone that buy this praise, 
The breath is gone whereof this praise is made.  (2.2.159-65) 
 
On Flavius’ report, Timon gluts himself on hollow praises even as his “friends” englut 
themselves on his bounty. Shakespeare references bounty seven times in relation to 
Timon throughout the play’s course, suggesting its import. Flavius’ gesture to the 
heavens, even if only in exclamation (or perhaps invocation), advances a divine eye 
toward Timon’s bounty. For Flavius, this bounty is that which has been entrusted to 
Timon by the gods, or by God in Timon’s greekjew parlance. Yet for those of wider 
Athens, Timon’s bounty is reducible to the plea of the prostitutes Phrynia and Timandra: 
“More counsel with more money, bounteous Timon” (4.3.166). Here bounty denotes a 
commodified object, what Heidegger calls standing reserve, something’s capacity to 
dispense—in Timon’s case, his ontological status by his fellow Athenians as nothing but 
a gold dispensary. What Timon sees in himself as philanthropic (“I could deal kingdoms 
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to my friends, / And ne’er be weary,” 1.2.215-16), Flavius reports as “prodigal bits”  
Taking up the charge of prodigal, Rolf Soellner accuses Timon of being “one cause of a 
societal crisis in Athens,” on the grounds that “his prodigality supports the corruption and 
Hobbesian values of the city.”86 During the period such charges of societal crisis were 
posed vehemently by conduct literature such as Turner’s Spirituall Physick. 
 By Turner’s indictment, 
Thys co~monly vsed liberalite in Englande nowe, is no true liberalite, but rather 
prodigalitie, for it is quyte contrarie both to ye liberalitie that God describeth and 
appointeth, and also vnto it that all wyse naturall men haue written of, and haue 
co~maunded their disciples to occupye. Almighty god in the lviii. cha. of Esay 
speaketh vnto all Emperores, kynges, dukes, erles, lordes, knyghtes, gentlemen 
and al other ryche men Frange esurienti panem tuunt. &c. breake thy bread vnto 
him that is hongry, and brynge into thy house poore & wanderyng me~, or 
wayfaring me~, or straungers that haue no houses, into thy house, & when as thou 
shalt se a naked man couer hym, and despyse not thy fleshe. This 
co~maundement of God, is co~monly broken in occupyenge of lyberalitie. For the 




Turner’s jeremiad admits a material aspect to hospitality (food, drink, shelter, and 
clothing) but maintains that such apportioning should come from spiritual precedent. The 
prophet Isaiah is invoked to remind the elite classes (“all Emperores, kynges, dukes, 
erles, lordes, knyghtes, gentlemen and al other ryche men”) of their overriding vocation 
as God’s stewards on this matter. Yet “[t] his co~maundement of God,” Turner inveighs, 
“is co~monly broken in occupyenge of lyberalitie”—that is, in the practice of secular 
liberality. Such is Timon’s hospitality despite what seems to be his good intentions 
otherwise. The poor and homeless (“poore & wanderyng me~, or wayfaring me~, or 
straungers that haue no houses”) occupy the center of Turner’s argument. Yet we see no 
                                                 
86 Rolf Soellner, Timon of Athens: Shakespeare’s Pessimistic Tragedy (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1979); quoted in John J. Ruszkiewicz, Timon of Athens: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: 
Garland, 1986), 104. 
87 Turner, A nevv booke of spirituall physik, 67-68. 
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poor in Timon except for the servants discharged after the fall of Timon’s estate, the two 
prostitutes accompanying Alcibiades (to whom he shows open contempt), and the 
eponymous character himself in the play’s final two acts. 
 As I have already suggested, it is only rich nobles who receive Timon’s 
hospitality, or rather, his prodigality. Moreover, it is from these same noble “friends” that 
his prodigality expects reciprocity. It is thus that Timon speaks to Flavius of his financial 
crisis as a type of blessing, “for by these / Shall I try friends” (2.2.177-78). Such trial is 
the reciprocity expected of hospitality as secular liberality. In a Heideggerian turn that 
follows his Athenian peers’ objectifying gaze of standing reserve, Timon confesses to 
Flavius that he is “proud” his “occasions” have fallen to such a state that he has “Found 
time to use” Lucius, Lucullus, and Sempronius “toward a supply of money” (2.2.185-86). 
With creditors at the doors even Ventidius is expected to repay the five talents of a debt 
now reinstated. Flavius is thus dispatched to Ventidius with the following charge:  
Greet him from me.  
Bid him suppose some good necessity 
Touches his friend, which craves to be remembered 
With those five talents.  (2.2.220-23) 
 
Once more Shakespeare associates Timon with the Parable of the Five Talents. It would 
seem, however, that he has here forgotten his own argument for a hospitality funded by 
agape (“you do mistake my love…”) in his initial dialogue with Ventidius. Perhaps such 
is the nature of prodigality.    
 John Donne parses the prodigal distinction in the period from a bearing inverse to 




When we shall come to our Redde rationem villicationis, to give an account of 
our Stewardship, when we shall not measure our inheritance by Acres, but all 
heaven shall be ours, and we shall follow the Lamb, wheresoever he goes, when 
our estate, and term shall not be limited by years, and lives, but, as we shall be in 
the presence of the Ancient of dayes, so our dayes shall be so far equall to his, as 
that they shall be without end; Then will our great Merchants, great practisers, 
great purchasers, great Contracters, find another language, another style, then they 
have been accustom’d to, here. There no man shall be call’d a prodigall, but onely 
the Covetous man; Onely he that hath been too diligent a keeper, shall appear to 




Donne’s teaching signals a movement in lexicon from a market to spiritual definition of 
prodigality, from economics to oikos-pneumatics. On Donne’s account the true prodigal 
is the person who withholds their talents from the practice of biblical stewardship. It is 
thus in a prophetic tone he warns such hospitality will show itself “before the presence of 
the Ancient of dayes” to be not stewardship but covetousness. Thus Donne’s call for 
England’s “great” men (merchants, practicers, purchasers, and contractors) to “find 
another language” is an entreaty for the practice of love’s language as agape, the offering 
of hospitality to the alien, alterior, homeless, and poor. In short, to the very character 




Timon is a play concerned with dwelling, the relational proximity of lived 
hospitable nearness. However, it is as misanthropos that Timon delivers a final 
instruction to his steward: “thou shalt build from men” (4.3.5128). This injunction recalls 
the Decalogue’s own “Thou shalts,” which Lévinas has described as spaces where 
                                                 
88 John Donne, “Sermon No. 10 Preached at Lincolns Inne, preparing them to build their Chappell,” in The 




“[a]lterity becomes proximity.”89 That is, in the “Thou shalt” Lévinas locates an 
ordinance of the other:  
It is an original obligation to which I am, in the guise of me, devoted and elected, 
I am ordered me. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” or “Thou shalt love 
thy neighbor, that is what thyself is.”90  
 
Heidegger finds a similar correlation between self/other at the level of neighborliness in 
his native German bauen, to build. For Heidegger, there exists in bauen a “covert trace,” 
a lost etymological residue, of Nachbar, the neighbor.
91
 As he puts it: “The Nachbar is 
the Nachgebur, the Nachgebauer, the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby.”92 Per 
Heidegger’s genealogy, also in-dwelling within bauen is the verb to be: 
Bauen originally means to dwell. Where the word bauen still speaks in its original 
sense it also says how far the essence of dwelling reaches. That is, bauen, buan, 
bhu, beo are our word bin in the versions: ich bin, I am, du bist, you are, the 
imperative form bis, be. What then does ich bin mean? The old word bauen, to 
which the bin belongs, answers: ich bin, du bist mean I dwell, you dwell. The way 





Dwelling pace Heidegger is an ontological status; to live authentically is to dwell. 
Contrary to Timon, it is to build (bauen) in nearness to others. 
 Flavius understands well this comportment of dwelling. On this point Jowett’s 
reading of Timon’s steward bears repeating in full: 
he distributes his last money to the servants under his authority, reserving only 
what he intends to give to Timon. This does not greatly enrich the servants 
because they money is so little, and the script is written so that the servants 
                                                 
89 Emmanuel Lévinas, “From Ethics to Exegesis,” in In The Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 110. 
90 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
91 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 348-49. 
92 Ibid., 349. 
93 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
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Jowett’s description aptly demonstrates Flavius building in nearness to others. What is 
built is the “communal embrace,” a commune of shared relationality which is 
simultaneously a religious encounter in its aspect as religare, a site of communal binding 
and union.  For A.D. Nuttall it is not religious action but telos that is observed in this 
exchange: “The Steward, even amid the ruin of the house, must go on dispensing money 
because his identity is invested in his office: his esse is to dispense.”95 If Flavius is 
“pathologically loyal,” to further borrow Nuttall’s phrasing, then it is to his vocation as a 
in its imitation of the life of Christ as a steward. That is, to emend Nuttall’s reading, it is 
precisely because his identity is invested in his office as steward that Flavius gives 
himself fully (his esse) to the practice of agape. Hunt reads Flavius in this fashion: “This 
self-sacrificial spirit [agape], however, seems to live more fully in the steward Flavius, an 
impression encapsulated for a later age as a Christian truth: ‘For the Son of Man came not 
to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many’ (Mark 10:45).”96 It is in 
answer to the call “not to be served but to serve” that both Jesus and Flavius demonstrate 
dwelling’s pneumatic aspect. 
 Heidegger constructs his dwelling through a framework he describes as the 
fourfold. Its elements—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—are conjoined in a matrix 
of interdependence. For Heidegger proper dwelling retains an aspect beyond 
creaturely/material estate, thus the inclusion of a supra/supernatural (or “pneumatic”) 
                                                 
94 Jowett, The Life of Timon of Athens, 81. 
95A.D. Nuttall, Timon of Athens, Harvester New Critical Introductions to Shakespeare (New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 88. 
96 Hunt, “Qualifying the Good Steward of Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens,” 513. 
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component (and comportment) in the divinities. This fourfold further comports with the 
biblical paradigm of stewardship in its vocational calling to “cherish,” “protect,” 




In Genesis humankind made in God’s image is given responsibility (Hebrew 
radah) to care for all of creation.
98
  While radah is variously translated in what may seem 
ostensibly negative, as in “to have dominion over” (KJV) or “to rule” (ASB), it need not 
be exploitative. Like Hiedegger’s bauen, radah too tasks the behavior of stewardship. As 
one scholar has noted, “radah, meaning to tread down,” is often translated as dominion, 
suggesting the domination of the earth (and its inhabitants) in all of the negative 
connotations such a term can leverage.
99
 Yet one must also remember that “Israel’s king 
had covenantal responsibilities to care for those over whom he ruled.”100 Per divine 
requisite the same king was thus called to perform acts of hospitality to neighbor and 
stranger alike, a reminder espoused in the New Testament epistle to the Hebrews, “Be not 
forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.”101  
Following scriptural precedent, dominion therefore does not mean to exploit or destroy 
but to exercise care and responsibility for God’s domain, particularly in the interest of the 
                                                 
97 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 349. Regarding those with whom humans dwell, see 352: 
“When we speak of mortals, we are already thinking of the other three along with them, but we give no 
thought to the simple oneness of the four” (human and animal); “Mortals dwell in that they save the earth” 
(environmental); “dwelling itself is always a staying with things. Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the 
fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things” (thing).  
98 Gen. 1:26-28. 
99 Russell A. Butkus, “The Stewardship of Creation,” in Moral Landscape of Creation, ed. Robert B. 
Kruschwitz (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2001), 20. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Hebrews 13:2. 
182 
 
poor and marginalized.”102 Moreover, Genesis 2:15 speaks to an understanding of radah 
as stewardship cum dwelling for it is here that God places mankind on the earth “to 
cultivate” (abad) and “to keep” (shamar).103 As with stewardship, abad means “to serve” 
and further “implies respect and even reverence.”104 It is with such reverence that Flavius 
approaches his former master in the wilderness outside Athens. 
 As misanthropos there is arguably none more alterior within or without Athens 
than Timon, and yet Flavius would serve him with genuine care: 
That which I show, heaven knows, is merely love, 
Duty and zeal to your unmatchèd mind, 
Care of your food and living; and, believe it, 
My most honoured lord, 
For any benefit that points to me, 
Either in hope or present, I’d exchange 
For this one wish: that you had power and wealth 
To requite me by making rich yourself. (4.3.507-14) 
 
The steward’s care flows from a love that “heaven knows,” one of “Duty and zeal,” thus 
it is a love of conscious and willful moral choice.
105
 In short: agape. Flavius’ “one wish,” 
though qualified as exchange, does not concern itself with the transaction of wealth as 
gold but relational proximity; it is a wish that Timon would be rich in dwelling, the 
shared nearness of a genuine love for the other. Implicit in Timon’s rejoining, “Thou 
singly honest man, / Here, take”—at which point the stage directions report “[He gives 
FLAVIUS gold]” (4.3.515-16)—is an echo of the Parable of the Talents. One all but hears 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 21. Variously, abad may translated as “to work” or “take care”; shamar, also as “care.” 
104 Ibid. 
105 The story of Lazarus being raised from the dead distinguishes the love that “heaven knows” from the 
love mankind understands. Each report of love spoken by Jesus or about him by his disciples uses a form of 
agape, whereas the accounts of Jesus’ love by all others in the narrative use forms of phileo, friendship 
love. See Jn. 11.  
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Timon speak to his once-steward, “Well done my good and faithful servant.”106 And like 
the good stewards of the parable, Flavius is entrusted with more (here, gold and the 
injunction to build away from men) because he has proven himself a wise caretaker. 
Flavuis’ response to Timon’s outpouring of wealth—“O, let me stay / And comfort you, 
my master” (4.3.525-26)—discloses a desire for relational dwelling, even as Timon 
vocalizes his disdain for all human contact. 
 There is perhaps no greater biblical paradigm of stewardship qua dwelling than 
the story of the Good Samaritan. In the world of first century Palestine, when baited by a 
lawyer on the question of neighbor-love—“And who is my neighbour?”—Jesus answers 
with this well-known parable.
107
 By its account it is not the outwardly religious (the priest 
or the Levite) who offers hospitality to the person in need. It is the foreigner, the stranger, 
the alien, the alterior. For Jewish culture at that time there was perhaps no race more 
alterior than the Samaritan. Yet the narrative tells that it is the Samaritan who shows 
“compassion” for his fellow man by dressing his wounds with wine and oil, expensive 
commodities in those days. He then establishes this unknown man at an inn for which he 
pays all expenses. 
 As with the parable of the Five Talents, the Good Samaritan requires exegetical 
unfolding in order to fully ascertain its scriptural intent and subsequent development by 
Shakespeare in his Athenian ambit. Exegesis from the Church Fathers through the early 
modern period tended to allegorize this parable following the model set forth by 
                                                 
106 Mt. 25:21. 





 From this hermeneutic paradigm, the wounded man in need of care is 
Adam, Jerusalem the heavenly city, Jericho symbolizes mortality, the good Samaritan is 
Christ, and so on.
109
 Reformation theologians tended to adopt Luther’s disdain for 
allegorization (he famously derided Origen’s allegorizing as being “worth less than dirt”) 
and yet Luther himself nonetheless allegorized the parable in terms of his prevailing 
interest in sola fide.
110
 Calvin, however, is unique among the Reformers in that his 
reading of the Good Samaritan rejects the hitherto prevailing Christological 
interpretation.
111
 Instead, in his A Harmony of the Gospels (1555) Calvin reads the Good 
Samaritan as a paradigm of hospitality in human-to-human praxis. Upon Calvin’s 
explication Jesus’ impress in the parable is “to show that neighbourliness which obliges 
us to do our duty by each other is not restricted to friends and relations, but open to the 
whole human race.”112 Calvin’s reading coincides with Jesus’ erasure of the 
neighbor/enemy dyad in his Sermon on the Mount. Such openness, however, to use 
Calvin’s word, proves risky business. 
Like the parable of the Five Talents, the Good Samaritan’s association with risk is 
connected to a cultural understanding of its message. The priest and Levite in the story, 
for example, are perhaps not as incredulous as they might first seem. Vallet reads the 
                                                 
108 For an overview of this exegetical model as it was developed by Origen, the Scholastics, and 
Reformation theologians, see Robert H. Stein, An Introduction to the Parables of Jesus (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1981), 45-49.  
109 Klyne R. Snodgrass, “From Allegorizing to Allegorizing: A History of the Interpretation of the Parables 
of Jesus,” in The Challenge of Jesus’ Parables, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2000), 4. 
110 On these points see Stein, An Introduction to the Parables of Jesus, 49. For Luther’s critique of Origen 
and allegorization more broadly, see Stein, 155, n.23. 
111 Ibid. 
112 John Calvin, A Harmony of the Gospels Matthew, Mark and Luke, Vol. III, trans. A.W. Morrison (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 38-39; quoted in Stein, An Introduction to the Parables of Jesus, 50. 
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parable as a narrative about taking risks for the sake of others.
113
 In this context he 
reminds contemporary readers and exegetes alike that both the priest and Levite faced the 
risk of being unclean for an extended period of time, more if the body they touched was 
dead, lessened if they came into proximal relation with an unclean person.
114
 In either 
case these religious men faced social ostracism prescribed by the law, even if only for a 
short time, a risk they are unwilling to hazard. Yet in the world of first century Palestine 
the Samaritan faced no less risk than the priest or Levite, as Sylvia Keesmaat 
contextualizes: 
It is important to remember that Samaritans also followed Torah, and so the same 
risk of defilement from touching a dead body was present for this Samaritan as 
well—with such ritual “uncleanness” extending also to his animals and 
merchandise. Furthermore, he risked retaliation from the man’s family. For in 
situations of violence, where revenge was commonly taken, an enemy (even one 
who helps) could easily become the object of a family’s revenge. In addition, the 
robbers might still have been lurking around the place watching for other 
travelers. A Samaritan, who probably had more than one animal and some 





What differentiates the Samaritan from the holy men in the narrative is his willingness to 
act in agape, in concern for the other, in loving hospitality to the poor, despite the risks 
involved. Like the Samaritan, Flavius risks no less in carrying gold into the Athenian 
wilderness to aid Timon. He too is a prime target for bandits, though not from those on 
the Jericho road but the highwaymen who canvass Athens’ woods. Echoing the risks of 
the priest, Levite, and Samaritan alike, Flavius chances not only loss of wealth and 
                                                 
113 Vallet, Stepping Stones of the Steward, 103-04. 
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material possessions, but the possibility of becoming like Timon a social pariah, guilty by 
association. Even so, Flavius would tend to Timon’s needs following the paradigm of 
Christian liberality set forth in parable. 
The Samaritan’s actions conjoin material hospitality to the pneumatic call to care 
for others. The parable’s Greek is also telling. The “compassion” by which the Samaritan 
is moved is from the verb splagxnizomai, meaning “to be moved in one’s inward 
parts.”116 A 1578 sermon by John Stockwood confirms that such an understanding of the 
Greek was recognized in Shakespeare’s time. Describing the splagxnizomai experienced 
by the Samaritan, Stockwood reminds his fellow Englishmen, 
The Lorde worke in vs bowels of compassion…euery one according to the 
portio~ that God hath bestowed vpon vs, maye indéede féele and be touched 
inwardlye, wyth the miseries of the néedie, and in consideration of the same, gyue 




Whether one reads Jesus’ parable or Stockwood’s exegetical gloss, the Samaritan’s 
actions provide witness of hospitality as visceral care not fiscal remove. Flavius’ would-
be care for Timon is of this order. That is, Flavius “indéede féele[s]” and is “touched 
inwardlye, wyth the miseries of the néedie” he witnesses in Timon’s unaccommodated 
estate outside Athens’ walls. He would even hazard the full extent of his wealth (a would-
be giving of “muche almes”) to Timon in his desire to fund the man with what remains of 
his own dwindling gold, coin that, admittedly, the misanthrope readily rejects. 
                                                 
116 For the Greek see Nestle, Greek New Testament; definition is from Strong’s, s.v. “splagchnizomai.” 
117 John Stockwood, A sermon preached at Paules Crosse on Barthelmew day, being the 24. of August. 
1578 Wherein, besides many other profitable matters meete for all Christians to follovv, is a large prooued, 
that is the part of those that are fathers, householders, and scholemaisters, to instruct all those vnder their 
gouernement, in the vvord and knovvledge of the Lorde (London: Printed by Henry Bynneman, 1578), 113. 
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I concede that there is no direct allusion to the Good Samaritan in Timon, like that 
of the Five Talents.
118
 Yet I would argue that the paradigm it enacts enters Shakespeare’s 
text not directly from the Bible, but rather through the switch points of Timon’s dwelling. 
Stitched within the Good Samaritan’s tapestry is the thread of agape. Likewise, Timon as 
oikos, as a space of dwelling, whether within Athenian city limits or removed to its outer 
wilds, presents an example of the person as a site for the practice of hospitality as 
stewardship in both its failures and potentiality as dwelling.
119
 In Apemantus, for 
example, Shakespeare demonstrates hospitality’s failure as dwelling. By his own account 
the cynic visits Timon near his cave-turned-home with the express admission “To vex 
thee” (4.3.237) even as he offers to “mend” Timon’s “feast” (4.3.284) of a freshly 
uncovered root, an ostensible act of hospitality in the offering of food to the poor. 
Apemantus’ hospitality, however, shows itself to be further distasteful, as a medlar—
“There’s a / medlar for thee; eat it” (4.3.303-04)—is a rotten pear. Penning Apemantus’ 
inverse in the character of Flavius, Shakespeare scripts dwelling’s potential as hospitality. 
Flavius’ is a hospitality premised on agape, an economics of care rather than exchange. 
Like the Samaritan, he expects no return on his investment, desiring instead only genuine 
and self-sacrificial concern for the other person’s well being. While it is true that 
Apemantus never actively nor vocally seeks wealth in the form of gold, the cynic’s 
desired coin nonetheless takes the form of Schadenfreude. Flavius, in contrast, seeks no 
remuneration. Thus it is in the person of Timon, or rather at the site of Timon’s person, 
                                                 
118 Carter suggests Lk. 10:34 is glossed in Timon’s desire to aid Ventidius at 1.1.9-10. See, Shakespeare 
and Holy Scripture, 445. 
119 In a similar theorization, contemporary German philosopher and cultural scientist Peter Sloterdijk posits 
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188 
 
that Shakespeare offers two divergent modes of hospitality for our reflection, the one of 
exploitation, the other of dwelling as care. 
“What is the state of dwelling in our precarious age?” 120 Heidegger poses this 
question as he concludes his contemplation of proximal living. In answer he offers the 
following: we “must ever learn to dwell,” which can only be accomplished if we learn to 
“think for the sake of dwelling.”121 By this he means to think for the sake of relational 
nearness and the care of and for others.
122
 Timon, I’ve suggested, offers a space to 
ruminate upon hospitality as stewardship and its Shakespearean renditions as one such 
thinking for the sake of dwelling. Not unlike Heidegger’s fourfold, my argument has 
worked in the key of pneumatics. In Spiritual Shakespeares, Ewan Fernie has sought to 
distinguish (to distance) the spiritual, which precedes revelation, from the religious, 
which is bound to scripture and covenant. I have not done so; my Timon investigates a 
spirit that remains invested in the religious. The play’s Athens and its exteriors exhibit an 
understanding of religion as religare, a communal binding together through shared 
proximity (dwelling) and care (agape) for one another. By Fernie’s definition, 
spirituality precedes religion and may well take place outside it. Spirituality is an 
experience of truth, but it is concerned with the truth not of this world but of a 
world that has not yet and perhaps will never come to be. Spirituality is a mode of 




To the degree that spirituality is a mode of opposition to what is, Shakespeare offers in 
Timon what I have suggested as a pneumatico-ethical form of hospitality in its 
                                                 
120 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 363. 
121 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
122 Heidegger’s fourfold extends this dwelling as care to both human and non-human others, extending the 
philosophical scope of stewardship to the cultivation of the environment, animals, and objects (things) as 
well. 
123 Ewan Fernie, “Introduction: Shakespeare, Spirituality and Contemporary Criticism,” in Spiritual 
Shakespeares, ed. Ewan Fernie (New York: Routledge, 2005), 9.  
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dispensation as stewardship. The spiritually entruthed world Fernie envisions that has not 
yet come and perhaps will never come to be is messianic in its gesture, encoding a desire 
which, if unfulfilled, harbors the potential for despair on the order of Timon’s 
misanthropy. This spiritual yet non-religious messianism, however, cuts itself off from 
the equipment for living developed in positive religion, in the form of prayers, precepts 
and parables that help guide our care for one another. 
 Yet in Timon, Shakespeare offers a glimpse of the messianic in its thinking for the 
sake of dwelling. Through a false or poetic etymology, Timon’s name shares a phonemic 
association with time.
124
 Indeed, his tragedy may well be that he does not steward well in 
the time that he is given, a concern archived across the literature on hospitality in the age 
of Shakespeare. Thinking for the sake of dwelling witnesses a similar gesture in Giorgio 
Agamben’s The Time That Remains as the philosopher turns his hermeneutic eye toward 
the Apostle Paul’s delineation of  “ho nyn kairos” in his letter to the Romans.125 
Agamben translates this phrase as “time of the now,” signaling not a messianic time of 
the future, a waiting on the horizon of tomorrow, but a messianic time now, today, in 
one’s present moment—an enactment of the what-could-be-tomorrow today.126 This ho 
nyn kairos is nothing short of the contemporary practice of a hospitality funded by agape. 
Such call to action in early modern England is espoused in Adams’ The Happiness of the 
Church (1619) whose exhortation supports the Pauline ho nyn kairos in action as agape 
with the teaching of the St. John:   
                                                 
124 Frank Kermode traces the etymology of Timon’s name in “Timon of Athens,” in Shakespeare’s 
Language (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 238. 
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[Englishmen today] will wish some thing, but doe nothing. They haue open 
mouthes, but shut hearts: soft words, but hard bowels. To these S. Iohn giues 
aduise Let vs not loue in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth. Opposing 
workes to words, veritie to vanity. Verball complements are not reall implements: 
and with a little inuersion of the Philosophers sense; The belly hath no eares. The 
starued soule delights not to heare Charitie, but to feele it. Oculate mihi sunt 
manus: the poores hands haue eyes; what they receiue, they beleeue. The gowtie 
vsurer hath a nimble tongue: and though he will not walke in loue, he can talke of 
loue: for of all members the tongue Postrema senescit; waxeth old last. Let a 
distressed passenger come to some of their gates, and he shall haue diuinitie 
enough, but no humanitie; wholesome counsell, but no wholesome food. They can 
afford them exhortation, but not compassion; charging their eares, but in no wise 
ouer-charging their bellies. They haue scripture against begging, but no bread 
against famishing. The bread of the Sanctuary is common with them, not the 




According to Adams the Englishman’s fault in hospitality is his dearth of agape, his 
failure to “walke in loue.” Following Adams, ho nyn kairos must be enacted by active 
(immanent) stewardship today: “The starued soule delights not to heare Charitie, but to 
feele it.” Like the Good Samartian one must choose tangible action over empty intent, 
“bread of the Buttery” over “bread of the Sanctuary.”   
 Shakespeare’s Athens, like the parable of the Good Samaritan, affords the 
opportunity to think hospitably in the key of stewardship.
128
 Both then and now. It is a 
space of ho nyn kairos. In its wider registers, hospitality as stewardship is a challenge to 
reverse Timon’s tragic epitaph: 
‘Here lie I, Timon, who alive 
All living men did hate. 
Pass by and curse thy fill, but pass 
And stay not here thy gait.’  (5.5.75-78) 
 
                                                 
127 Adams, The happiness of the church, 132-33. 
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As an ethical practice, stewardship is a challenge to dwell rather than pass by. If we take 
up the call to think for the sake of dwelling, then we must ask ourselves with whom we 






Rethinking life with the Age of Shakespeare 
 
 
[T]here is no such thing as a man who, solely of himself, is only man.  
 —Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” 
 
 
 I inaugurate my closing remarks by returning to the Heideggerian thread stitched 
across my argument. I do so initially by way of the American cultural critic, author, and 
poet Wendell Berry. At the millennial turn Berry observed that life had lost its meaning. 
For Berry this erosion of significance, one that is still with us well into the twenty-first 
century, is the effect of a decline in language: 
The problem, as it appears to me, is that we are using the wrong language. The 
language we use to speak of the world and its creatures, including ourselves, has 
gained a certain analytical power…but has lost much of its power to designate 
what is being analyzed or to convey any respect for care or affection or devotion 
toward it. As a result we have a lot of genuinely concerned people calling upon us 
to ‘save’ a world which their language simultaneously reduces to an assemblage 
of perfectly featureless and dispirited ‘ecosystems,’ ‘organisms,’ ‘environments,’ 
‘mechanisms,’ and the like. It is impossible to prefigure the salvation of the world 




Berry’s argument is reminiscent of Heidegger. One is reminded of the philosopher’s 
pronouncement in his “Letter on Humanism” that “[l]anguage is the house of Being” and, 
more expressly, that “[i]n its home man dwells.”2 Elsewhere in the same essay Heidegger 
describes language as “the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself.”3 As if invoking 
Heidegger’s fourfold, Berry insists that life is holy, it is a miracle, an admixture of 
human, non-human, and divine. “To think otherwise,” he writes, “is to enslave life, and to 
                                                 
1 Wendell Berry, Life is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern Superstition (Washington, D.C.: 
Counterpoint, 2000), 8, emphasis is in the original. 
2 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2008), 217. 
3 Ibid., 230. 
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make, not humanity, but a few humans its predictably inept masters.”4 Berry might as 
well have been writing of Western biopolitics. In the brief pages that remain I would like 
to rethink life through the language of Heidegger’s philosophy and Pauline messianism 




 My tarrying with the early modern period began with Heideggerian destruktion. 
This project’s argumentative target, like Heidegger’s, has been instrumental thinking. 
And like Heidegger I have sought recourse from this particular strain of materialist 
thinking in poiesis, the creative arts, particularly Shakespeare’s drama.  Heidegger closes 
his essay “The Question Concerning Technology” with an emphatic and indeed prophetic 
valuation of the creative arts as humanity’s life-reorienting and life-saving techne. 
Following his lexical genealogy poiesis is techne, especially in its express as poetry 
which Heidegger argues as being the fundamental technology of humankind. Conceived 
in this way, art becomes the salvific technology (techne) by which to rethink life, and by 
such estimation there is no higher art than poetry. Hence the philosopher’s well-known 
observation, “poetically man dwells.”5  
By Heidegger’s definition the poietic is a mode of revealing that brings truth to 
presencing. The truth it reveals is an understanding of life as a miracle of 
interconnectivity, to borrow Berry’s term, the associational pull of the fourfold as it links 
                                                 
4 Berry, Life is a Miracle, 9. 
5 Martin Heidegger, “Poetically Man Dwells,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 213-29. 
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human, non-human, and divine in existential co-relation. Poetry is dwelling together. To 
think poetically in this aspect is religious practice, poetry as religare. It is the re-ligature, 
the ob-ligature and obligation of the human condition that binds us to our neighbors and 
our shared environments through a common creaturely association with the divine. 
Heidegger turns religious in this sense during his last recorded interview when he 
concludes that 
Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present state of 
the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely human mediations 
and endeavours. Only a god can still save us. I think the only possibility of 




In a Hamlet-esque gesture the philosopher tells us “the readiness is all.” For Heidegger 
such readiness is prepared most readily in the poetry of Höderlin. For my project, and 
arguably the West more broadly, such readiness is prepared by attending to Shakespeare.
7
 
The poiesis of Shakespeare’s dramatic art, as I have attempted to show through my 
readings of Measure for Measure, The Winter’s Tale, and Timon of Athens, both scripts 
and stages life’s existential encounters with the full force of shared ethical relation. In a 
way Heidegger never fully theorized, drama is perhaps a more poietic form of poetry 
itself, due in no small part to its players. Drama is poetry in action, enlivened and 
embodied through performance. To follow Heidegger in an ontological turn, theater is 
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the modern West and its reciprocal ties to Shakespeare by arguing that “Shakespeare makes modern culture 
and modern culture makes Shakespeare.” See, Shakespeare and Modern Culture (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2009).  
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living poetry. As Hannah Arendt once remarked, it is also “the political art par 
excellence.”8 Not so much because of its political-theoretical quality, but because “it is 
the only art whose sole subject is man in his relationship to others.”9 I read Heidegger’s 
call to prepare readiness through poietic attendance similarly as an act of relational 
dwelling, a lived drama of sorts. It is also messianic in its gesture as a waiting for the 
presencing of the divine.  
Shakespeare is no less messianic. Yet rather than waiting on a future-oriented 
soteriology of divine presencing, as perhaps suggested by Heidegger, Shakespeare 
dramatizes messianic time as lived immanent action in the now, the inspirited care for 
others enacted today. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. To read the messianic in 
Shakespeare, Julia Reinhard Lupton writes, is to move “beyond historicism by taking 
literature as a mode of discourse that hosts urgencies that remain ethical and political, but 
not in a strictly contextual sense; and concern theology, but not in a strictly religious or 
confessional sense.”10 My engagements with Measure for Measure, The Winter’s Tale, 





                                                 
8 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 
1998), 188. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Hospitality and Historicism: The Winter’s Tale and the Affordances of 
Messianism” (Unpublished paper, University of California, Irvine, 2013), 5. I once more wish to thank the 






 Each chapter in its own way has positioned Shakespearean locales and characters 
as instances of messianic encounter in the sense of Giorgio Agamben’s ho nyn kairos. 
The theme of Pauline messianic time (ho nyn kairos) as it is expressed through 
Agamben’s philosophical filter has already been glossed in each of its individual 
occurrences, yet nonetheless prompts some description here. Romans 11:5, this concept’s 
referential verse in scripture, reads: “Even so then at this present time (ho nyn kairos) 
also there is a remnant according to the election of grace.”11 The context for this chapter 
of Paul’s epistle concerns community, specifically the incorporation or exclusion of Jews 
from Gentiles, or the sacred from the secular (to cast the net more widely), under the 
covenant of grace. Paul writes that the community of grace is open to all humanity (see 
vv.25-32). It is thus in The Time That Remains that Agamben intuits in the Greek ho nyn 
karios a Pauline emphasis for urgent and necessary action.
12
 Grace, as I have argued in 
chapters One and Two, is a mode of political encounter. Read theologically, it requires 
the lived action of neighbor love today. Read from a secular perspective, it is the political 
charter of the dividual subject, the ethical call to live in community for and with others 
now. In chapters Three and Four I have read the messianic in the other-servicing 
Shakespearean politics of feminine becoming and the early modern call for hospitality’s 
practice as stewardship in its urgent contemporary need, then and now.  
                                                 
11 KJV, emphasis is mine. 
12 See Chapter 1, n.22. 
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 It is necessary to return to Berry’s concern for language. Messianic was not a term 
familiar to early modern vocabulary. As a word foreign to Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries the messianic  
thus already pushes us beyond historicism towards philosophical, political-
theological, and phenomenological conversations that locate Shakespearean 
drama in a signifying order composed of both earlier and later frames of reference 
that do not bear directly, in the manner of a context, on his immediate 




These philosophical, political-theological, and phenomenological conversations continue 
to resonate through our present-day thinkings with “the Age of Shakespeare.” This 
dissertation has been an attempt to think life otherwise than biopower in these very modes 
of expression. In doing so it has been necessarily atemporal, both historicist in its archival 
approach and presentist in its desire to propose a way of thinking beyond biopolitical 
instrumentalism. And as I reflect on the textual possibilities that have been opened up for 
me through messianic readings of Marlowe, Shakespeare, and the like, I cannot help but 
wonder what alternate political possibilities (realities) these works will continue to 
unfold. Their challenge remains to live life ethically oriented toward others, to dwell in 
neighborly proximity. Would that we all might accept such a challenge today—each in 
our respective, and collective, time that remains.     
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